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SEC AND OTHER PERMANENT
INJUNCTIONS

-

STANDARDS

FOR THEIR IMPOSITION, MODIFICATION,
AND DISSOLUTION
Marc I. Steinbergt
The enforcement of federal statutes, particularly the securities laws,' often requires appropriate federal agencies or de2
partments to procure permanent injunctions against violators.

t Special Counsel, Securities and Exchange Commission (Office of the General Counsel); Adjunct Professor, Georgetown University Law Center. A.B., University of Michigan;
J.D., University of California, Los Angeles; LL.M., Yale University. Member, California
and District of Columbia Bars.
The author expresses his appreciation to Michael G. Roberts (B.A., Michigan State
University, J.D. Candidate, American University) for his helpful comments and research.
The Securities and Exchange Commission, as a matter of policy, disclaims responsibility for any private publication or statement by any of its employees. The views expressed
herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission
or of the author's colleagues on the staff of the Commission.
' See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 21(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(e) (1976)
(authorizes Commission to seek and federal district courts to grant injunctive relief upon
proper showing). The comparable sections of the other securities laws include: Securities
Act § 20(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b); Trust Indenture Act § 321(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77uuu(a) (1976)
(incorporates by reference § 20 of Securities Act); Public Utility Holding Company Act §
18(f), 15 U.S.C. § 79b(f) (1976); Investment Company Act § 42(e), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-41(e)
(1976); Investment Advisers Act § 209(e), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-9(e) (1976).
2 Indeed, the Securities and Exchange Commission's authority to seek injunctive relief
is its exclusive civil judicial remedy under the securities laws. See 15 U.S.C.-§ 78u(d)(e)
(1976). In recent years, the Commission has successfully obtained far-reaching orders of
ancillary or other equitable relief to accompany injunctions.
"Violator" is used as a term of art. In the majority of injunctive decrees issued under
the federal securities laws, the defendant, without admitting or denying the allegations
contained in the Commission's complaint, consents to the entry of judgment. See generally
Pitt & Markham, SEC Injunctive Actions, 6 REV. SEC. REG. 955 (1973).
This Article will discuss the modification or dissolution of permanent irijunctions. The
standards, policies, and effects of preliminary injunctions are somewhat different. See generally Chromalloy Am. Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 611 F.2d 240, 244 (8th Cir. 1979) (private party seeking preliminary injunction must show substantial likelihood of success on
merits and irreparable injury if injunctive relief not issued); Sonesta Int'l Hotels Corp. v.
Wellington Assocs., 483 F.2d 247, 250 (2d Cir. 1973) (preliminary injunction in private suit
should issue upon clear showing of either likely success on merits and possible irreparable
harm, or sufficiently serious questions pertaining to merits which are fair ground for litigation and balance of hardships weighing heavily toward party requesting preliminary relief);
SEC v. Toth, No. CA 79-4758 (D. La. Jan. 22, 1980) (SEC must establish strong prima
facie case and reasonable expectation that illegal conduct would continue in absence of
injunctive relief. Accord, SEC v. Big D. Oil & Gas Co., 434 F. Supp. 589 (N.D. Tex. 1977);
SEC v. Scott, Gorman Muns., Inc., 407 F. Supp. 1383 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). See also Camenisch
v. University of Tex., 616 F.2d 127, 130 (5th Cir. 1980); Aleknagik Natives Ltd. v. Andrus,
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Such injunctions, which are generally imposed as equitable measures to prevent future violations, 3 may cause inconvenience and
hardship to the subject parties.
To alleviate these consequences,
many of which are of a collateral nature, 5 6a violator may seek to
have the injunction dissolved or modified.
The standards a court should apply when considering
whether to grant relief from an injunction are of paramount
importance. Although an injunction may have the effect of stigmatizing the subject party, 7 the government has a countervailing
interest in deterring future violations by the threat of criminal
contempt.8 Far from being punitive, according to the government, the injunction merely requires that the law be obeyed.9
The central purpose of this Article is to examine the circumstances under which injunctions obtained by the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) and other government entities
should be susceptible to dissolution or modification. Although the
thrust of the Article is directed toward injunctions procured by
government entities, much of the discussion is pertinent to privately obtained injunctions as well. For background reasons and to
buttress the principal focus of the Article, standards for the imposition of SEC and other govenment permanent injunctions will
be discussed from a general perspective. Thereafter, the Article
will focus on dissolution and modification issues.
I
GOVERNMENT

INJUNCTIONS-AN

OVERVIEW

Government injunctions, like those procured by private parties, are designed to afford preventative relief only, and not to
Fed. R. Serv. 2d 796 (9th Cir. April 17, 1980); Anaheim v. Kleppe, 590 F.2d 285, 288 n.4 (9th
Cir. 1978); Canal Auth. v. Callaway, 489 F.2d 567, 572-73 (5th Cir.1974).
' See, e.g., Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944); United States v. Pent-RBooks, Inc., 538 F.2d 519, 523 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 906 (1977); Seeler v.
Trading Port, Inc., 517 F.2d 33, 39-40 (2d Cir. 1975).
4 See, e.g., SEC v. Advance Growth Capital Corp., 539 F.2d 649, 652 (7th Cir. 1976);
SEC v. Jan-Dal Oil & Gas, Inc., 433 F.2d 304, 305 (10th Cir. 1970); Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. American Oil Co., 405 F.2d 803, 812-14 (8th Cir. 1969).
' See SEC v. Warren, 76 F.R.D. 405, 410-11 (W.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd, 583 F.2d 115, 118,
121-22 (3d Cir. 1978).
6 See, e.g., Pasadena Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 437-40 (1976); System
Fed'n v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 646-51 (1961); United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106,
114-19 (1932).

See note 4 supra.
See, e.g., Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147 (1969); Williams v. United States, 402
F.2d 47 (10th Cir. 1967); United States v. Custer Channel Wing Corp., 376 F.2d 675 (4th
Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 850 (1967); SEC v. Greenspan, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP.

I

(CCH)

97,332 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).

1 See SEC v. Thermodynamics, Inc. 464 F.2d 457, 461 (10th Cir. 1972).
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redress past injuries."0 Under traditional notions of equity, an
injunction could issue only upon a showing that the complainant
would suffer irreparable injury absent such relief,'1 that he was
without an adequate remedy at law, 2 and that injunctive relief
13
was necessary to prevent future violations actually threatened.
Courts continue to apply these historical equitable concepts today.
In Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp.,1 4 the Supreme Court held that
an aggrieved party must show irreparable harm as an indispensible prerequisite to the granting of permanent injunctive relief
based on Section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act. 15 In so
ruling, the Court upheld the trial court's exercise of sound judicial discretion to deny the requested relief,'" implicitly adhering to
a prior Supreme Court decision that held that "[a]n appeal to the
equity jurisdiction conferred on federal district courts is an appeal
to the sound discretion which guides the determinations of courts
of equity." 17
Irrespective of these principles, it is clear that govenment injunctive actions authorized by statute18 are not subject to such
prerequisites as a showing of irreparable injury or the absence of
an adequate remedy at law. 9 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court
has made it patently clear that such actions are governed by the
historic injunctive process, which is "designed to deter, not to

"o

See, e.g., Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329-30 (1944).

n See I J. HIGH, TREATISE ON THE LAW

OF INJUNCTIONS

36 (4th ed. 1905): "An injunc-

tion, being the 'strong arm of equity,' should never be granted except in a clear case of
irreparable injury .... "
12 See, e.g., Stewart Dry Goods Co. v. Lewis, 287 U.S. 9, 11 (1932) (existence of remedy
at law does not preclude injunctive relief unless such remedy is certain, reasonably prompt
and efficacious.").
" See J. HIGH, supra note 11, at 38; W. KERR, A TREATISE ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE
OF INJUNCTION IN EQUITY 10-11 (1871). See generally R. EDEN, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
INJUNCTIONS 2 (1822); F. MAITLAND, EQUITY AND THE FORMS OF ACTION 22 (1913).
14 422 U.S. 49 (1975).

15 Id. at 61. In brief, § 13(d) of the Exchange Act, as amended by the Williams Act,
requires that any person who becomes the beneficial owner of more than five percent of
an equity security of a class covered by the section shall make timely disclosure of certain
information. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1976).
16 422 U.S. at 61-62, quoting Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. at 329. See Stromfeld v.
Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., Inc., 484 F. Supp. 1264, 1273 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
17 Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 235 (1943), quoted in Hecht Co. v. Bowles,
321 U.S. at 329.
I' See note 1 supra.
19 See, e.g., Aaron v. SEC, 100 S. Ct. 1945, 1957-58 (1980); Walling v. Clinchfield Coal
Corp., 159 F.2d 395, 399 (4th Cir. 1946); Jaeger & Yadley, Equitable Uncertainties in SEC
Injunctive Actions, 24 EMORY L. REV. 639, 642 n.9 (1975).
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punish." 20 To ensure that this process is not abused, the critical
determinant, as noted by the Court, "is that there exists some
cognizable danger of recurrent violation .... 12 1 That the defendant has abandoned his unlawful activities, when cessation stems
from anticipating the filing of a lawsuit, however, is insufficient to
deny the govenment the relief it seeks.2 2 The proper yardstick in
these cases is that the public interest, rather than the interests of
the private litigant, is paramount in determining the propriety and
23
need for injunctive relief.
These equitable principles, with the above caveats, apply to
government injunctive actions authorized by statute. In Hecht Co.
v. Bowles, 24 the Supreme Court considered whether the language
of section 205(a) of the Emergency Price Control Act mandated
or merely permitted an injunction to issue once the Administrator
made a showing that the defendant violated or was about to violate the Act or the regulations promulgated thereunder. 2 5 The
nature of the Hecht Company's conduct highlighted the need for
the application of equitable principles: the company offered itself
as a laboratory in which the Administrator could experiment with
any regulation that might be prescribed, expended significant efforts to comply with the Act, and implemented measures to correct violations once they were discovered. The district court therefore concluded that the Hecht Company's noncompliance had
been involuntary and that an injunction would serve no useful
purpose.2 6 Although not addressing whether the trial judge
abused his discretion, the Court adhered to the traditions of
equity as a flexible instrument to adjust and reconcile fairly between the public and private litigant's needs as well as between the

20 Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944).
21 United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953). Under the federal se-

curities laws, the W.T. Grant standard is rephrased so that courts inquire whether there is a
reasonable likelihood of future violations by the defendant. This subject is discussed in
greater depth at notes 32-38 and accompanying text infra. See also Aaron v. SEC, 100 S. Ct.
1945, 1958 (1980) ("the Commission must establish a sufficient evidentiary predicate to show
that such future violation may occur.").
22 See United States v. Parke, Davis & Co. 362 U.S. 29, 48 (1960); Hecht v. Bowles, 321
U.S. 321, 327 (1944); Marshall v. Lane Processing, Inc., 606 F.2d 518, 519 (8th Cir. 1979).
23 321 U.S. at 331. Courts have applied this principle with regularity in cases brought
by the SEC seeking injunctive relief. See notes 60-67 and accompanying text infra.
24 321 U.S. 321 (1944).
25 The statute provided that upon a proper showing, an injunction, restraining order,
or other order shall be granted. Pub. L. No. 77-421, 56 Stat. 23 (repealed 1956).
26 321 U.S. at 324-26.
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claims of competing private parties.27 Applying these equitable
concepts in conjunction with the language and legislative history
of section 205(a), the Court concluded that the issuance of an injunction under the statute was not mandatory. Rather, such relief
should be ordered only in comport with the traditions of equity
practice.2
The Hecht decision may stand for the proposition that the
nature of the defendant's conduct, even though he cannot assure
that his violative actions will cease, may nevertheless indicate that
the issuance of an injunction would serve no useful public in27 Id. at 329-32. See Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288 (1960);
Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395 (1946). Porter was a proceeding to enjoin the
charging of excessive rents and also seeking to obtain restitution of illegally collected rents
under § 205(a) of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942. The Court stated:
Thus the Administrator invoked the jurisdiction of the District Court to
enjoin acts and practices made illegal by the Act and to enforce compliance
with the Act. Such a jurisdiction is an equitable one. Unless otherwise provided
by statute, all the inherent equitable powers of the District Court are available
for the proper and complete exercise of that jurisdiction. And since the public
interest is involved in a proceeding of this nature, those equitable powers assume an even broader and more flexible character than when only a private
controversy is at stake.... [T]he court may go beyond the matters immediately
underlying its equitable jurisdiction .... and give whatever other relief may be
necessary under the circumstances ....
Moreover, the comprehensiveness of this equitable jurisdiction is not to be
denied or limited in the absence of a clear and valid legislative command. Unless a statute in so many words, or by a necessary and inescapable inference,
restricts the court's jurisdiction in equity, the full scope of that jurisdiction is to
be recognized and applied. "The great principles of equity, securing complete
justice, should not be yielded to light inferences, or doubtful constructions."
328 U.S. at 397-98 (quoting Brown v. Swann, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 497, 503 (1836)). See United
States v. Moore, 340 U.S. 616, 619 (1951).
Mitchell was an action by the Secretary of Labor under §§ 15 and 17 of the Fair Labor
Standards Act. In ordering an injunction, the district court declined to grant reimbursement of lost wages. The court of appeals held that the district court lacked jurisdiction to
order such relief. Refusing to distinguish Porter either because that case dealt with a wartime statute or because the statute, by its terms, contained the phrase "or other order," the
Mitchell Court enunciated the following broad principle:
When Congress entrusts to an equity court the enforcement of prohibitions
contained in a regulatory enactment, it must be taken to have acted cognizant
of the historic power of equity to provide complete relief in light of the statutory purposes. As this Court long ago recognized, "there is inherent in the
Courts of Equity a jurisdiction to ... give effect to the policy of the legislature."
361 U.S. at 291-92, quoting Clark v. Smith, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 195, 203 (1839).
28 321 U.S. at 328-31. The Hecht decision and the principles it adopted have been
relied upon by the Supreme Court and a number of lower federal courts. See, e.g., Aaron
v. SEC, 100 S. Ct. 1945, 1958 (1980); Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 60-61
(1975); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192, 200-01 (1973); Mid-West Paper Prods. Co. v.
Continental Group, Inc. 596 F.2d 573, 594 (3d Cir. 1979); United States v. Pent-R-Books,
538 F.2d 519, 523 (2d Cir. 1976).
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terest. Under such circumstances, an injunction's imposition and
resultant hardships on the subject party appear inequitable. In assessing the need for a government sought injunction, however,
Hecht also makes clear that although courts should recognize that
traditional equitable principles apply, the necessities of the public
interest are paramount.2 9 Subsequent Supreme Court and lower
court decisions have reaffirmed the equitable principles enun30
ciated in Hecht.
II
SEC

INJUNCTIONS

As in any other type of case where permanent injunctive relief is sought, a defendant's violation of the federal securities laws
3
is not by itself sufficient for the SEC to obtain an injunction. '

29

"For the standards of the public interest, not the requirements of private litigation,

measure the propriety and need for injucntive relief in these cases." 321 U.S. at 331. Thus,
while traditional equitable principles should apply to government injunctive actions authorized by statute, these principles are "conditioned by the necessities of the public interest which Congress has sought to protect." Id. at 330.
30 See, e.g., Aaron v. SEC, 100 S. Ct. 1945, 1958 (1980); United States v. Parke, Davis &
Co., 362 U.S. 29, 48 (1960); Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 291-92
(1960); United States v. W.T. Grant, 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953); Porter v. Warner Holding
Co., 328 U.S. 395, 397-98 (1946); SEC v. Blazon Corp., 609 F.2d 960, 967 (9th Cir. 1979);
SEC v. Geon Indus., Inc. 531 F.2d 39, 56 (2d Cir. 1976); SEC v. Advance Growth Capital
Corp., 470 F.2d 40, 54-55 (7th Cir. 1972).
31 See, e.g., SEC v. Koracorp Indus. Inc., 575 F.2d 692, 701 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 953 (1978); SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 565 F.2d 8, 18 (2d Cir. 1977); SEC v.
Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d. 801, 807 (2d Cir. 1975). As the Ninth Circuit recently stated, "even after a showing of a past violation of the securities laws, no per se rule
requires that an injunction issue." SEC v. Arthur Young & Co., 590 F.2d 785, 787 (9th Cir.
1979).
Injunctive relief is the SEC's sole remedy under the express provisions of the securities laws: "It should be emphasized that while the SEC investigates potential violations of
the securities laws, the only remedy it can bring on its own is an injunctive action." SENATE
COMM.

ON BANKING,

HOUSING,

AND URBAN AFFAIRS, FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES AND

DO MESTIC AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT IMPROVED ACTS OF 1977, S. REP. No. 114, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. 11 (1977). See Gruenbaum & Steinberg, Section 29(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934: A Viable Remedy Awakened, 48 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 52-53 (1979).
In recent years, the SEC has sought, and successfully obtained, ancillary or other
equitable relief against an enjoined party. Examples of such relief include disgorgement,
appointment of a receiver, appointment of independent members of the board of directors, and appointment of a special counsel. See, e.g., SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc.,
458 F.2d 1082 (2d Cir. 1972) (disgorgement); SEC v. Fifth Ave. Coach Lines, Inc. 289 F.
Supp. 3 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd, 435 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1971) (receiver); SEC v. Coastal States
Gas Corp., SEC Lit. Rel. No. 6054 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 12, 1973) (independent members of
board of directors). See generally Farrand, Ancillary Remedies in SEC Civil Enforcement Suits,
89 HARV. L. REV. 1779 (1976); Mathews, Liability of Lawyers Under the FederalSecurities Laws,
30 Bus. LAW. 105 (1975). As recently stated by the Ninth Circuit:
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33

Rather, the test applied in practically all federal courts is whether
there is a reasonable likelihood that the defendant, if not enjoined, will again engage in the violative conduct.3

2

In identify-

ing the relevant factors that demonstrate "a reasonable likelihood
of future violations," 33 the Second Circuit has pointed to "the deThe federal courts have inherent equitable authority to issue a variety of
"ancillary relief" measures in actions brought by the SEC to enforce the federal
securities laws. This circuit has repeatedly approved imposition of a receivership in appropriate circumstances. The power of a district court to impose a
receivership or grant other forms of ancillary relief does not in the first instance depend on a statutory grant of power from the securities laws. Rather,
the authority derives from inherent power of a court of equity to fashion effective relief.
SEC v. Wencke, 622 F.2d 1363, 1369 (9th Cir. 1980) (footnotes omitted).
If a court refuses to grant injunctive relief, it may nevertheless grant other equitable
relief. See, e.g, SEC V. Commonwealth Chem. Sec., Inc. 574 F.2d 90, 102-03 (2d Cir. 1978);
Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 390-91 (2d Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973). As stated by the Second Circuit in Chris-Craft:
The SEC has no express statutory authority to seek rescission, restitution, or
other forms of equitable monetary relief. The Commission, however, may institute an action for injunctive relief and, once the equity jurisdiction of the district court has been properly invoked, the court has power to grant all equitable
relief necessary under the circumstances.
Id. at 390. See generally Hazen, Administrative Enforcement: An Evaluation of the Securities and
Exchange Commissions's Use of Injunctions and' Other Enforcement Methods, 31 HASTINGs L.J.
427, 444-51 (1979).
32 See, e.g., SEC v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., [Current] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
97,505, at 97,64344 (D.C. Cir. May 29, 1980); SEC v. Mize, 615 F.2d 1046, 1051 (5th Cir.
1980); SEC v. Bonastia, 614 F.2d 908, 912 (3d Cir. 1980); SEC v. Monarch Fund, 608 F.2d
938, 943 (2d Cir. 1979) ("whether the defendant's past conduct indicates ... that there is a
reasonable likelihood of further violation in the future," quoting SEC v. Commonwealth
Chem. Sec., Inc., 574 F.2d 90, 99 (2d Cir. 1978)); SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325, 1334 (5th
Cir. 1978); SEC v. Koracorp Indus., Inc., 575 F.2d 692, 699 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
953 (1978). See note 58 infra.
In SEC v. Bangor Punta Corp. 331 F. Supp. 1154, 1163 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), the district
court's inquiry for whether an injunction should issue was whether the defendants were
shown to have "a propensity or natural inclination to violate the securities law." This standard was specifically disapproved by the Second Circuit in SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers,
Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1101 (2d Cir. 1972) ("we adhere to our well established rule and hold
that the SEC has demonstrated the necessity for injunctive relief since there is a reasonable
likelihood of future violations on the part of appellants.").
33 SEC v. Advance Growth Capital Corp., 470 F.2d 40, 53 (7th Cir. 1972), quoting SEC
v. Keller Corp., 323 F.2d 397, 402 (7th Cir. 1963).
An issue that has recently surfaced in many recent SEC administrative actions is
whether courts should apply the "clear and convincing" standard of proof or the "preponderance of evidence" standard. In Collins Sec. Corp. v. SEC, 562 F.2d 810, 824-27 (D.C.
Cir. 1977), the court applied the clear and convincing standard in a broker-dealer case
where the possible sanction was deprivation of defendant's livelihood. On the other hand,
courts have used the preponderance of evidence standard in cases where relief would not
result in deprivation of livelihood. SEC v. Savoy Indus., 587 F.2d 1149, 1168-69 (D.C. Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 913 (1979). See generally Gruenbaum & Steinberg, Accountants'
Liability and Responsibility: Securities, Criminal and Common Law, 13 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 247
(1980).
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gree of scienter involved, the sincerity of defendant's assurances
against future violations, the isolated or recurrent nature of the
infraction, defendant's recognition of the wrongful nature of his
conduct, and the likelihood, because of defendant's professional
occupation, that future violations might occur." 31 Other courts
have also deemed relevant the gravity of the offense committed,3"
36
the time elapsed between the violation and the court's decision,
whether the defendant, in good faith, relied on advice of counsel, 3 7 and the adverse effect an injunction would have on the de38
fendant.
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Aaron v. Securities
and Exchange Commission 39 casts light on this issue. There, the
Court held that the SEC must prove scienter in civil enforcement
actions to enjoin violations of section 10(b) of the Securities Ex-

The Fifth Circuit refused to follow Collins in Steadman v. SEC, 603 F.2d 1126 (5th
Cir. 1979). There, the court allowed the SEC to apply the preponderance of evidence
standard in a proceeding where the sanction was permanent disbarment. Id. at 1137-41.
Presumably to reconcile this conflict in the circuits, the Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Steadman. See 100 S. Ct. 1849 (1980). See also Decker v. SEC, [Current] FED. SEC.
L. REP.
97,614 (10th Cir. Aug. 18, 1980); Whitney v. SEC, 604 F.2d 676, 681 (D.C. Cir.
1979); Gruenbaum & Steinberg, supra, at 284-85; Mathews, Litigation and Settlement of SEC
Administrative Enforcement Proceedings, 29 CATH. U.L. REv. 215, 232-38 (1980).
3' SEC v. Universal Major Indus. Corp., 546 F.2d 1044, 1048 (2d Cir. 1976); see SEC v.
Spence & Green Chem. Co., 612 F.2d 896, 903 (8th Cir. 1980); SEC v. Bonastia, 614 F.2d
908 (3rd Cir. 1980); SEC v. Commonwealth Chem. Sec., Inc., 574 F.2d 90, 100 (2d Cir.
1978); SEC v. Paro, 468 F. Supp. 635, 649 (N.D.N.Y. 1979).
'5 "These were not mere 'technical' violations of regulatory legislation, but continual
and extensive violations of provisions which lie at the very heart of a remedial statute."
SEC v. Advance Growth Capital Corp., 470 F.2d 40, 53-54 (7th Cir. 1972). See SEC v.
Manor Nursing Centers, Inc. 458 F.2d 1082, 1102 (2d Cir. 1972) ("in view of the 'blatant'
nature of the violations found by the district court to have been committed by [the defendants'] and in view of their professional occupations which place them in positions where
they could misappropriate public investor funds in other offerings, the district court's decision to enjoin them from further violations was not an unreasonable one."). See generally,
Harkleroad, Requirementsfor Injunctive Actions Under the Federal Securities Laws, 2 J. Conp'.
LAw 481 (1977).
6 'See, e.g., SEC v. Monarch Fund, 608 F.2d 938, 943 (2d Cir. 1979) (judgment entered
in district court more than seven years after alleged violations); SEC v. National Student
Marketing Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682, 716 (D.D.C. 1978) ("in the six years since the filing of
the action, [the Commission] ha[d] made no attempt to obtain interlocutory injunctive relief against the defendants. Such inaction argues strongly against the need for injunctive
relief.").
" See, e.g., SEC v. Lum's, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1046, 1066 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) ("acting on
the advice of counsel is a factor to consider in granting or withholding an injunction").
38 See, e.g., SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1102 (2d Cir. 1972)
("the adverse effect of an injunction upon defendants is a factor to be considered by the
district court in exercising its discretion").
39 100 S. Ct. 1945 (1980).

1980]

SEC AND OTHER INJUNCTIONS

change Act, 40 Rule lOb-5 promulgated thereunder, 41 and section
17(a)(1) of the Securities Act, 42 but need not prove scienter under
section 17(a)(2) or 17(a)(3). 4' The Court noted that under section
17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3), "the degree of intentional wrongdoing evident in a defendant's past conduct" is an important factor in determining whether the Commission has "establish[ed] a sufficient
evidentiary predicate to show that such future violation may occur." 4 4 The presence or lack of scienter is "one of the aggravating or mitigating factors to be taken into account" in a court's
exercise of its equitable jurisdiction.4 5 In a concurring opinion,
Chief Justice Burger deviated from the majority's rationale, asserting that the SEC "will almost always" be required to show that the

40 Id. at 1952-55. Section 10(b) provides:

It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means of instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange.
(b) To use or emply, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered,
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976).
' 100 S. Ct. at 1952-55. Rule lOb-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1980).
42 100 S. Ct. at 1955. Section 17(a) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities by the
use of any means or instruments of transportation or communications in interstate commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a
material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976).
"1 100 S. Ct. at 1955-57.
44 Id. at 1958.
45 Id.
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defendant's past conduct was more culpable than negligence. 46
The Chief Justice concluded that "[a]n injunction is a drastic remedy, not a mild prophylactic, and should not be obtained against
one acting in good faith." 47
Some commentators contend that the Aaron Court's language, even apart from the Chief Justice's concurring opinion,
could require the SEC to prove scienter in order to make a
"proper showing" for procuring injunctive relief under any section
of the securities acts. 48 This may overstate Aaron's implications. It
is arguable that the majority merely stated that the presence of
scienter is an important factor for a court to weigh in determining
whether to grant the Commission's request for injunctive relief. 49
The absence of scienter may not preclude the granting of such
relief where the applicable statutory provision requires only negligent culpability. Indeed, where a defendant has committed prior
violations, where his carelessness is egregious, where public investors have been severely injured, or where the defendant's occupation increases the probability of future violations, a court considering the totality of the circumstances may order injunctive relief. "
Although the above factors are important in determining
whether an injunction should issue, the primary purpose of injunctive relief under the federal. securities laws is to deter future
violative conduct, not to punish the violator.5 1 As Judge Friendly
46 Id. at 1959 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
47 Id.
48
See Huffman, Aaron Restricts SEC Enforcement, Legal Times, June 9, 1980, at 2; Marcus, SEC Sees Nothing Fatal in Curb on Frauds Writs, Nat'l L.J., June 16, 1980, at 3. See also
-Brodsky, Wilfullness in SEC Injunction Actions, N.Y.L.J., June 18, 1980, at 1; Pitt, SEC's
Ability to Administer Flexibly Hurt by Aaron, Legal Times, June 16, 1980, at 12.
4 See 100 S. Ct. at 1958.
5o See SEC v. Murphy, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)

97,588 (9th Cir. July 23,

1980); note 66 and accompanying text infra. Although concluding that the defendant "had
at the least, acted recklessly in violating the registration provisions," id. at 97,587, the Ninth
Circuits's language supports the proposition that negligent conduct may be actionable:
In the present proceeding, the totality of the circumstances strongly
suggests the need for an injunction. Murphy stated that he took all precautions
he thought reasonable to keep from violating the registration requirements.
Nevertheless, the court found that he did violate them. The fact that he violated the requirements once when he did not intend to do so is sufficient to
justify the conclusion that he might do so again, even if the court believed he
was sincere in his protestations to the contrary. Moreover, his continued insistence that he has done nothing wrong indicates that he may commit similar
errors in the future, particularly since he has not expressed an' intention to
cease dealing in limited partnerships.
Id. at 98,128 (footnote omitted).
51 Thus, the equitable principles of Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321 (1944), have
been universally applied in SEC injunctive actions. See, e.g., Aaron v. SEC, 100 S. Ct. 1945,
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has noted, an injunction can have severe collateral consequences.. 2 For example, an injunction can serve as the basis for
suspending or revoking a broker-dealer's registration, or constitute grounds for prohibiting any person from associating with a
broker-dealer. 3 Similarly, an injunction disqualifies the subject
party from serving as a director, officer, or employee of a registered investment company.
It can constitute a basis for barring
an attorney, accountant, or other professional from practicing before the SEC.5 5 Additionally, a Regulation A exemption may be

1958 (1980); SEC v. Blazon Corp., 609 F.2d960, 967 (9th Cir. 1979); SEC v. Geon Indus.,
Inc., 531 F.2d 39, 56 (2d Cir. 1976); SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082,
1102 (2d Cir. 1972); SEC v. Advance Growth Capital Corp., 470 F.2d 40, 54-55 (7th Cir.
1972).
52 SEC v. Commonwealth Chem. Sec., Inc., 574 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1978):
It is fair to say that the current judicial attitude toward the issuance of
injunctions on the basis of past violations at the SEC's request has become more
circumspect than in earlier days. Experience has shown that an injunction,
while not always a "drastic remedy"... often is much more than [a] "mild
prophylactic"....
Id. at 99 (citations omitted). See Aaron v. SEC, 100 S. Ct. 1945, 1954 (1980) (Burger, C.J.,
concurring); SEC v. Dimensional Entertainment Corp., [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
97,578, at 98,054 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 1980) (SEC must "establish that the likelihood of
further violations is a real probability and not a distant prophecy.").
'3 Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, § 15(b)(4)(C), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)(C). See
SEC v. Geon Indus., Inc., 531 F.2d 39, 55 (2d Cir. 1976).
" Investment Company Act § 9(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-9(a)(2). The SEC can lift or
waive this disqualification. Investment Company Act § 9(c), 15 U.S.C § 80a-9(c). See SEC v.
Sun Co., Inc., [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,280 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 1980) (pursuant to a settlement, SEC granted a temporary exemption from disqualification).
" SEC Rule 2(e)(3)(i), 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e)(3)(i) (1979). Rule 2(e)(1) provides that the
SEC may deny the privilege of practicing before it to any person who is adjudged by the
Commission after notice and hearing:
(i) not to possess the requisite qualifications to represent others; or
(ii) to be lacking in character or integrity or to have engaged in unethical or
improper professional conduct; or
(iii) to have willfully violated or willfully aided and abetted the violation of any
provision of the federal securities laws ... or the rules and regulations thereunder.
17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e)(1) (1980). Recently, the Commission has been criticized by some commentators and lawyers of converting, without legislative authorization, the rule from one
exercising disciplinary authority over the incompetent, dishonest or unethical practitioner
into one utilized to regulate the professions that practice before the Commission. The Second Circuit recently rejected this line of reasoning:
To summarize: we reject appellants' assertion that the Commission acted
without authority in promulgating Rule 2(e). Although there is no express
statutory provision authorizing the Commission to discipline professionals appearing before it, Rule 2(e), promulgated pursuant to its statutory rulemaking
authority, represents an attempt by the Commission to protect the integrity of
its own processes. It provides the Commission with the means to ensure that
those professionals, on whom the Commission relies heavily in the performance
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unavailable to an enjoined issuer of securities. 56 Finally, the
Commission frequently requires that an injunction be disclosed in
certain filings, reports, statements, or other information sent to
shareholders and investors. 5 7 Largely because of these consequences, the courts have required the SEC "to go beyond the mere
of its statutory duties, perform their tasks diligently and with a reasonable degree of competence.
Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC, 609 F.2d 570, 582 (2d Cir. 1979). Compare Downing & Miller,
The Distortion and Misuse of Rule 2(e), 54 NOTRE DAME LAw. 774 (1979), with Gruenbaum,
Clients' Frauds and Their Lawyers' Obligations, 68 GEo. L.J. 191 (1979).
-6 Rule 252(c)(4) of Regulation A, 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e)(3)(i) (1969). The Commission
has proposed for comment amendments to Rules 242 and 252 under § 3(b) of the securities Act. SEC Rel. No. 33-6214 (June 19, 1980), 20 SEC DocKTr 390 (July 1, 1980). The
proposed amendments provide that such disqualifications, which now last indefinitely,
would terminate automatically after five years. The Commissiion stated:
Rule 252 provides that a Regulation A exemption from registration for small
public offerings of an issuer's securities shall not be available if the issuer or
any person in a specified relationship with the issuer is subject to one of the
disqualifications described in the rule [e.g., "a permanent injunction proscribing
any conduct or practice involving the purchase or sale of any security or arising
out of conduct as an underwriter, broker, dealer, or investment advisor."]. The
Commission solicits comments on amendments to the rule which would make
disqualifications which now last indefinitely terminate automatically after five
years.
20 SEC DOCKET at 390.
11 See SEC Rel. Nos. 33-5949, 34-15006, 35-20643, IC-10342 (Sept. 30, 1978), 15 SEC
DOCKET 428 (August 15, 1978), in which the Commission adopted final rules amending
certain disclosure forms and regulations to standardize and improve requirements relating
to, inter alia, disclosure of legal proceedings involving directors and executive officers of in
issuer. The Commission described the disclosure rules:
In Release No. 5758 the Commission ...proposed substantive amendments to
provide additional information about litigation in which officers and directors
had been involved....
The substantive proposals would require information about injunctions prohibiting directors and officers from engaging in any type of business including:
(i) injunctions prohibiting specified persons from engaging in any type of business practice; (ii) injunctions prohibiting specified persons from future violations of federal or state securities laws; and (iii) civil actions in which specified
persons were found to have violated any federal or state securities laws. The
Commission also proposed amendments to require disclosure of not only court
order, judgment or decree enjoining such persons from acting in certain
capacities (e.g., as an investment advisor, or as an underwriter) but also to require disclosure of any such order, judgement, or decree restricting such activities.
15 SEC DOCKET at 433. In addition, registered broker-dealers and investment advisers
must disclose injunctions against them in certain materials filed with the Commission and
self-regulatory organizations. See Mathews, SEC Civil Injunctive Actions, 5 REV. SEC. REQ.
969, 971 (1972).
These are merely some of the collateral consequences flowing from an injunction. See
Comment, Injunctive Relief in SEC Civil Actions: The Scope of Judicial Discretion, 10 COLUM.
J.L.Soc. PROB. 328, 340-42 (1974); Note, The Scienter Requirement in SEC Injunctive Enforcement of Section 10(b) after Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 419, 442-43 (1977).
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facts of past violations and demonstrate a realistic likelihood of
recurrence." 58 Employing this standard, courts have concluded
in a number of recent cases that the SEC has not made a sufficient showing and have denied the Commission's request for in59
junctive relief.
Notwithstanding the adverse effects an injunction may have
on a defendant, a critical inquiry is whether the SEC's request for
such relief serves the public interest. The Second Circuit and
other courts have recognized that "the public interest, when in
conflict with [the] private interest, is paramount." 60 To ensure
that the interests of the public are adequately protected, the
courts should not impose an undue burden on the Commission to
show a reasonable likelihood of recurrent violations. Courts
should scrutinize a defendant's assertion that he has abandoned
his unlawful conduct,6 I has changed professions, 62 or had acted
unwittingly. 3 Moreover, once the Commission shows that the
defendant intentionally or recklessly violated the securities laws,
an inference should arise that there is a cognizable danger of fu-

58 SEC v. Commonwealth Chem. Sec., Inc., 574 F.2d 90, 100 (2d Cir. 1978). Indeed,
some courts have used even stronger language. In an earlier case, the Second Circuit stated
that "the Commission cannot obtain relief without positive proof of a reasonable likelihood
that past wrongdoing will recur." SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 565 F.2d 8, 18 (2nd Cir.
1977). And, in SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325, 1334 (5th Cir. 1978), the Fifth Circuit stated
that the SEC must "go beyond the mere fact of past violations" and "offer positive proof of
the likelihood that the wrongdoing will recur." But see note 32 supra.
"' See, e.g., SEC v. Caterinicchia, 613 F.2d 102 (5th Cir. 1980); SEC v. Monarch
Fund, 608 F.2d 938 (2d Cir. 1979); SEC v. Dimensional Entertainment Corp., [Current]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
97,578, at 98,054-55 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 1980); SEC v. Miller,
[Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,551, at 97,890-91 (S.D.N.Y. June 27, 1980); note
41 supra.
"' SEC v. Culpepper, 270 F.2d 241, 250 (2d Cir. 1959); see SEC v. Advance Growth
Capital Corp., 470 F.2d 40, 53 (7th Cir. 1972); SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458
F.2d 1082, 1102 (2d Cir. 1972). See also Steadman v. SEC, 603 F.2d 1126, 1139 (5th Cir.
1979), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 1849 (1980).
"' See SEC v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,505, at
97,643 (D.C. Cir. May 29, 1980).
62 See SEC v. Bonastia, 614 F.2d 908, 913 (3rd Cir. 1980):
By determining that Madden's change in occupation, in and of itself, precluded
the necessity for an injunction, the district court failed to evaluate the other
factors that are essential to a proper determination. Changed circumstances of
the violator are relevant in determining whether an injunction shall issue, but a
change in occupation, without more, will not provide a complete defense to an
injunction suit.
63 See, e.g., Allan v. SEC, 577 F.2d 388, 391 (7th Cir. 1978); SEC v. Commonwealth
Chem. Sec., Inc., 574 F.2d 90, 90-100 (2d Cir. 1978); SEC v. Universal Major Indus. Corp.,
546 F.2d 1044, 1048 (2d Cir. 1976); SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801,
807 (2d Cir. 1975).
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ture repetition. 64 Similarly, even if the defendant's conduct is
negligent, such as under section 17(a) (2) or 17(a) (3) of the Securities Act, 65 an inference arguably should arise when, for example, the violations are of a recurrent nature or the defendant's
professional occupation suggests the likelihood of future violations.16 Of course, the defendant should have the opportunity to
rebut this inference by pointing to such factors as remedial steps
taken to correct the deficiency, the isolated or technical nature of
the violation, good faith reliance on legal counsel, or acknowledgment of wrongdoing coupled with assurances against future
67
violations.
When a court issues a permanent injunction, the defendant is
forever prohibited from engaging in the proscribed activities. A
knowing violation of the court's decree can result in a conviction

64 "It is well established that the commission of past fraudulent conduct gives rise to an
inference that continued violations may be expected in the future." SEC v. Aaron, 605
F.2d 612, 624 (2nd Cir. 1979), vacated, 100 S. Ct. 1945 (1980). "Improper past conduct ...
'gives rise to the inference that there [is] a reasonable likelihood of future violations.' " SEC
v. Advance Growth Capital Corp., 470 F.2d 40, 53 (7th Cir. 1972) (quoting SEC v. Keller
Corp., 323 F.2d 397, 402 (7th Cir. 1963)). See SEC v. Koracorp Indus., Inc. 572 F.2d 692,
698 (9th Cir. 1978); SEC v. Cohn, 216 F. Supp. 636, 639 (D.N.J. 1963).
6- See notes 45-50 and accompanying text supra.
66 "Respectable authority justifies injunctive relief even though infractions are inadvertent and harmless, if they are likely to recur." SEC v. Advance Growth Capital Corp., 470
F.2d 40, 53 (7th Cir. 1972). See also SEC v. Bonastia, 614 F.2d 908, 912 (3d Cir. 1980);
SEC v. Coven, 581 F.2d 1020, 1026 (2nd Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 1432 (1979); SEC
v. American Realty Trust, 586 F.2d 1001, 1005-06 (4th Cir. 1978); SEC v. Pearson, 426
F.2d 1339, 1343 (10th Cir. 1970); SEC v. Kalvex, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
The court in Kalvex noted:
[W]hile the commission of past illegal conduct on the part of [the defendant] is
highly suggestive of the likelihood of future violations ... . the inference that he
is likely to repeat the wrong in the future depends upon the totality of the
circumstances ... and factors suggesting that the infraction might not have
been an isolated occurrence are always relevant.
Id. at 316. See note 50 supra.
A question left open by Aaron is whether recklessness constitutes scienter. The courts
generally have held that reckless conduct is actionable under § 10(b). See,g., Healey v.
Catalyst Recovery of Pa., Inc., 616 F.2d 641, 649 (3d Cir. 1980); Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball
& Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1023-25 (7th Cir. 1979); Nelson v. Serwold, 576 F.2d 1332,
1337 (9th Cir.) cert. denied, 439 U.S. 970 (1978); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570
F.2d 38, 44 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978). The meaning of "recklessness"
however, has deeply divided the courts. For an analysis of the different approaches to
defining "recklessness," see Steinberg & Gruenbaum, Variations of "Recklessness" after
Hochfelder and Aaron, 8 SEc. REG. L.J. 179 (1980).
67 See, e.g., SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325, 1334-35 (5th Cir. 1978); SEC v. Commonwealth Chem. Sec. Inc., 574 F.2d 90, 100-01 (2d Cir. 1978); SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers,
Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1101-02 (2d Cir. 1972).
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for criminal contempt.68 Because the collateral consequences of
an injunction can be grave,9: the enjoined party, after a period of
time, may seek to have the injunction dissolved or modified.
III
MODIFYING OR DISSOLVING PERMANENT
INJUNCTIONS-AN OVERVIEW

The Supreme Court's seminal opinion in United States v. Swift
& Co. 7 0 provides the guidelines for determining whether a court
will modify or dissolve a permanent injunction. The protracted
nature of that litigation, however, has provided lower courts with
a basis for distinguishing Swift's stringent holding. 71 In Swift the
68 In United States v. Custer Channel Wing Corp., 376 F.2d 675 (4th Cir. 1967), the

court stated:
The appellants had already breached the law and had been enjoined not to do
so again; yet they knowingly repeated the selfsame forbidden acts. It is not
consonant with reason, in these circumstances, to demand a more explicit demonstration of an evil mind in order to sustain the conviction for criminal contempt.
Id. at 682. See Williams v. United States, 402 JF.2d 47, 49 (10th Cir. 1967). But see United
States v. Hill, 298 F. Supp. 1221 (D. Conn. 1969) (after finding that defendant knowingly
violated previous injunction, court imposed stricter injunction rather than convicting for
criminal contempt).
For cases on civil contempt, see, e.g., Penfield Co. v. SEC, 330 U.S. 585 (1947); SEC v.
Radio Hill Mines Co., [1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 93,785 (S.D.N.Y.),
aff'd, 479 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1973). In Penfield, the Court distinguished between civil and
criminal contempt:
It is the nature of the relief asked that is determinative of the nature of
the proceeding.... This was not a proceeding in which the United States was a
party and in which it was seeking to vindicate the public interest.... The contempt proceedings were instituted as a part of the proceedings in which the
Commission sought enforcement of a subpoena. The relief which the Commission sought was production of the documents; and the only sanction asked was
a penalty designed to compel their production. Where a fine or imprisonment
imposed on the contemnor is "intended to be remedial by coercing the defendant to do what he had refused to do,".. . the remedy is one for civil contempt.... Then "the punishment is wholly remedial, serves only the purposes
of the complainant, and is not intended as a deterrent to offenses against the
public.".... One who is fined, unless by a day certain he produces the books,
has it in his power to avoid any penalty. And those who are imprisoned until
they obey the order, "carry the keys of their prison in their own pockets."...
Fine and imprisonment are then employed not to vindicate the public interest
but as coercive sanctions to compel the contemnor to do what the law made it
his duty to do.
330 U.S. at 590 (citations omitted).
69 See notes 52-57 and accompanying text supra.
70 286 U.S. 106 (1932).
71 See, e.g., SEC v. Blazon Corp., 609 F.2d 960 (9th Cir. 1979); SEC v. Warren, 583
F.2d 115, 120 (3rd Cir. 1978); King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 418 F.2d
31, 34-36 (2d Cir. 1969).
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Justice Department brought an action against five leading meatpackers alleging violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act arising
from an unlawful monopoly of a large portion of the nation's
food supply. In February 1920, the defendants consented to an
injunction prohibiting them from monopolization and engaging in
any combination in restraint of trade. In addition, the decree en72
joined the defendants from selling certain food products.
Shortly thereafter, two of the defendants sought to invalidate the
consent decree, claiming that the injunction interfered with contractual obligations. The Supreme Court, however, upheld the decree "in the face of a vigorous assault."73 Meanwhile, a lower
court had suspended the injunction at the request of a party who
had previously contracted with one defendant to purchase large
quantities of canned fruit. In May 1929, the Supreme Court restored the injunction and "swept [the final] obstacle [to the enforcement of the decree] aside," nearly a decade after it was en74
tered.
Against this litigious background, in April 1930, certain of
the defendants sought judicial relief to modify the consent decree
in order to adapt its restraints "to the needs of a new day."17
Justice Cardozo, writing for the Court, rejected the defendants'
plea. Although the Court acknowledged the inherent power of a
court of equity to modify an injunction in light of changed circumstances, whether entered after litigation or by consent,7 6 it
enunciated the following limiting principles:

286 U.S. at 111.
Id. at 112. See Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311 (1928).
71 286 U.S. at 112. See United States v. California Canneries, 279 U.S. 553 (1929)
75 286 U.S. at 113. Justice Cardozo observed:
The defendants and their allies had thus been thwarted in the attempt to invalidate the decree as of the date of its entry, and again the expectation would
have been reasonable that there would be acquiescence in its restraints. Once
more the expectation was belied by the event. The defendants, or some of
them, discovered as they thought that during the years that had intervened
between the entry of the decree and its final confirmation, conditions in the
packing industry and in the sale of groceries and other foods had been transformed so completely that the restraints of the injunction, however appropriate
and just in February, 1920, were now useless and oppressive.
Id. at 112-13.
76 Id. at 114. The Supreme Court subsequently reaffirmed the power of a court of
equity to modify or dissolve a permanent injunction. See System Fed'n v. Wright, 365 U.S.
642, 650-51 (1961). See also Elgin Nat'l Watch Co. v. Barrett, 213 F.2d 776, 780 (5th Cir.
1954); Bigelow v. Balaban & Katz Corp., 199 F.2d 794, 796-97 (7th Cir. 1952); Hygrade
Food Prods. Corp. v. United States, 160 F.2d 816, 819 (8th Cir. 1947); Coca-Cola Co. v.
Standard Bottling Co., 138 F.2d 788, 789-90 (10th Cir. 1943).
72
71
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There is need to keep in mind steadily the limits of inquiry
proper to the case before us. We are not framing a decree. We
are asking ourselves whether anything has happened that will
justify us now in changing a decree. The injunction, whether
right or wrong, is not subject to impeachment in its application
to the conditions that existed at its making. We are not at liberty to reverse under the guise of readjusting. Life is never
static, and the passing of a decade has brought changes to the
grocery business as it has to every other. The inquiry for us is
whether the changes are so important that dangers, once substantial, have become attenuated to a shadow. No doubt the defendants will be better off if the injunction is relaxed, but they
are not suffering hardship so extreme and unexpected as to
justify us in saying that they are the victims of oppression.
Nothing less than a clear showing of grievous wrong evoked by
new and unforeseen conditions should lead us to change what
was decreed after years of litigation with the consent of all con7
7

cerned.

Although Justice Cardozo's restrictive language in Swift is the
majority rule today,78 courts have considered at least five other
standards.7 9
The leading modern case adhering to the Court's

77 286 U.S. at 119. At another point in the opinion, however, the Court employed far
less restrictive language:
We are not doubtful of the power of a court of equity to modify an injunction in adaptation to changed conditions though it was entered by consent....
If the reservation [of that power] had been omitted, power there still would be
by force of principles inherent in the jurisdiction of the chancery. A continuing
decree of injunction directed to events to come is subject always to adaptation
as events may shape the need.... The distinction is between restraints that give

protection to rights fully accrued upon facts so nearly permanent as to be substantially impervious to change, and those that involve the supervision of changing conduct or conditions and are thus provisional and tentative .... The result
is all one whether the decree has been entered after litigation or by consent....
In either event, a court does not abdicate its power to revoke or modify its
mandate if satisfied that what it has been doing has been turned through
changing circumstances into an instrument of wrong.... The consent is to be
read as directed toward events as they then were. It was not an abandonment
of the right to exact revision in the future, if revision should become necessary
in adaptation to events to be.
Id. at 114-15 (citations omitted).
7' See, e.g., Safe Flight Instrument Corp. v. United Control Corp., 576 F.2d 1340, 1343
(9th Cir. 1978); Boughner v. Secretary of Health, Educ. and Welfare, 572 F.2d 976, 978
(3d Cir. 1978); Flavor Corp. v. Harnischfeger Corp., 242 F.2d 712, 713 (7th Cir. 1957);
United States v. City of Milwaukee, 441 F. Supp. 1377, 1380 (E.D. Wis. 1977). The discussion in this portion of the Article applies to injunctions procured by the government and
by private entities or persons.
11 See notes 166-71 and accompanying text infra.
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standard in Swift is Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. American Oil Co., 80

written by Justice Blackmun when he was a federal. appellate
judge. In Humble Oil, three oil companies sought to modify an
injunctive decree that restrained them from using certain marks
and names in connection with their gasoline and oil business operations in certain midwestern states."1 The plaintiffs argued that
the proper legal standard applicable to a request for modification
is whether, under the facts as they are shown to exist today, the
court would have issued the original injunction. In other words,
the plaintiffs contended that they were entitled to modification
because the original injunction, based on an entirely different set
of facts than then existed, could not have properly been issued
82
under the present facts.

80 405 F.2d 803 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 905 (1969).
81

Id. at 804-05. In Humble Oil, as in other modern cases where a party seeks to modify

or dissolve a permanent injunction, relief was sought under Rule 60(b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. The Rule provides:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or
his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the
following reasons:.... (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or
otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have
prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.
FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5), (6). For cases which have involved a motion for modification or
dissolution under FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5) or 60(b)(6), see, e.g., Brooker v. Special School
Dist. No. 1, 585 F.2d 347, 352 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 443 U.S. 915 (1979); Marshall v.
Board of Educ., 575 F.2d 417, 421-22 (3d Cir. 1978); Imprisoned Citizens Union v. Shapp,
461 F. Supp. 522, 524 (E.D. Pa. 1978). See generally Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United
States, 429 U.S. 17 (1976); Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, modified, 336 U.S. 942
(1949); Annot., 14 A.L.R. Fed. 309 (1973). Even without the invocation of FED. R. Civ. P.
60(b), the federal courts have "inherent equitable power to modify a continuing decree of
injunction." Ridley v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 427 F.2d 19, 23 (10th Cir. 1979).
82 405 F.2d at 811-14. An important issue is to what extent the applicable facts or law
must subsequently change to support a motion for modification. The Eighth Circuit has
stated:
While a decree may not normally be changed in the interests of the defendants
if the purposes of the litigation as incorporated in the decree have not been
fully achieved, unforeseen hardships to the defendants may be considered,
especially where there are (1) changes in operative facts, (2) changes in the
relevant decisional law, and (3) changes in any applicable statutory law.
Flavor Corp. v. Kemin Indus., Inc., 503 F.2d 729, 732 (8th Cir. 1974). For decisions interpreting the necessary change of fact or law to support a motion for modification, see, e.g.,
Bolden v. Pennsylvania State Police, 578 F.2d 912, 926 (3d Cir. 1978); Coalition of Black
Leadership v. Cianci, 570 F.2d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 1978); Jordon v. School Dist., 548 F.2d 117,
120-22 (3d Cir. 1977); Imprisoned Citizens Union v. Shapp, 461 F. Supp. 522, 524 (E.D. Pa.
1978); United States v. City of Milwaukee, 441 F. Supp. 1377, 1380 (E.D. Wis. 1977). See
notes 117-44 and accompanying text infra.
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Relying on Swift, the Eighth Circuit unequivocably rejected
the plaintiffs' standard. Implying that the invocation of such a
standard would, in essence, impeach the issuance of the injunction, the court instead framed the question in terms of the propriety of withdrawing or modifying injunctive relief that had been
previously granted.8 3 Accordingly, Justice Blackmun employed
the Swift rationale, thereby refusing to distinguish Swift on the
basis of the litigious and protracted nature of that proceeding.
The court gleaned from Swift the following factors:
(1) [T]hat, where modification and amendment of an existing
decree is under consideration, there are "limits of inquiry" for
the decree court and for the reviewing court; (2) that the inquiry is "whether the changes are so important that dangers,
once substantial, have become attenuated to a shadow"; (3) that
the movants must be "suffering hardship so extreme and unexpected" as to be regarded as "victims of oppression"; and (4)
that there must be "[n]othing less than a clear showing of
grievous wrong evoked by new and unforeseen conditions."
Placed in other words, this means for us that modification is
only cautiously to be granted; that some change is not enough;
that the dangers which the decree was meant to foreclose must
almost have disappeared; that hardship and oppression, extreme and unexpected, are significant; and that the movants'
task is to provide close to an unanswerable case. To repeat: caution, substantial change, unforeseenness, oppressive hardship,
8 4
and a clear showing are the requirements.
Looking at subsequent Supreme Court decisions that have interpreted Swift, 8 5 Justice Blackmun, while observing that these deci-

sions continue to recognize an equity tribunal's power to dissolve
or modify an injunctive decree, nevertheless asserted that they did
not retreat from Swift's strict standards. 86 Applying these stanJustice Blackmun stated:
We feel that [plaintiffs' assertions], standing alone, are not consistent with the
language and with what we regard as the requirements of Swift. As Mr. Justice
Cardozo said in Swift, 286 U.S. at 119, 52 S. Ct. at 464, "We are not framing a
decree." We are confronted here not with a question of the granting of injunctive relief but with the question of the withdrawal or modification of injunctive
relief granted in the past. It is in the latter situation-the one which confronts
us-where the Cardozo precepts are the operating guidelines.
405 F.2d at 814.
84 Id. at 813.
85 United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 391 U.S. 244 (1968); Columbia Artists
Mgmt., Inc. v. United States, 381 U.S. 348, 352 (1964) (dissenting opinion); System Fed'n v.
Wright, 364 U.S. 642 (1961).
83

86 405 F.2d at 813.
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dards to the facts before it, the Eighth Circuit held that the plaintiffs failed to show the substantial change, unforeseenness, and
oppressive hardship necessary for modification of the injunction.87
Swift's stringent guidelines have been applied by numerous
courts in a variety of contexts. 8 8 For example, in Mayberry v.
Maroney,89 the Third Circuit adopted Swift's restrictive language in
denying the State of Pennsylvania's motion for modification of a
previous consent order that enjoined the state from confining inmates in a basement facility at a state penitentiary.9 0 In Ridley v.
Phillips Petroleum Co.,9 1 the Tenth Circuit, relying specifically on
both Swift and Humble Oil, denied the oil company's motion to
dissolve an injunction that restrained it from disconnecting a gas
line that was connected to an irrigation waterwell 9 2 In De Filippis
v. United States,9 3 the Seventh Circuit refused to modify an injunction enjoining the Marine Corps from prohibiting the use of short
hair wigs at the Corps' summer training camp.9 4 Quoting Swift,
the court stated that a motion for modification does not permit
relitigation of issues that were resolved by the previous judgment.9 5 In denying the government's motion, the court con-

87 Id. at 818-21.
88 See cases cited in note 78 supra.
89

558 F.2d 1159 (3d Cir. 1977).

90 In stringently applying the Swift standard, the Third Circuit stated: "We think a
healthy respect for the finality of judgments demands no less." Id. at 1163. In a decision
rendered a year later, however, the court declined to apply the rigors of Swift and affirmed
the district court's dissolution of a permanent injunction. See SEC v. Warren, 583 F.2d 115,
118-22 (3d Cir. 1978).
91 427 F.2d 19 (10th Cir. 1970).
92 Id. at 22-23. The court noted:
These two cited cases hold that where a modification of an injunctive decree is
sought the court should determine "whether the changes are so important that
dangers, once substantial, have become attenuated to a shadow," and it must be
shown that the moving party is exposed to severe hardships of extreme and
unexpected nature. Thus the requested change should be approached with caution and a strong showing is required of new conditions and circumstances
making the original injunction oppressive.
Id. at 22.
93 567 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1977).
94 Id. at 344.
95 Id. at 343-44. See Elgin Nat'l Watch Co. v. Barrett, 213 F.2d 776,780 (5th Cir. 1954)
("rule 60(b).... was not intended as, and it is not, a substitute for a direct appeal from an
erroneous judgment.").
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cluded that "[a]bsent a clear showing of grievous wrong, judgments will not, and cannot be opened."' 6
A minority of courts, however, has refused to follow Swift's
stringent requirements. These courts argue that subsequent Supreme Court decisions attribute Swift's reasoning to the protracted
nature of that litigation.9 7 According to this view, the Supreme
Court's decision in United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.,9 8
represents a significant departure from Swift's restrictive standards. In United Shoe, the government sought to modify an earlier
judgment to impose more onerous limitations on the enjoined
party. The earlier judgment held that the defendant had violated
the Sherman Antitrust Act by monopolizing the manufacture of
shoe machinery. The government originally requested the court
to break up the defendant into three separate shoe machinery
manufacturing companies. The district court instead chose to impose a number of restrictions and conditions that were designed
"to recreate a competitive market."99 The decree also provided
that ten years thereafter, either party could petition the court for
modification. 10 ' When the specified date arrived, the government reported to the court that United Shoe continued to dominate the shoe machinery market and requested that the company
be restructured to constitute two competing corporations. The district court denied the government's motion, holding that under
Swift, its power to modify an original decree was confined to cases
involving "(1) a clear showing of (2) grievous wrong (3) evoked by
new and unforeseen conditions." 101

"l 567 F.2d at 344. Judge Pell, in a dissenting opinion, distinguished Swift. He asserted
that a subsequent change in law rendered the continued application of the injunction inequitable. Id. at 344-45.
'7 See SEC v. Warren, 583 F.2d 115, 119-20 (3d Cir. 1978); King-Seeley Thermos Co.
v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 418 F.2d 31, 34 (2d Cir. 1969). See also Tobin v. Alma Mills, 192
F.2d 133, 136 (4th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 933 (1952).
98 391 U.S. 244 (1968).
SId. at 246.
100 Id. The decree issued by the district court provided:
On [January 1,1965] both parties shall report to this Court the effect of
this decree, and may then petition for its modification, in view of its effect in
establishing workable competition. If either party takes advantage of this paragraph by filing a petition, each such petition shall be accompanied by affidavits
setting forth the then structure of the shoe machinery market and defendant's
power within that market.
United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 354 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per
curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
l"t United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 266 F. Supp. 328, 330 (D. Mass. 1967),
rev'd, 391 U.S. 244 (1968).
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The Supreme Court reversed, stating that the district court
had misconceived the decision in Swift. The Court reviewed the
Swift defendants' numerous unsuccessful attempts to vacate the
decree that preceded the petition for modification. The United
Shoe Court then observed that Swift's restrictive language "must, of
course, be read in light of this context"t12 and concluded that
"Swift teaches that a decree may be changed upon an appropriate
showing, and it holds that it may not be changed in the interests
of the defendants if the purposes of the litigation as incorporated
in the decree . . . have not been fully achieved." 103

Unlike Swift,

where the defendants had sought relief to escape the decree's adverse effects, the government in United Shoe sought modification
to accomplish the purposes of the original decree. Accordingly,
the Court instructed the lower tribunal that, if the decree had not
accomplished its principal purposes, the time had come to order
other, and if appropriate, more definitive, means to effectuate
these purposes. 104
The Supreme Court's decision in System Federation v.
Wright 105 lends additional support to the minority view. There,
the Court held that the trial court abused its discretion in denying
modification of an injunction, entered pursuant to a consent decree, where a subsequent change in federal law expressly made
lawful the activity prohibited by the decree. 0 ' The Court relied
heavily on Swift to reaffirm a number of principles: that a court
of equity has power to modify an injunction in light of changed
circumstances; that in seeking modification, a party cannot impeach the integrity of the original decree; that the identical standards for modification apply whether the injunction was entered

102

391 U.S. at 248.

03 Id. (emphasis in original). The government in United Shoe could have sought modifi-

cation prior to the expiration of the ten-year period because a court of equity has inherent
power to modify an injunctive decree. See note 77 supra. Accord, System Fed'n v. Wright,
364 U.S. 642, 647 (1961). See also 391 U.S. at 251.
104 391 U.S. at 249-52.
105364 U.S. 642 (1961).
106 Id. at 643-52. In System Federation nonunion railroad employees sued the railroad and
a number of unions for damages. The plaintiffs invoked § 2 of the Railway Labor Act, ch.
347, 44 Stat. 577 (1926) (current version at 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1976)), which at the time of
suit prohibited carriers from coercing employees to join or not to join any labor organization. The parties settled the suit, and as part of the settlement, the defendants were enjoined from discriminating against the plaintiffs' class on the basis of their nonunion status.
Thereafter, Congress amended the Railway Labor Act to allow contracts mandating a
union shop under certain circumstances. Based on this change in law, the petitioner labor
union sought to dissolve the injunction pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
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49

by consent or after litigation; and that firmness and stability require courts to exercise sparingly the power to modify an injunctive decree. 1 7 Of particular significance to courts seeking to distinguish Swift is the System Federation Court's recognition that:
[A] sound judicial discretion may call for the modification of
the terms of an injunctive decree if the circumstances, whether
of law or fact, obtaining at the time of its issuance have
changed, or new ones have since arisen. The source of the
power to modify is of course the fact that an injunction often
108
requires continuing supervision by the issuing court ....

107364 U.S. at 647-48, 650-51. The Court also relied on Pennsylvania v. Wheeling &
Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421 (1855), which concerned the effect of a subsequent congressional enactment on an outstanding injunction. The Court dissolved the
injunction because the congressional enactment rendered it unenforceable. Id. at 430-32.
The System Federation Court remarked that the principles of Wheeling Bridge were followed
in lower federal and state courts. 364 U.S. at 650 n.6. See McGrath v. Potash, 199 F.2d 166,
167 (D.C. Cir. 1952); Coca-Cola Co. v. Standard Bottling Co., 138 F.2d 788, 790 (10th Cir.
1943); Western Union Tel. Co. v. International Bhd., 133 F.2d 955, 958 (7th Cir. 1943);
Santa Rita Oil & Gas Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 112 Mont. 359, 367-70, 116 P.2d
1012, 1016-18 (1941); Ladner v. Siegel, 298 Pa. 487, 500, 148 A. 699, 703 (1930).
108 364 U.S. at 647. The Court also stated:
Firmness and stability must no doubt be attributed to continuing injunctive relief based on adjudicated facts and law, and neither the plaintiff nor the court
should be subjected to the unnecessary burden or re-establishing what has once
been decided. Nevertheless the court cannot be required to disregard significant changes in law or facts if it is "satisfied that what it has been doing has been
turned through changing circumstances into an instrument of wrong."... A
balance must thus be struck between the policies of res judicata and the right of
the court to apply modified measures to changed circumstances.
Id. at 64748 (quoting United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. at 114-15). The System Federation
Court also commented that the limits of lower court discretion are usually far clearer to an
appellate court when the new circumstances involve a change in law rather than in facts.
364 U.S. at 648. Also of possible significance is the System Federation Court's omission to
quote Swift's most stringent language. It is plausible that this omission was intentional.
In a more recent case, Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976),
the Court, quoting the above broad language of the System Federation Court, stated that
ambiguity in the subject provision of the decree combined with a change in applicable law
compelled modification of the decree. Id. at 436-38 (quoting 364 U.S. at 647). Dissenting,
Justice Marshall applied the strict Sift principles and concluded that the district court was
correct in denying modification. Id. at 444. See also Columbia Artists Mgmt. Inc. v. United
States, 381 U.S. 348, 352 (1965) (dissenting opinion) (dissenters contended that the Court
summarily affirmed the lower court's modification of a consent decree where no changed
circumstances were claimed).
An issue that may arise either in ordering an injunction or in a motion for modification under FED. R. Civ. P. 65(d) is whether the decree's terms are adequately specific. FED.
R. Civ. P. 65(d) provides that "[elvery order granting an injunction and every restraining
order shall.... be specific in terms; shall describe in reasonable detail, and not by reference to the complaint or other document, the act or acts sought to be restrained .. " 427
U.S. at 439. With respect to this provision, the Spangler Court stated: "because of the rightly

50
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A minority of lower courts has concluded that the decisions in
United Shoe and System Federation have relaxed the stringent Swift
standards. Two leading federal appellate court decisions distinguished Swift and permitted modification or dissolution of an injunction. In King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Industries,Inc., 109 the
Second Circuit reversed the district court's denial of a motion to
modify an injunction issued in a trademark case."'
In Securities
and Exchange Commission v. Warren, t ' the Third Circuit upheld
the district court's dissolution of a permanent injunction that had
1 12
been entered by consent.
In King-Seeley, Judge Friendly, writing for the court, commented that the district judge, in denying the motion for modification, gave Swift a rigidity that the Supreme Court had not
intended. Citing the United Shoe Court's assertion that Justice Cardozo's language must be read in light of Swift's protracted context,
the Second Circuit stated that the case at bar, unlike Swift, involved no such conflict.1 1 3 Noting that changes in fact or law
provide the strongest reasons for modifying an injunction, the
court held that modification or dissolution also is appropriate
"where a better appreciation of the facts in light of experience
indicates that the decree is not properly adapted to accomplishing
its purposes.""14 The court commented that the Eighth Circuit's
serious view courts have traditionally taken of violations of injunctive orders, and because
of the severity of punishment which may be imposed for such violation, such orders must
in compliance with Rule 65 be specific and reasonably detailed." Id. See SEC v. Keller
Corp., 323 F.2d 397, 402 (7th Cir. 1963); United States v. Sherwood, 175 F. Supp. 480,
482 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). See generally Schmidt v. Lessard, 414 U.S. 473 (1974) (per curiam).
109 418 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1969).
11 Id. at 34.
lii
583 F.2d 115 (3d Cir. 1978). For a discussion of Warren, see notes 155-65 and accompanying text infra.
112 583 F.2d at 118-22. Although the Third Circuit in Warren did not explicitly distinguish Swift, its reasoning and reliance on United Shoe and King-Seeley leads to that conclusion.
Judge Friendly stated:
Although we admire our brother Anderson's effort to achieve precision,
we think he gave the Swift decision a rigidity the Court did not intend. The
defendants who there sought modification of a consent decree had been
obliged by the very nature of the case to stake their claim on drastic changes in
conditions and, as pointed out in United Shoe, the language "to the effect that
'nothing less than a clear showing of grievous wrong evoked by new and unforeseen conditions should lead us to change'..., the decree, must, of course, be
read in light of this context."
418 F.2d at 34 (quoting 391 U.S. at 248) (citations omitted).
114 418 F.2d at 35. See Tobin v. Alma Mills, 192 F.2d 133 (4th Cir. 1951) (upholding
dissolution of injunction upon a showing that enjoined company had in good faith complied with its terms for over ten years), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 933 (1952). The Tobin court
stated:
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opinion in Humble Oil imposed too severe a requirement for modifying or dissolving an injunction 1 5 In affirming the court's
power to alter an injunction even in the absence of changed circumstances, Judge Friendly cautioned,
however, that this power
16
should be exercised sparingly.
The King-Seeley decision is the first explicit judicial deviation
from Swift's stringent standards. 1 7 The Second Circuit has subsequently reaffirmed this departure from Swift." 8 In addition, the
Third Circuit, relying heavily on King-Seeley, has likewise abandoned Swift's strict requirements.'9 Although these developments are interesting in themselves, cases involving the federal
securities laws, largely because of the SEC's dependence on injunctive relief, lend themselves to motions by enjoined parties to
modify or dissolve previously issued injunctions.1 20 For this
reason, and also because such motions may affect the ability of the
SEC to administer the federal securities laws, the following discussion will focus on the modification or dissolution issue in the context of SEC injunctive decrees.
IV
MODIFYING OR DISSOLVING

SEC

INJUNCTIONS

Because of the severe collateral consequences that may accompany an SEC injunction, 1 2

a number of courts have recog-

It is well settled that an injunctive order may be modified or dissolved in
the discretion of the court when conditions have so changed that it is no longer
needed or as to render it inequitable.... Surely, such change of conditions is
shown with respect to an injunction against the violation of a statute where it
appears that the one enjoined has observed the provisions of the statute in
good faith over a period of ten years and there is no present reason to apprehend violation by him. The whole business atmosphere of most corporations
as well as their ownership and management have undergone radical changes
after the lapse of so long a period; and there is no reason to hold them subject
to such an injunctive order when changes of this sort have occurred and there
is no further need of injunctive relief.
Id. at 136 (citations omitted).
115 418 F.2d at 38n.2. For a discussion of Humble Oil, see notes 80-87 and accompanying
text supra.
116 418 F.2d at 35.

117 But see Tobin v. Alma Mills, 192 F.2d 133, 136-37 (4th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343
U.S. 933 (1952).
118 Chance v. Board of Examiners, 561 F.2d 1079, 1086 (2d Cir. 1977) (following KingSeeley but concluding "some form of hearing is generally required to make so vital a determination").
"I SEC v. Warren, 583 F.2d 115, 118-22 (3d Cir. 1978); see notes 134-44 and accompanying text infra.
120 See generally notes 29-49 and accompanying text supra.
21 See notes 52-57 and accompanying text supra.
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nized that the remedy is more than a mild prophylactic. 12 2 In
order to obtain injunctive relief, the SEC must show a reasonable
likelihood that the defendant, absent such relief, will again engage
in the violative conduct.1 2 3 Even where the SEC makes the necessary showing, some courts have hesitated to order an unconditional permanent injunction. The conditions that courts have attached to the imposition of an injunction include automatic dissolution after a fixed number of years, 124 suspension after the defendant fulfills certain requirements, 1 25 and permitting a petition
for dissolution after a fixed period of time on a lesser showing
than that required by Swift.12 6 Although the SEC, at times, has
agreed to certain of these limitations pursuant to the consent process,' 2 7 the Commission's position appears to be that upon making
a proper showing, it is entitled as a matter of statutory right to
28
the ordering of a permanent injunction.
The Ninth Circuit's recent decision in Securities and Exchange
Commission v. Blazon Corp. 129 illustrates some of the issues that may
122

See, e.g., Aaron v. SEC, 100 S. Ct. 1945, 1954 (1980) (Burger, C.J., concurring); SEC

v. Commonwealth Chem. Sec., Inc., 574 F.2d 90, 99 (2d Cir. 1978) (Friendly, J.) ("Experience has shown that an injunction, while not always a 'drastic remedy' ... often is much
more than [a] 'mild prophylactic'.... ).
123 See notes 30-32 and accompanying text supra.
124 See SEC v. Continental Connector Corp., No. 75-2210 (D.D.C. 1976) (court, sua
sponte, limited duration of SEC injunction to six years).
25 See SEC v. Associated Minerals, Inc., No. 77-0986 (E.D. Mich. 1979), cross appeals
pending, Nos. 79-1449, 79-1450 (6th Cir. 1980) (court order provided for automatic dissolution of injunction entered upon repayment to investors of portion of investment funds converted by defendants).
26 See SEC v. Starr Broadcasting Group, Inc., No. 79-0357 (D.D.C. Feb. 7, 1979), SEC
Lit. Rel. 8667. The order provided for dissolution upon petition if the enjoined party
demonstrated compliance with the law-a standard far more relaxed than in Swift. Thus,
the decree allowed defendants to petition the court "to modify or terminate their disqualifications as officer, directors or general counsel or in-house counsel of public corporations
provided they can establish to the satisfaction of the court and the Commission that they
are able to discharge the responsibilities of persons occupying such positions under the
federal securities laws .... ). In addition, courts have issued decrees allowing future petitions for dissolution without articulating the criteria for modification. See SEC v. Blazon
Corp., 609 F.2d 960 (9th Cir. 1979) (district court order provided that defendants could
move for dissolution of injunction after expiration of 18 months).
127 See, e.g., SEC v. Starr Broadcasting Group, Inc., No. 79-0357 (D.D.C. Feb. 7, 1979).
128 See Brief of the Securities and Exchange Commission at 10, SEC v. Associated Minerals, Inc., Nos. 79-1449, 79-1450 (6th Cir.1980) ("By providing in the statutes for Commission enforcement by injunction, Congress plainly intended that after having found that the
Commission has made a 'proper showing,' the court is to shift to the defendants the burden
of policing their conduct under the in terrorem threat of contempt proceedings.").
The SEC has, at tiiies, agreed with the defendant that the injunction should be dissolved. See, e.g., SEC v. John Cummmins Pharmaceutical Co., No. 71-H-69 (S.D. Tex.
March 7, 1979); SEC Lit. Rel. 8685.
129 609 F.2d 960 (9th Cir. 1979).
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arise when a lower court orders injunctive relief with certain limitations attached. The trial court's order provided that the defendants could move for dissolution of the injunction after eighteen
months if they demonstrated compliance with its terms. Notwithstanding such compliance, the order further provided that
the injunction would continue in effect if the SEC showed that the
public interest so required.1 3 0 Clearly, this Order altered the
Swift standards, even as arguably modified by United Shoe and System Federation. These cases require the moving party to bear the
burden of satisfying the court that the injunction should be modified or dissolved. Yet, under the district court's order in Blazon, if
an enjoined party showed mere compliance with the decree, the
SEC would be required to prove that continued enforcement
31
would be in the public interest.1
On appeal, the SEC argued that the district court's fashioning of the dissolution provision was beyond its judicial power and
constituted an abuse of discretion.13 2 The Ninth Circuit, relying
on Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 13 3 observed that a trial court has wide discretion in framing an injunction based on traditional principles of
equity.1 34 Moreover, the court did not agree with the SEC's
characterization of the injunction as a "limited" one. As perceived
by the Ninth Circuit, the provision did not automatically terminate the injunction after eighteen months; rather it merely provided the defendants with a right to seek review after the period
expired.13 5 However, the court did not address the SEC's central
argument-that the trial court misapplied the Swift standards:

130

Id. at 966. The pertinent provision of the district court's order provided:

It is hereby further ordered that the defendants may move for dissolution of
this injunction at any time following eighteen (18) months from the date of
entry of this order provided that in support of such a motion defendants demonstrate compliance with the terms of the injunction and, provided further,
that, notwithstanding such a showing by the defendants, the injunction shall
continue in full force and effect if the plaintiff Securities and Exchange Commission demonstrates that the public interest so requires.
a Indeed, the district court's formulation in Blazon appears to be even more expansive

than those decisions that have relaxed the Swift standard. See note 76 supra.
132 609 F.2d at 966.
133 See the discussion of Hecht at notes 24-29 and accompanying text supra.
'4
609 F.2d at 966-67. The Ninth Circuit remarked that it had repeatedly applied the
equitable principles of Hecht in SEC enforcement proceedings. See, e.g., SEC v. Arthur
Young & Co., 590 F.2d 785 (9th Cir. 1979); SEC v. Koracorp Indus., Inc., 575 F.2d 692
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978); SEC v. United Financial Group, Inc. 474 F.2d
354 (9th Cir. 1973).
135 609 F.2d at 967-68. It is clear that even absent this 18-month proviso, the defendants
could move for dissolution under traditional notions of equity. See note 82 supra.

54
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The Commission correctly argues that the standards for modification of a permanent, unconditional injunction are strict.
United States v. Swift & Co., 1932, 268 U.S. 106 .... We do not
now decide whether the review provision in the injunction was
intended to change the otherwise strict standards for modification of an injunction or, if so, whether such action was within
the discretion of the trial judge. Neither of these questions will
be before us until the time, 36if ever, when the injunction is actually modified or dissolved.'
Although the Ninth Circuit declined to determine the appropriate standards under which an SEC injunction can be dissolved or modified, a number of other courts have confronted this
question. As with the dissolution of injunctions in general, the
majority of courts appear to adhere to the stringent Swift standards in this particularized area as well. 137 The minority view, basically composed of the Third Circuit's opinion in Securities and Exchange Commission v. Warren,'3 8 distinguishes Swift by pointing to
subsequent Supreme Court decisions and also by relying on the
Second Circuit's reasoning in King-Seeley.' 39
The Seventh Circuit's decision in Securities and Exchange Commission v. Advance Growth Capital Corp.,1 40 represents the majority
viewpoint. In that case, the defendants sought dissolution of an
injunction prohibiting future violations of the Investment Company Act on the grounds that they had complied with its terms,
that the company had continued to prosper, that they had suffered embarrassment in their business relations due to the injunction, and that the injunction had prevented them from serving as
officers and directors of the company. 41 Relying on Swift, the
Seventh Circuit held that these effects did not constitute the
"'grievous wrong evoked by new and unforeseen conditions,'

609 F.2d at 968.
See, e.g., SEC v. Advance Growth Capital Corp., 539 F.2d 649 (7th Cir. 1976); SEC v.
Jan-Dal Oil & Gas, Inc., 433 F.2d 304 (10th Cir. 1970); SEC v. LeBrock, 245 F. Supp. 799
(S.D.N.Y. 1965). See also Elco Corp. v. Microdot Inc., 360 F. Supp. 741 (D. Del. 1973).
138 76 F.R.D. 405 (W.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd, 583 F.2d 115 (3d Cir. 1978). See also SEC v.
Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 82 F.R.D. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
139 See notes 105-112 and accompanying text supra; notes 145-52 and accompanying text
infra.
140 539 F.2d 649 (7th Cir. 1976).
141 539 F.2d at 651-52. Section 9(a)(2) of the Investment Company Act disqualifies the
enjoined party from serving as a director, officer, or employee of a registered investment
company. The Commission may waive this qualification. See note 38 and accompanying
text supra.
136
137
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that Swift envisioned.1 42 Likewise, in Securities and Exchange Commission v. Jan-Dal Oil & Gas, Inc., 14 3 the Tenth Circuit reversed a
district court's order dissolving an eight-month old permanent injunction which prohibited the defendants from further violations
of the registration provisions of the Securities Act.1 44 The defendants asserted that they had complied with the law and that
the injunction was a continuing embarrassment in their business
associations. The court, however, citing Swift, United Shoe, and its
decision in Ridley, 145 concluded that these circumstances were "not
1 46
enough" to justify dissolution of the injunction.
A later Tenth Circuit case, Securities and Exchange Commission
v. Thermodynamics, Inc.,1 47 affirmed the district court's denial of a
motion to vacate the injunction, but deviated somewhat from the
Swift standards. The enjoined party pointed to his good reputation in the community, the embarrassment caused by the injunction, and the detrimental effects that the injunction had on his
business relations as grounds for dissolution. He stressed, for
example, that the injunction prevented him from securing a line
of credit from a local bank, precluded him from being considered
for a directorship of a company with which he transacted business, and disqualified him from making a Regulation A offering
of stock in his own corporation.1 48 The court, in recognizing that
the Swift standards present a difficult obstacle, concluded that a
motion to vacate an injunction must be premised on substantial
change in either the law or facts.14 1 In discussing what constituted "substantial change," however, the court departed from the
strict limitations of Swift:
[11n instances where the defendant concerned is an individual,
and where the alleged violation leading to the injunction was an
incident of limited scope or duration, the passage of a substantial period of time with full compliance and with no other violations may be regarded as a significant factor showing a

142 539 F.2d at 652 (quoting United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. at 119).

143 433 F.2d 304 (10th Cir. 1970).
144 Id. at 304-05.
145 For a discussion of Ridley, see note 81 and accompanying text supra.
146 433 F.2d at 305-06.
14' 464 F.2d 457 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 927 (1973).
141 Id. at 459-60. The collateral effects of the injunction in Thermodynamics closely resembled those in Warren. See SEC v. Warren, 76 F.R.D. 405, 408-12 (W.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd, 583
F.2d 115 (3d Cir. 1978).
1 464 F.2d at 460.
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"change" for these purposes. In reality this is
about all an indi15
vidual can show under these circumstances. 1

The minority view's departure from the stringent Swift standards is also evidenced by a recent district court decision, Securities
and Exchange Commission v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc. 151

Although deny-

ing the defendants' motion to'dissolve the injunction, the court
opined that Judge Friendly's flexible approach in King-Seeley appeared to represent the better view.1 5 2 There, the defendants,
who had consented to a permanent injunction, moved for dissolution when their codefendants had not been enjoined after a nonjury trial. 15 3 The court denied the motion, finding that it had
not adjudicated the movants' liability in the trial of the nonsettling defendants and that the injunction was neither oppressive
nor burdensome.

54

The most significant recent decision in the area of dissolution
or modification of SEC permanent injunctions is Securities and Exchange Commission v. Warren.155

In Warren, the defendant was en-

joined pursuant to a consent decree from future violations of the
margin requirements of the Securities Exchange Act and Regulation U promulgated thereunder.' 5 6 He moved for dissolution on
SO Id. at 461. See Tobin v. Alma Mills, 192 F.2d at 136; note 95 supra.

In Thermodynamics, the Tenth Circuit raised but did not address the propriety of administrative agencies procuring injunctions to permit future agency enforcement through
contempt proceedings. The court stated:
There is a difference of opinion as to whether as a general proposition injunctions to 'obey the law' should be issued in order that enforcement by administrative agencies may be sought by contempt rather than by the statutory route.
The standards for a change in any injunction are difficult to meet, and in some
instances this may lead to problems.
464 F.2d at 461. Other courts have also raised this concern. See Tobin v. Alma Mills, 192
F.2d at 136 ("This sort of govenment by injunction should not be unduly extended"); SEC
v. Warren, 76 F.R.D. at 412 ("We are well aware that there is a difference of opinion on
the issuance of injunctions to 'obey the law' so that enforcement by administrative agencies
may be sought by contempt rather than by the statutory route.")
,5- 82 F.R.D. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
.12 Id. at 52.
,5 Id. at 51.
,5' Id. at 53. The court pointed out that when the defendants elected to settle, they
knew that the SEC might not prevail on the merits:
Wisely or unwisely, they submitted to these restraints upon the exercise of powers that would normally be theirs. They chose to renounce what they might
otherwise have claimed, and the decree of a court confirmed the renunciation
and placed it beyond recall.
Id. (quoting United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. at 119).
155 76 F.R.D. 405 (W.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd,, 583 F.2d 115 (3d Cir. 1978). See also SEC v.
Wong, 369 F. Supp. 646 (D.P.R. 1974).
,' 583 F.2d at 116 nn.1 & 2.
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the grounds that the conduct involved an isolated, technical violation involving no intent to defraud, the loans were repaid within
six months, he settled while under intense personal and family
pressures, the danger of recurrence was minimal, because of the
injunction's undesirable taint, he felt compelled to resign directorships from a number of corporate boards and to forego various
investment opportunities, and the promulgation of Regulation X
was sufficient to protect the investing public from future violations.157 Distinguishing Swift and citing the principles of KingSeeley, the district court in Warren exercised its "inherent equitable
power to weigh the severity of the alleged danger which the injunction was designed to eliminate against the continuing necessity
for the injunction and the hardship brought by its prospective
application." 158 Weighing these factors, the court granted the
motion to dissolve the injunction. 159
15" 76 F.R.D. at 408-12. See also 583 F.2d at 116-18, 121-22. In 1970, Congress added
§ 7(f) to the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78g(f). The following year the Federal Reserve
Board promulgated Regulation X, 12 C.F.R. § 224. These provisions make it unlawful for
a borrower knowingly to obtain credit in violation of the margin requirements.
151 76 F.R.D. at 408. The standard adopted by the district court resembled that espoused by Judge Hoffman in United States v. Swift & Co., 189 F. Supp. 885 (N.D. Ill.
1960), aff'd per curiam, 367 U.S. 909 (1961). In denying the defendants' motion for modification, Judge Hoffman stated:
[T]he continued need for the decree and the hardship suffered by the defendants are neither alternative standards for modification, either of which will
suffice, as the defendants submit, or cumulative prerequisites, both of which
must be established, as the government claims. They are rather correlative elements of a single standard. As need is diminished, a lesser showing of hardship
will tip the scales in favor of modification, and as the defendants' suffering increases, their burden of showing decreased need is correspondingly lightened.
189 F. Supp. at 905.
159 76 F.R.D. at 407-08, 411-13. See also SEC v. Wong, 369 F. Supp. 646 (D.P.R. 1974),
where the district court relieved the defendant of an undertaking not to serve as an officer, director or member of an advisory board of any registered broker-dealer or investment company. In so holding, the court cited neither Swift nor any other Supreme Court
decisions. The court stated:
In exercising its discretion, the Court is moved by the fact that Mr. Gomez
has complied with the undertaking since November 30, 1967, for more than six
years, and that he does not intend to engage in the area of securities business.
The Court is further moved by its conclusion, reached from the testimony of
Mr. Gomez, that the continued existence of the undertaking affects the development of his business affairs in which he is presently engaged and greatly
affects his psychological well-being.
Guided by equitable considerations and the principles similar to the ones
who goven dissolution of injunctions, the Court concludes that more than six
years of obedience to the undertaking is a reasonable limit to its terms and that
there are no convincing reasons to extend the terms of the undertaking
further.
Id. at 647-48, citing Tobin v. Alma Mills, 192 F.2d 133 (4th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S.
933 (1952).
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On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed on substantially the
same reasoning.16 0 The SEC argued that the district judge exceeded his authority by reviewing the facts underlying the consent
decree. Although it noted that the trial court would have abused
its discretion had it impeached the validity of the decree, the
Third Circuit observed that the court had properly received evidence regarding the nature and background of the loan transaction for the sole purpose of evaluating the scope and character of
the violation to determine the necessity of continuing the injunction. 6 1 The court also concluded that the stringent Swift standards must be viewed in light of the "unique" facts of that case 162
and the subsequent decisions in United Shoe and King Seeley. 163
Thus, the court distinguished Swift on the grounds that the
case before it did not resemble the outrageous conduct enjoined
there, that the injunction applied to a single individual and did
not involve an important public or national interest, and that, unlike Swift, the purpose of the injunction had apparently been
achieved.' 6 4 Based on these factors, in conjunction with the injunction's severe collateral consequences, the Third Circuit held
that the district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the
dissolution of the injunction. The ,court nevertheless acknowledged the central importance of injunctions to the enforcement
of the securities laws, concluding that "they are not to be lightly
vacated." 165
The foregoing discussion illustrates that the viability of the
stringent Swift standards is open to debate. If courts should apply
Swift only in cases involving extreme, litigious conduct, are the
alternative approaches thus far adopted by certain courts appropriate? If not, what standards should apply? The final section of
the Article will consider this troublesome and controversial issue.

See
Id.
162 Id.
163 Id.
160
161

583 F.2d at 118-22.
at 118 n.5.
at 119.
at 119-20. For a discussion of these cases, see notes 98-104, 113-19 and accom-

panying text supra.
164 583 F.2d at 120-21.
1 5 Id. at 122. A party may have to disclose that he was enjoined even after the injunction has been dissolved. Id. at 122 n.10. Under rules recently adopted by the SEC, it appears that disclosure of a dissolved injunction must be made if the injunction was entered
within five years of filing. Registrants, however, would be allowed to explain any mitigating
circumstances. See SEC Rel. Nos. 33-5949, 34-15006, 35-20643, IC-10342 (Sept. 30, 1978);
note 57 supra.
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REFLECTIONS ON MODIFICATION AND DISSOLUTION
OF

SEC

AND OTHER PERMANENT INJUNCTIONS

The preceding discussion has shown that in spite of the continued vitality of Swift, courts have employed at least five different
standards to determine whether to modify or dissolve permanent
injunctions. First, Swift itself requires a clear showing that the
dangers that gave rise to the decree have ceased and that the
movants have suffered grievous wrong from unforseen changed
conditions.- '
Second, the decisions in United Shoe and System Federation 167 have encouraged courts to recognize a change in law or
fact as sufficient equitable basis for modification or dissolution.1" 8 Third, Judge Friend ly's opinion in King-Seeley held that
although a change of fact or law provides the clearest basis for
relief, "a better appreciation of the facts in light of experience"
may indicate that "the decree is not properly adapted to accomplishing its purposes," and therefore should be altered."" :
Fourth, the trial court in Warren balanced "the alleged danger the
injunction was designed to eliminate against the continuing necessity for an injunction and the hardship brought by its prospective
application." 170 Finally, the district court's order in Blazon implies that dissolution after a fixed period of time is appropriate if
the enjoined party complies with the decree's terms unless the
applicable govenment entity satisfies the court that the public in71
terest requires the continued protection of the injunction.
A. Policies Underlying Modification or Dissolution of Injunctive Decrees
Although Swift remains the majority view, 172 the emerging
minority may represent an attempt to reconcile general equitable
166 United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 119 (1932). For a detailed discussion of

the Swift standard, see notes 70-95 and accompanying text supra.
17 See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 391 U.S. 244 (1968); System Fed'n v.
Wright, 364 U.S. 642 (1961). For a discussion of these cases, see notes 98-108 and accompanying text supra.
16' See SEC v. Thermodynamics, Inc., 464 F.2d 457, 460-61 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
410 U.S. 927 (1973); King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Alladin Indus., Inc., 418 F.2d at 35;
Tobin v. Alma Mills, 192 F.2d 133, 136-37 (4th Cir. 1951).
19 418 F.2d at 35.
170 76 F.R.D. 405, 408 (W.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd on other grounds, 583 F.2d 115 (3d Cir.
1978). See also SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 82 F.R.D. 50, 52 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); United States
v. Swift & Co., 189 F. Supp. 885, 905 (D. Ill.
1960), aff'd per curiam, 367 U.S. 909 (1961);
notes 151-65 and accompanying text supra.
171609 F.2d 960, 966-68 (9th Cir. 1979). For a discussion of Blazon, see notes 129-36 and
accompanying text supra.
M7See notes 58-75 and accompanying text supra.
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principles with the nearly impossible burden imposed in Swift.
Arguably, however, such departure from Supreme Court precedent should warrant swift and certain reversal by a reviewing tribunal.' 7 3 A methodology designed to harmonize these opposing
principles must account for the policies connected with the modification or dissolution issue.
The traditional role of injunctive relief is an appropriate
analytical starting point. Although the term "permanent injunction" arguably connotes a static decree, thereby "lasting or
intend[ed] to last indefinitely," 174 such orders are by nature continuing. In Swift, Justice Cardozo stated: "A continuing decree of injunction directed to events to come is subject always to adaptation
as events may shape the need." 173 The Bill of Review in equity,
which was available only after issuance of a final order, is analogous. 171 Courts granted the Bill when "a change in law or circumstances .... render[ed] a decree.... no longer appropriate or
proper." 17 Thus, there is ample historical precedent for review
of permanent injunctions, but the guidelines are unclear.
The historic purpose of injunctive relief is to deter future
violations, not to punish the violator.'7 8 Accordingly, it can be
argued that an injunction that has fulfilled its objective of deter-

173 Blazon represents the most extreme deviation from Supreme Court authority. The
district court's opinion is the first decision that would impose a burden on the successful
litigant to justify the continuation of the decree. See notes 109-16 and accompanying text
supra. See also SEC v. Wong, 369 F. Supp. 646, 647-48 (D.P.R. 1974).

174 THE AMERICAN COLLEGE DICTIONARY 902 (1979). The employment of definitional

meanings to terms has been recognized in certain recent Supreme Court decisions. See
Aaron v. SEC, 100 S. Ct. 1945, 1955 nn.13-14 (1980); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425
U.S. 185, 199 nn.10-12 (1976).
175 286 U.S. at 114.
176 See 7 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE

60.15[1] (2d ed. 1979). The Bill of Review is

rooted in the first Ordinance of Lord Chancellor Bacon, which provided:
No decree shall be reversed, altered, or explained, being once under the great
seal, but upon bill of review; and no bill of review shall be admitted, except it
contain either error in law, appearing in the body of the decree, without
further examination of matters in fact, or some new matter which hath risen in
time after the decree, and not any new proof which might have been used
when the decree was made. Nevertheless, upon new proof that is come to light
after the decree made, and could not possibly have been used at the time when
the decree passed, a bill of review may be grounded by the special license of
the court, and not otherwise.
Id. at $ 60.15[l] (citing 2 STREET, EQUITY PRACTICE 1256 (1909)). The 1946 revision of Rule

60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure abolished the Bill of Review. Id. at 60.15[8].
177 Id.at 60.15[41 (citing International Ry. v. Davidson, 65 F. Supp. 58 (W.D.N.Y. 1945)).
178 Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944). See notes 19-30 and accompanying
text supra.
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ring the enjoined party should be dissolved upon an appropriate
motion. The problem, of course, is to ascertain when an injunction ceases as a preventative measure and becomes solely punitive.
In making this determination, the courts have made clear that
with respect to injunctions procured by government entities, the
17 9
public interest, when in conflict with the private, prevails.
Perhaps this approach represents a shorthand method of conveying that any doubts regarding dissolution should be resolved in
favor of the decree's continued effect. Such an approach may be
viewed as somewhat punitive and thereby inconsistent with historic equitable principles, but nevertheless arguably justified. Accordingly, the answer as to when a decree becomes excessively
punitive rather than preventative is by no means clear. In short, it
may well depend on the circumstances of the particular case and
the extent to which a public or other countervailing interest is
invoked.
Although "public or other countervailing interest" is an ambiguous concept, it can often be identified by reference to the
nature of the parties and violations addressed in the decree. Modification or dissolution would evidently be precluded, for example,
for injunctions against recidivist securities law violators, injunctions necessary for enforcement of the federal antitrust laws
within the setting of major industries, and injunctions in private
suits that are necessary to protect clearly recognizable personal interests, such as property interests in trademark infringement suits.
The latter example, although not constituting a "public interest"
per se, should be viewed as worthy of protection.
As another caveat, where the enjoined party seeks to dissolve
or modify the terms of an injunction, the strength of the public or
other countervailing interest involved should play a pivotal role in
ascertaining the extent of the burden to be placed on the movant.
For example, the burden should be greater when the movant
seeks to dissolve or modify an injunctive decree that is designed to
recreate a competititve market in a major industry than when a
particular individual is enjoined from engaging in certain conduct. Although the latter decree may be designed to protect the
public from the'proscribed conduct and to promote the public
policies embodied in the particular statute, its impact is considerably less than a decree that may affect thousands or millions of
people and society's economic stability.

179

See note 43 supra.
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In view of the above considerations, the strict requirements
established in the factual setting of Swift appear consistent with
general equitable principles. The movants' protracted attempts to
evade the provisions of the consent decree indicated substantial
risk of future violations. The public interest in enforcement of the
antitrust laws in this important industry further suggests that the
Court properly imposed a rigorous standard.
The nature of the public interest, however, is arguably unrelated to the historic equitable deterrence rationale. This argument
is flawed for two reasons. First, although individual deterrence is
of primary importance, the public interest in general societal deterrence is also relevant. The stability of a permanent injunctive
decree may serve a public purpose by deterring others from violating the law. While such decrees surely do not deter all potential
violators, 18 1 the attendant publicity and collateral consequences
have the effect of deterring many who might otherwise engage in
the proscribed conduct. 1 8 ' Second, constant litigation of dissolution petitions conflicts with the traditional interest in finality and
will undoubtedly increase court congestion.
This latter problem arises particularly when Congress has
granted regulatory agencies authority to seek injunctions. Congress could not have intended that agencies constantly litigate
modification or dissolution suits. Otherwise, these agencies would
have time and resources to do little else. 8t'
For example, the

8 See generally van den Haag, Punitive Sentences, 7

HOFSTRA

L. REV. 123, 124 (1978) ("no

legal threat, no matter how great the danger it produced, can deter everybody").
181 See generally Forst, Rhodes & Wellford, Sentencing and Social Science: Research for the
Formulation of Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 355, 363 (1979); Pugsley,
Retribution: A Just Basisfor CriminalSentences, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 379, 390-97 (1979); Robinson, A Brief History of Distinctions in Criminal Culpability, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 815, 817 n.14
(1980).
182 One area where this issue has arisen is the statutory time limits imposed by the
Freedom of Information Act. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A). See, e.g., Exner v. FBI, 542 F.2d
1121 (9th Cir. 1976); Open America v. Watergate Special Prosecution Force, 547 F.2d 605
(D.C. Cir. 1976); Cleaver v. Kelly, 415 F. Supp. 174 (D.D.C. 1976). Despite an agency's due
diligence and its employment of all appropriate and available personnel, the sheer volume
of requests may render the agency incapable of complying with the statutory time periods.
The more logical approach .... is to recognize that an agency has important
functions assigned to i~tother than the processing of informational requests. In
the case of the FBI, it is uncontrovertible that this agency has vital law enforcement duties to perform. To interpret the existence of exceptional circumstances to signify the deployment of all personnel to complete the review
and deliberation process within statutory time limits would leave the FBI with
time to do little else. Under such a construction, the FBI would be incapable of
performing its law enforcement obligations in a satisfactory manner.
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SEC's "hard pressed" staff, t8 3 reputed to be the most capable
agency in the federal government, 8 4 simply does not have the
resources to litigate a large number of modification or dissolution
cases. Indeed, largely because of lack of time and resources, the
SEC settles approximately ninety percent of its cases pursuant to
18 5
the consent process.
It would be more efficient to consider the length of the injunction during the consent negotiation process. Currently, private parties may choose the consent route to negotiate the least
onerous charges, to negotiate an injunction against the corpora-

Steinberg, The 1974 Amendments to the Freedom of Information Act: The Safety Valve Provision
Section 552(a)(6)(C) Excusing Agency Compliance with Statutory Time Limits -A ProposedInterpretation, 52 NOTRE DAME LAW. 235, 243-44 (1976).
183 Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 567 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
See Comment, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1188, 1192 (1975).
184 Senator Proxmire, Chairman of the Senate Banking Committee, recently called the
SEC "the finest agency in Washington. It has absolute integrity." "SEC Nominee Tells Senate He Would Quit Lav Firm," Washington Star, April 2, 1980, at F7.
185 Interview with SEC Commissioner Irving Pollack, 484 Sec. REG. & L. REP. (BNA)
AA-4 (an. 3, 1979). Regarding the SEC's lack of resources and the increased number of
securities law violators, Professor Hazen has stated:
The SEC's record reveals that, notwithstanding vigilant Commission activity, the
number of violations continues to rise. Staffing limitations have, or soon will,
prevent the SEC from being able to keep up with violators. One solution might
be to increase the enforcement staff of an already highly staffed agency. In a
time of concern over governmental spending and expansion, however, this does
not appear to be the optimal solution. Another approach might be to shift
much of the enforcement power to the private sector by expanding the scope
of private remedies. This too is unlikely to be an available solution as the Supreme Court seems to be moving in the opposite direction, and limiting private
remedies in the securities area. A viable variation might be to increase the efficacy of private enforcement with the use of SEC ancillary relief or by increasing
the collateral estoppel effect of SEC injunctive actions. A final alternative, advocated here, is to expand the scope of SEC administrative sanctions, thereby
increasing effective enforcement while reducing costs.
Hazen, supra note 3 1, at 443-44.
In regard to consent decrees in general, SEC Director of Enforcement Stanley Sporkin argues:
I submit that the consent decree process has vindicated the rights of the public
in a most direct, efficient and effective way. Where we find that a publicly held
company is controlled by persons or entities who are 'defrauding the public or
misusing corporate assets, we have attempted through the consent decree to
correct the abuses while preserving the corporate form and maintaining the
company's business. In various consent decrees, the Commission has consistently attempted to provide relief that is not only necessary to prevent the recurrence of the problem, but also, by utilizing the full equitable powers of the
court and the administrative process, to assure that all necesary corrective actions has been provided for and implemented.
Sporkin, "A Regulator Responds," Emanuel Saxe Distinguished Lecture 19-20 (Dec. 18,
1979).
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tion without specifically including named individuals, or to avoid
certain collateral effects of an injunction."8 6 There is no reason
why the duration of the injunction cannot also be considered in
the negotiation process. If the SEC refuses to negotiate that issue,
the private party is free to litigate or to consent to a permanent
injunction.' 8 7

186 See generally Rowe, Settlement of an SEC Enforcement Action, SEC. REG. (P-H)

1121, at

1200.103 Uan. 2, 1980). Generally, private parties may wish to settle an SEC enforcement
action to avoid litigation expenses, consuming time demands of businessmen and professionals, adverse publicity, the effects of collateral estoppel, disclosure of confidential or
other sensitive information, to facilitate SEC review concerning proposed business transactions, assist defense of a criminal action, and lessen the impact of the SEC action regarding
potential actions by other regulatory agencies. Id. at 1200.97.
In Parklane Hosiery v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979), the Supreme Court upheld the
offensive use of collateral estoppel occurring "when the plaintiff seeks to foreclose the
defendant from litigating an issue the defendant has previously litigated unsuccessfully in
an action with another party." Id. at 326 n.4. Eschewing blanket rules, the Court preferred
an approach that grants trial courts broad discretion in deciding when to allow the offensive use of collateral estoppel. Id. at 331-33.
The Court's decision in Parklane Hosiery has broad ramifications in securities litigation.
Although the offensive use of collateral estoppel will prove valuable to private plaintiffs,
the fear of such use of collateral estoppel may induce a number of defendants to consent
to an SEC injunction or administrative sanction rather than risk litigating. One commentator observes:
Although the Court was unwilling to sanction offensive use of collateral estoppel without reservation, its decision will have enormous practical effects on securities litigation. Broad application of collateral estoppel is particularly appropriate in securities cases. Courts have long recognized that private damage suits
provide an essential supplement to SEC enforcement actions. Permitting private
plaintiffs to rely on determinations obtained by the SEC will significantly
lighten their task and increase the deterrent effect of both public and private
penalties. Furthermore, securities litigation is often protracted; any time saved
by applying collateral estoppel should prove welcome.
Unfortunately, ParklaneHosiery may also vest the SEC with power to coerce
non-culpable defendants into settling enforcement actions. Such defendants
may fear the preclusive effects flowing from an unfavorable first judgment and
the SEC may succeed in establishing securities violations where private litigants
would fail. A defendant may rationally agree to the entry of a consent decree
against him in the enforcement action, regardless of the merits of the action, in
order to force private plaintiffs to prove independently the elements of their
damage claim. This consequence of Parklane Hosiery is not limited to SEC actions; the decision probably will enhance the ability of most agencies armed
with prosecutorial powers to force both culpable and non-culpable defendants
to capitulate.
Note, Mutuality of Estoppel and the Seventh Amendment: The Effect of Parklane Hosiery, 64
CORNELL L. REV. 1002, 1013-15 (1979).
187 See generally Rowe, supra note 186, at 1200.103-04 ("SEC will not ordinarily negotiate
such a [time] limit upon injunctions.").
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B. Other Relevant Factors in the Modification or Dissolution
Determination
1. Nature of the Proceeding
Because a party enters into an SEC or other consent decree
with knowledge of most of the collateral consequences, it may be
inequitable to allow modification or dissolution without showing a
subsequent change of fact or law. Mere passage of time during
which the enjoined party complies with the law should not be sufficient, unless that party demonstrates grievous harm. In sum, because parties who consent to these injunctions are forewarned of
the collateral effects and nevertheless agree to enter into such decrees, and because the applicable law enforcement regulatory
agencies do not have the time or resources to litigate modification
or dissolution cases, courts should be most selective in granting
1 88
such motions.
In other proceedings, there may be a basis for modification
or dissolution of a permanent injunction due to the passage of
time, absent a strong public or other interest to the contrary. Because of changing conditions, a decree may fail to effectuate its
purposes.' 83: Equity should not saddle a party with the burdens
of an injunction that does not function as intended, provided
there are no public or other countervailing considerations. On the
other hand, if the injunction has not achieved its objectives and
the public interest necessitates that this interest be fulfilled, a
court should have discretion to modify the decree to impose more
onerous requirements. In United Shoe, the Supreme Court made
clear that a district court has such discretion. 190
2. Existence of Adverse Collateral Consequenses
Modification or dissolution may also be proper when the enjoined individual or corporation has complied with the terms of
the decree for a number of years and has suffered severe adverse
collateral consequences. Viewed another way, compliance with the
injunction may constitute sufficient change in the facts to warrant

188

This proposition may be viewed as conflicting with the Court's language in Swift that

motions for modification or dissolution should be viewed as "all one whether the decree
has been entered after litigation or by consent." 286 U.S. at 114. For the reasons herein
provided, however, there exists an arguably sound basis for distinction.
189 See generally King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Alladin Indus., Inc., 418 F.2d 31, 34-35 (2d
Cir. 1969).
"' United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 391 U.S. 244, 248 (1968).
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modification or dissolution. What should the movant be required
to show? First, because the injunction merely requires the party to
comply with the law, compliance, without more, should not constitute sufficient grounds for modification. Compliance is precisely
what the law requires."" Otherwise, no permanent injunction
would be "permanent"; the decree need only be obeyed for a
period of time before the movant could successfully petition for
dissolution.' :9 2 Second, the collateral consequences visited upon
the enjoined party must be more than merely some loss of reputation or business opportunity. 19 3 Rather, movants must show
grievous loss that renders the continued application of the injunction inequitable, such as loss of opportunity to earn a livelihood in
19 4
a chosen field or substantial loss of business opportunity.
Third, even if the movant satisfies the above two conditions, he
must demonstrate to the court that he has been rehabiliated -that
there is no longer a risk he will engage in future violations of the
95
law. 1
3. Rehabilitation
This latter point raises the issue of whether rehabilitation, in
part shown by compliance with the decree over a period of time,
is a sufficient change of fact to justify dissolution or modification.
Ignoring the movant's rehabilitation conflicts with the decree's
purpose of deterrence rather than punishment. Because mere
compliance with the decree does not adequately prove rehabilitation, courts should look to the underlying circumstances present
both before and after issuance of the injunction, and the public or
other countervailing interest evoked in the decree's continued ap96
plication.1
19 7
Although the decree is clearly not subject to impeachment,
the conditions surrounding its issuance should be relevant in de11 See generally note 117 supra.
192 On this subject see the discussion of the district court's order in Blazon, supra note

129. See notes 29-36, 171, 173 and accompanying text supra.
193 See notes 58-75, 117, 119-26 and accompanying text supra.
19' See SEC v. Warren, 76 F.R.D. 405, 410-41 (W.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd, 583 F.2d 115,
121-22 (3d Cir. 1978).
195 The courts have not directly raised the subject of rehabilitation. One of the few
courts that has indirectly discussed this issue was the Third Circuit in Warren: "Approximately ten years have elapsed since Warren, Jr., committed the violation. Almost five years
have elapsed since the consent decree was entered. During this entire period there has
been no evidence of any recurrence of any violation." 583 F.2d at 122.
196 See generally cases cited in note 194 supra.
197 See United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 119 (1932). See note 77 and accompanying text supra.
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termining the extent to which the movant must demonstrate-rehabilitation to alleviate concerns about future violations. For
example, the burden placed upon a party who intentionally violated the law and deliberately inflicted harm on investors should
be greater than that upon one who negligently omitted material
information from a proxy statement submitted to shareholders."' 8 Although both were properly enjoined and the effect on
investors may have been equally detrimental, the latter did not
intend to defraud investors. Accordingly, proof by the negligent
wrongdoer that it has consulted with expert counsel in subsequent
proxy solicitations, that it has engaged in a number of solicitations
without violating the decree, and that no SEC or other actions
have been brought should support a finding of rehabilitation.
Further, any SEC action, including a private investigation and
perhaps even an informal staff inquiry,1 99 should be relevant to
negate a showing of rehabilitation. Such investigations arguably
cast a measure of doubt on the legality of the enjoined party's
conduct and suggest that the injunction may still be in the public
00
interest.2

196

Most courts have held that negligence is sufficient culpability to establish liability,

even in private damage actions, in proxy violation actions under § 14(a) of the Exchange
Act and SEC Rule 14a-9. See Gould v. American Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761, 777-78
(3d Cir. 1976). Accord, Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1300-01 (2d Cir.
1973); SEC v. Dimensional Entertainment Corp., [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
97,578, at 98,054-55 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 1980); Berman v. Thomson, 403 F. Supp. 699
(W.D. Ill. 1975); Notre & Co. v. Huffines, 304 F. Supp. 1096, 1109-10 (S.D.N.Y. 1968),
aff'd, 416 F.2d 1189 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied sub nom. Muscan v. Notre & Co., 397 U.S.
989 (1970); Richland v. Crandall, 262 F. Supp. 538, 553 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). But see Adams v.
Standard Knitting Mills, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,382 (6th Cir. May 2, 1980)
(scienter held necessary element for liability in private damage suit under § 14(a) and Rule
14 a-9).
I See 17 C.F.R. § 202.5 (1979). See also Ferrara, SEC Division of Trading and Markets:
Detection, Investigation and Enforcement of Selected Practices That ImpairInvestor Confidence in the
Capital Markets, 16 How. L.J. 950 (1971); Lowenfels, Securities and Exchange Commission Investigations: The Need for Reform, 45 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 575 (197 1); Mathews, Effective Defense
of SEC Investigations: Laing the Foundationfor Successful Disposition of Subsequent Civil, Administrative, and Criminal Proceedings, 24 EMORY L.J. 567 (1975); Mathews, Witnesses in SEC
Investigations: A Primerfor the Witnesses and Their Counsel on the Scope of the SEC's Investigatory
Powers, 3 REV. SEC. REG. 923-32 (1970); Merrifield, SEC Investigations, 32 Bus. LAw. 1583
(1977); Winter, Representing Witnesses in SEC Formal Investigations, 5 LITIGATION 24 (Nov. 3,
1979); Comment, 20 AM.U.L. REV. 115 (1970).
200 The Supreme Court has compared an agency inquiry to that of a grand jury which
can investigate merely on suspicion that a law has been violated without establishing probable cause. United States v. Morton Salt, 338 U.S. 632, 642-43 (1950). Accord, United States
v. Lieberman, 608 F.2d 889, 897-98 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1019; SEC v.
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The burden placed on an intentional violator to show rehabilitation should be even greater. The public interest in such
circumstances requires that courts grant dissolution only after the
movant submits positive proof of rehabilitation. To satisfy this
burden, the enjoined party must demonstrate that his c6nduct has
been that of a model citizen or that subsequent circumstances
render it practically impossible for him to violate the decree. °1
4. Status and Identity of Movant
Should the law provide one standard for an aider and abettor seeking modification or dissolution of a permanent injunction
and another for a principal? Generally, the answer should be
clearly in the negative. There can be little question that the culpability and danger of recidivism can be as great for an aider and
abettor as for a principal. Rather, courts should make an ad hoc
determination based on the type of conduct that the original decree sought to enjoin and the subsequent steps taken by the aider
20 2
and abettor to rehabilitate himself.
In determining whether to lift a permanent injunction, some
courts arguably have shown more leniency toward individuals
than toward corporations or other entities.20 3 Such preferential
treatment is unjustified. Although the presence of severe collateral consequences should affect a court's decision, such consequences are not confined to individuals. An outstanding injunction may cripple the successful underwriting of a new stock issue
that the enjoined corporation may need desparately to raise new
capital. - 0

4

In addition, a permanent injunction against a small-

Savage, 513 F.2d 188, 189 (7th Cir. 1975); SEC v. First Sec. Bank, 447 F.2d 166, 168 (10th
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1038 (1972); Consolidated Mines v. SEC, 97 F.2d 704, 708
(9th Cir. 1938); Ayers v. SEC, 482 F. Supp. 747, 751 (D. Mont. 1980).
201 On the other hand, a mere change in occupation, without more, is insufficient for
dissolving an injunction. See generally SEC v. Bonastia, 614 F.2d 908, 913 (3d Cir. 1980).
202 The scienter requirement for aiding and abetting liability under the antifraud provisions of the federal securities law has been a subject of lively debate. See generally Edwards
& Hanly v. Wells Fargo Sec. Clearance Corp., 602 F.2d 478 (2d Cir. 1979) (recklessness is
appropriate standard for aider and abettor liability only where fiduciary duty exists); Rolf
v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1979)
(recklessness suffficient scienter where a fiduciary duty exists). For a more detailed discussion on this issue, see Steinberg & Gruenbaum, Variations of "Recklessness" After Hochfelder
and Aaron, 8 Sec REG. L.J. 179 (1980).
203 See SEC v. Warren, 583 F.2d 115, 121-22 (3d Cir. 1978); SEC v. Thermodynamics,
Inc., 464 F.2d 457, 461 (10th Cir. 1972).
204 See generally notes 52-56 and accompanying text supra.
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city brokerage firm can cause substantial financial hardship.
Perhaps more than large city firms, a local brokerage firm can
have its reputation severely damaged by an outstanding injunction

o

0

5. Societal Deterrence and the Public Interest
The foregoing discussion is subject to two caveats that merit
repetition. First, deterring individuals is not the sole objective of
an injunctive decree. Societal deterrence is important as well. 20
Second, the public or other countervailing interests -particularly
if the injunction is procured by a government entity-are
paramount. 20 7 Courts should recognize that Congress could not
have intended to subject regulatory agencies with insufficient staff
and strained resources to frequently litigate petitions seeking
20 8
modification or dissolution of decrees.
6. Change of Law
A subsequent change of law can also serve as a basis for modifying or dissolving a permanent injunction.2 0 1 The above principles that limit a court's discretion to order modification or dissolution are equally applicable in this area. Generally, for a
change in law to serve as a basis for modification or dissolution,
the prior judgment must have served as a necessary element of
the decree, thereby giving rise to the right of action or a successful defense.21 0 It is clear, however, that it is not sufficient that

21' See generally Tobin v. Alma Mills, 192 F.2d 133, 137 (4th Cir. 1951): "It is little short
of absurd to contend that [the Swift] decision requires that the consent decrees that the
various administrative agencies have been obtaining should be extended in perpetuo
against people who have been obeying the law over long periods and show no intention of
doing otherwise."
206 See notes 180-81 and accompanying text supra.
207 See generally notes 60-68 supra.
20 See notes 182-86 and accompanying text supra.
209 See, e.g., Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 436-38 (1976); System Fed'n v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 647-48 (1961); Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont
Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421 (1855); Coalition of Black Leadership v. Cianci, 570
F.2d 12, 16 (Ist Cir. 1978); De Filippis v. United States, 567 F.2d 341, 343 n.4 (7th Cir.
1977); Jordan v. School Dist., 548 F.2d 117, 122 (3d Cir. 1977); Theriault v. Smith, 523
F.2d 601, 602 (1st Cir. 1975); Class v. Norton, 507 F.2d 1058, 1061-63 (2d Cir. 1974);
Flavor Corp. v. Kenin Indus., Inc., 503 F.2d 729, 732 (8th Cir. 1974); Lubber v. Selective
Serv. Sys. Local Bd. 27, 453 F.2d 645, 650 (1st Cir. 1972).
210 Coalition of Black Leadership v. Cianci, 570 F.2d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 1978); De Filippis
v. United States, 567 F.2d 341, 343 n.4 (7th Cir. 1977); Lubber v. Selective Serv. Sys. Local
Bd. 27, 453 F.2d 645, 650 (1st Cir. 1972).
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the prior judgment provided only precedent for the entry of the
court's original decree.2 11 The crucial factor is the closeness of
the nexus between the reasons for the entry of the court's decree
and the particular rationale that was directly overruled.
Applying this criterion requires consideration of equitable
principles. For example, it is unjust to bind a party to an injunction based directly on an interpretation of law that was subsequently overruled by a Supreme Court or other controlling
court decision. 21 2 On the other hand, although courts should
apply equitable concepts to relieve an enjoined party from the decree where there has been a change of law, such relief should be
granted only when the court's order was clearly based on a pronunciation of law that was directly overruled. Otherwise, any subsequent change of law, even if used only as precedent in the
court's order, could open the floodgates for petitions seeking
modification or dissolution. In addition to further congesting the
courts, such petitions, when a government entity is a party, might
severely hamper that entity's resources. 1
C. Propriety of Limited Decrees
Whether decrees ordered for a fixed period of time are appropriate is subject to debate. While such decrees may be prope'
when they are the result of the consent negotiation process,2 14 different equitable and policy considerations arguably arise in a litigation context. Under the federal securities laws, the SEC is entitled, consistent with Hecht's equitable principles, as a matter of
statutory right to the entry of a permanent injunction "upon a
proper showing."' 2 15
Once the SEC satisfies this standard, a
court's imposition of a less stringent decree may exceed its authority and thereby may constitute an unwarranted exercise of judicial
activism. 2 16 In cases where the complainant satisfies its burden
211

See note 188 supra.

See Theriault v. Smith, 523 F.2d 601, 602 (1st Cir. 1975).
See notes 182-87 and accompanying text supra.
214 See notes 182-87 and accompanying text supra.
211 Securities Act § 20(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (1976); Exchange Act § 21(b), 15 U.S.C. §
212

213

78u(d) (1976).:The Supreme Court recently considered this issue in Aaron. See 100 S.Ct. at
1957-58.
216 Conversely, as implicitly acknowledged by the Court in Aaron, the SEC's failure to
make a "proper showing" precludes the imposition of injunctive relief. Note, however, that
in such circumstances the SEC may obtain other equitable relief, such as disgorgement. See
note 29 supra. Moreover, Hecht's equitable principles apply. See note 217 infra.
This Article does not advocate either judicial activism or restraint. Nevertheless, when
the language and meaning of a statute are clear, the judiciary, absent questions of constitu-

1980]

SEC AND OTHER INJUNCTIONS

and no statutory mandate requires the imposition of a permanent
injunction, such a decree arguably still should be ordered absent
compelling circumstances.2 1 7 In this context, as long as the standards employed for modification or dissolution are not unduly
rigorous, the movant may satisfactorily petition for relief from the
decree. The standards recommended in this Article seek to obtain
this balance. Permanently enjoining the violator once the complainant satisfies its burden serves the relevant private and public interests. If the decree becomes unduly punitive, the enjoined party
can successfully obtain modification or dissolution under the standards proposed herein.2 1 8
D. The Proposed Standard
Neither the Swift test nor the other formulations promulgated by the lower courts 2 1' is necessarily the appropriate standard to be applied in modification or dissolution suits. Rather,
courts should engage in an ad hoc balancing test, considering such
factors as (1) subsequent change of fact or law, (2) the extent of
adverse, unforeseen collateral consequences, (3) whether the injunction has fulfilled its objectives, (4) whether the individual deterrent effect of the injunction has ceased, (5) the decree's effect
on societal deterrence, (6) whether a government entity is a party
to the litigation and the adverse effect that granting of the motion
would have on the entity's resources and (7) the extent and nature
of the public or other countervailing interest involved. This list of
considerations is not exhaustive, but should serve as a fairly comprehensive benchmark for assessing motions for modification or
dissolution. Although the formulation may resemble a balancing

tionality, should properly enforce Congress' express intent. See generally Griswold, Foreword:
Of Time and Attitudes-Professor Hart and Judge Arnold, 74 HARV. L. REv. 81 (1960); Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 86
YALE L.J. 221 (1973).
2'1 Such compelling circumstances might include, for example, that regardless of the
violator's good faith, future violations nevertheless will occur, and that the ordering of an
injunction would serve no beneficial public interest. The facts in Hecht Co. v. Bowles resembled this characterization. See 321 U.S. at 324-26; notes 23-28 and accompanying text supra.
21' For the reasons provided herein, injunctions ordered for a fixed period of time or
ordering the parties to appear before the court at some future date are ordinarily measures that misallocate the proper burdens, provided the complainant has satisfied the requisite standards. It bears emphasis that the enjoined party under traditional principles of
equity can move for dissolution or modification. If the decree's continuance serves no
legitimate need, the court may order appropriate relief.
"' For a description of the various standards, see notes 145-52 and accompanying text

supra.
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test, such a characterization may be misleading. The importance
of each factor may change from case to case, depending on the
totality of the circumstances. Further, if the factors are to be
weighed, they should not be weighed equally. 22 0 For example,
when a party seeks modification or dissolution of an injunction
that was obtained by a government entity, the public interest
criteria should be of paramount importance. 22 1 In such a case,
dissolution or modification may still be granted-but only if the
public interest is relatively minute or, in the alternative, if the
other variables clearly are predominant.
This standard would undoubtedly vest wide discretion in the
trial court. Such discretion, however, is wholly consistent with
equity jurisdiction. 222 The proposal's greatest deficiency is its lack
of a uniform standard, which invites ad hoc variations and disparate rationales among the courts. The proposal does have a common thread, however, that would link all such cases involving

220 Both congressional legislation and Supreme Court precedent support the establish-

ment of a balancing standard in appropriate situations. For example, under the Speedy
Trial Act, Congress directed that in determining whether a dismissal should be with or
without prejudice, a court must consider, among others, the following four factors: (1) the
seriousness of the offense, (2) the facts and circumstances which led to the dismissal, (3)
the impact of a reprosecution on the administration of the Act, and (4) the impact of a
reprosecution on the administration of justice. 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(1)(2). See Steinberg,
Dismissal With or Without Prejudice Under the Speedy Trial Act: A ProposedInterpretation, 68 J.
CRINO. L. & C. 1 (1977).
In Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), the Court established a four-prong test to determine whether to imply a private cause of action under a federal statute:
First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was
enacted,"- that is, does the statute create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit,
either to create such a remedy or to deny one? Third, is it consistent with the
underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the
plaintiff? And finally, is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state
law, in an area basically the concern of the States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law?
Id. at 78 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). In a subsequent case, the Court held
that not all of the Cort factors are to be weighed equally. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington,
442 U.S. 560, 575 (1979). See Transamerica Mortgage Advisers, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11,
15-16 (1979); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 703 (1979); Steinberg, Implied Private Rights of Action Under Federal Law, 55 NOTRE DAME LAw. 33 (1979).
22 See notes 43-48 supra. But see United States v. Swift & Co., 189 F. Supp. 885, 905
(N.D. Ill. 1969), aff'd per curiam, 367 U.S. 909 (1961) ("Protection for the public is therefore to be achieved so far as possible without visiting unnecessary hardship upon the defendants").
222 See, e.g., Mitchell v. Robert Demario Jewelry Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 291-92 (1960); United States v. Moore, 340 U.S. 616, 619 (1951); Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S.
395, 397-98 (1946); Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944); Meredith v. Winter
Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 235 (1943); notes 24-30 and accompanying text supra.
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modification or dissolution: the above factors would be relevant in
each court's determination and some factors, such as the public
interest, would be more important than others.
This proposal comports with the traditional function of
equity jurisdiction. Courts having jurisdiction of suits in equity
should not be confined to fixed rules or formulations. Rather,
they should be flexible to meet the various exigencies as they arise
on a case by case basis.2 2 3 The formulation proposed should
provide courts of equity adequate guidance, yet afford them sufficient power "to do equity" 2 24 and to order whatever "relief may
be necessary under the circumstances." 22"5
CONCLUSION

This Article has scrutinized the guidelines used in the ordering of injunctive relief and the various standards employed by the
courts to review motions for modification or dissolution of permanent injunctions. Although much of the discussion has centered on the modification or dissolution issue in the context of
injunctions procured by government entities, particularly the SEC,
many of the principles set forth apply to privately obtained injunctions as well.
Although the Swift test is the majority view today, a number
of courts have deviated from this standard. Close analysis reveals
that courts should employ neither the Swift test nor any other of
the standards thus far adopted. Rather, courts should take an approach that resembles an ad hoc balancing test, taking into account
a number of factors. The scope of this Article was not only to
propose such a standard but also to analyze the numerous criteria
formulated by the courts and to scrutinize their underpinnings.
Hopefully, regardless of whether tribunals adopt the proposed
standard, this analysis of the various decisions and their rationales
will prove beneficial to courts, practitioners, and scholars in deciphering this important and controversial area of equity jurisdiction.

223

See generally note 195 supra.

224 Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944).
225 Porter v. Warner Hoiding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398 (1946).

SOLIDARITY FOREVER-OR HARDLY EVER:
UNION DISCIPLINE, TAFT-HARTLEY,

AND THE RIGHT OF
UNION MEMBERS TO RESIGN*
William B. Gouldt
American labor law embraces an abiding tension between
maintaining workers' collective interests in solidarity through
labor unions and protecting the worker's ability to dissent from
the majoritarian decisions of unions that affect significant individual rights.1 These competing interests are at the core of the
historical debate concerning union security arrangements
negotiated in collective bargaining agreements that compel membership in a union as a condition of employment. 2 More recently, these interests have been the focal point of another labor
policy debate-the union's authority to discipline members whose
conduct compromises the solidarity interests of other members.
Litigation in this area has expanded geomeirical.ly in the past
twenty years, 3 producing concern and consternation among many
militant, progressive, and other liberal trade unionists. These individuals, along with other union, civic, and political leaders, view

* This Article was presented as a paper to the 1980 Southern California Labor Law
Symposium in Los Angeles, California, on April 25, 1980.
t Professor of Law, Stanford Law School. Secretary, Labor and Employment Law Section, American Bar Association. B.A. 1958, University of Rhode Island; LL.B. 1961, Cornell Law School; Graduate Study, 1962-63, London School of Economics. Copyright
©1980 by William B. Gould. While I take full responsibility for any deficiencies in this
Article, I wish to express gratitude for a number of useful discussions on this subject to
Cornelius Peck, Professor of Law, University of Washington Law School (Visiting Professor
of Law, Stanford Law School), and to Julius Reich, Los Angeles, California, member of the
California bar. I am also grateful for research assistance provided by Todd Brower, Stanford Law School '80, and Deborah Roth, Stanford Law School '81.
See generally L. BRANDEIS, S. PERLMAN, P. TAFT & J. COMMONS, HISTORY OF LABOR IN
THE UNITED STATES (1966); H. MILLIS & R. MONTGOMERY, ORGANIZED LABOR (1945); S.
WEBB & B. WEBB, INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY (1965); S. WEBB & B. WEBB, THE HISTORY OF
TRADE UNIONISM (rev. ed. 1973).
2 See generally W. OBERER, K. HANSLOWE &

J.

ANDERSEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON

LABOR LAw 42-50, 167-68, 808-14, 838-53 (2d ed. 1979). See also K. HANSLOWE, D. DUNN &
J. ERSTLING, UNION SECURITY IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT: OF FREE RIDING AND FREE AsSOCIATION (Inst. Pub. Employment Monograph No. 8-1978).
3 See note 27 infra.
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with alarm a perceived decline in the American labor movement
brought about by the threat to the voluntary support of rank and
4
file workers who form the heart and strength of trade unions.
This Article analyzes the tension between a union's right to discipline its members and the member's concomitant right to avoid
discipline by resigning from the union. The Supreme Court has
not adequately addressed this issue, leaving the lower courts and
the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to forge ahead relatively unguided in these troublesome waters.
A trade union should lawfully be able to restrict a member's
right to resign.
Many union constitutions and bylaws, however,
fail to accommodate the union's interest in restricting the right to
resign with the union member's legitimate interest in refraining
from collective activity. This Article suggests that these interests
could be balanced by union constitutions that freely allow members to resign until ten or fifteen days after contract negotiations
begin. Unions should not be allowed to discipline members for
their post-resignation conduct unless those unions provide midstrike democratic ballot box procedures for challenging union decisions. In addition, many of the problems caused by member resignations and post-resignation discipline could be avoided if unions
fully informed their members that union membership is never required under any collective bargaining contract if the worker
satisfies the same financial obligations that regular union members
must meet. If the unions shirk this responsibility, the Board
should establish an educational program to fill this gap.

4 See generally S. BARKIN, THE DECLINE OF THE LABOR MOVEMENT (1961); Raskin, The
Big Squeeze on Labor Unions, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Oct. 1979, at 41; Raskin, The Squeeze on
the Unions, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, June 1961, at 55.
Many trade unionists strongly oppose fining members and are embarrassed by the
notion that union officers should be compelled to impose monetary sanctions on members
who must support themselves and their families.
In an article published several years after NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388
U.S. 175 (1967), I asserted that the Board should strictly scrutinize union discipline: "IT~he
Board [should] not... abdicate its responsibility to limit discipline which is offensive to
public policy where penalties are involved." Gould, Some Limitations Upon Union Discipline
Under the National Labor Relations Act: The Radiations of Allis-Chalmers, 1970 DUKE L.j. 1067,
1137. Subsequent events and a re-analysis of the union's interest in restricting member
resignations in certain circumstances have instigated a moderate retraction of my earlier
opinions.
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I
ALLIS-CHALMERS AND SECTION

8(b)(1)(A)

OF THE

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT

A. Section 8(b)(1)(A): A Limit on Union Autonomy
In the United States, a labor organization 6 acts as the exclusive bargaining representative 7 empowered to negotiate an
employment contract covering all workers, union and nonunion, 8
within an appropriate bargaining unit.9 Congress purposefully
designed the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) to promote
union autonomy t ° by creating this exclusive status and by pro6 The term "labor organization" means any organization of any kind, or any

agency or employee representation committee or plan, in which employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with
employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of
employment, or conditions of work.
National Labor Relations Act of 1935, § 2(5), 29 U.S.C § 152(5) (1976).
' Section 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976),
provides:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining
by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall
be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the
purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of
employment, or other conditions of employment: Provided, That any individual
employee or a group of employees shall have the right at any time to present
grievances to their employer and to have such grievances adjusted, without the
intervention of the bargaining representative.
8 See Radio Officers Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 47 (1954).
The employer may be obligated to bargain on a plant, company, or multi-employer
basis. "The Board shall decide in each case whether, in order to assure to employees the
fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by this Act, the unit appropriate for the
purposes of collective bargaining shall be the employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof." National Labor Relations Act of 1935, § 9(b), 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1976).
10 Industrial strife which interferes with the normal flow of commerce and with
the full production of articles and commodities for commerce, can be avoided
or substantially minimized if employers, employees, and labor organizations
each recognize under law one another's legitimate rights in their relations with
each other, and above all recognize under law that neither party has any right
in its relations with any other to engage in acts or practices which jeopardize
the public health, safety, or interest.
It is the purpose and policy of this chapter, in order to promote the full
flow of commerce, to prescribe the legitimate rights of both employees and
employers in their relations affecting commerce, to provide orderly and peaceful procedures for preventing the interference by either with the legitimate
rights of the other, to. protect the rights of individual employees in their relations with labor organizations whose activities affect commerce, to define and
proscribe practices on the part of labor and management which affect commerce and are inimical to the general welfare, and to protect the rights of the
public in connection with labor disputes affecting commerce.
National Labor Relations Act of 1935, § l(b), 29 U.S.C. § 141(b) (1976).
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hibiting employers from "interfer[ing], restrain[ing], or
coerc[ing]" employees in the exercise of their right to form and
join, or refrain from forming and joining, labor unions."
This
well-established principle of exclusivity imposes an obligation on
the union to represent all workers within the unit fairly and to
deal with them in good faith.1 2 Congress and the courts have
imposed several other significant limits on union autonomy that
reflect the inherent conflict between the rights of an individual
and the interests of the union.
The 1947 Taft-Hartley amendments to the NLRA proscribed
the closed shop by prohibiting collective bargaining contracts that
require all job applicants to belong to a union as a prerequisite for
employment eligibility. 3 These amendments did not, however,
ban "union shop" contracts, which require new employees to become union members thirty days or more after they accept
employment. 14 In addition, state "right to work" laws, which
prohibit union security clauses requiring union membership as a
condition of employment,1 5 are not preempted by the NLRA. 16
17
The Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v. General Motors Corp.,
which held that under the Taft-Hartley amendments an employee
was a "member" of a union if he paid union dues and initiation

" National Labor Relations Act of 1935, § 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976). This
provision is more restrictive than the comparable statute governing union conduct.
12 Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967). See also Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323
U.S. 192 (1944) (duty of fair representation imposed under Railway Labor Act).
"nSee National Labor Relations Act of 1935, § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976); cf.
Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 301
(1949) (state may prohibit maintenance-of-membership clause that requires employee to
remain union member once he voluntarily joins union).
14 See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976).
15 Section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act- of 1935, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3)
(1976), provides in part:
[Niothing in this subchapter, or in any other statute of the United States, shall
preclude an employer from making an agreement with a labor organization
(not established, maintained, or assisted by any action defined in [section 8(a) of
the Act] as an unfair labor practice) to require as a condition of employment
membership therein on or after the thirtieth day following the beginning of
such employment or the effective date of such agreement, whichever is the
later.
16 Section 14(b) of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, added by the Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947, authorizes states to enact tight to work laws
that prohibit collective bargaining agreements from "requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment in any State." 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1976).
17 373 U.S 734 (1963).
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fees, further restricted union autonomy. 8 The NLRA does not
require actual membership in the union. 1" Thus, contracts requiring union shops today effectively require only "agency
shops," 20 a phrase from the labor lexicon used to refer to contract
clauses that explicitly require the employee to meet only the financial responsibilities, but not the membership obligations, of
union membership.
Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the NLRA, added to the Act by the
Taft-Hartley amendments, is another major limitation on union
authority. 2 ' By prohibiting unions from "restrain[ing] or
coerc[ing] ... employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
in section [7 of the NLRA], ' 22 section 8(b)(1)(A) mandates that
unions-as well as employers-must respect the individual worker's right to join or refrain from joining labor unions. Congress
partially preserved internal union autonomy, however, with a
proviso to section 8(b)(1)(A) exempting union "rules with respect

Is Id. at 741-44.
19 [N]o employer shall justify any discrimination against an employee for nonmembership in a labor organization ... if he has reasonable grounds for believing that membership was denied or terminated for reasons other than the
failure of the employee to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees
uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership.
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3)(B) (1976).
20 See R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAw 644-45 (1976).
21 National Labor Relations Act of 1935, § 8(b)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1976).
22 Id. Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976),
provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right
to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right
may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization
as a condition of employment as authorized in section 158(a)(3) of this title.
The Supreme Court explained the purpose for this provision as follows:
Section 7 affirmatively guarantees employees the most basic rights of industrial self-determination, "the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection," as well as the right to
refrain from these activities. These are, for the most part, collective rights,
rights to act in concert with one's fellow employees: they are protected not for
their own sake but as an instrument of the national labor policy of minimizing
industrial strife "by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining."
Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50, 61-62 (1975)
(quoting 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970)). See generally Cox, The Right to Engage in Concerted Activities,
26 IND. L.J. 319 (1951).
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to the acquisition or retention of membership" from the restriction against union restraint and coercion of employees.2 3 Until
1967, courts and the Board interpreted this proviso to allow any internal union discipline that did not affect a worker's employment
status;24 external sanctions imposed by employers because of an
employee's union or nonunion activities, on the other hand, were
outlawed by this proviso. The Supreme Court modified this relatively simple dichotomy in 1967 when it recognized that fines, expulsion, or other sanctions imposed by a union may affect the
worker's pay envelope more than discipline imposed by the
employer. 25 In so doing, it created a new standard from which
26
the fallout has not yet settled.

B. NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co.
In NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co., 27 two UAW lo-

cals initiated internal proceedings against union members who
had crossed picket lines during a valid economic strike.28 Local

23 The proviso states: "[TIhis paragraph [section 8(b)(1)] shall not impair the right of a
labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the'acquisition or retention of
membership therein...." 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1976).
24 See, e.g., Local 248, UAW (Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co.), 149 N.L.R.B. 67, 70, 57
L.R.R.M. 1242 (1964), rev'd, 358 F.2d 656 (7th Cir. 1965), aff'd, 388 U.S. 175 (1967);
Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 727, 728-29, 34 L.R.R.M. 1431, 1432
(1954).
25 See text accompanying notes 137-40 infra.
26 The literature on this subject is voluminous. See, e.g., Atleson, Union Fines and Picket
Lines: The NLRA and Union Disciplinary Power, 17 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 681 (1970); Cox, Some
Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1947); Craver, The
Boeing Decision: A Blow to Federalism, Individual Rights and Stare Decisis, 122 U. PA. L. REV.
556 (1974); Gould, Some Limitations Upon Union Discipline Under the National Labor Relations
Act: The Radiations of Allis-Chalmers, 1970 DUKE L.J. 1067; Silard, Labor Board Regulation of
Union Discipline After Allis-Chalmers, Marine Works and Scofield, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 187
(1969); Note, Restrictions on the Right to Resign: Can a Member's Freedom to "Escape the Union
Rule" Be Overcome by Union Boilerplate?, 42 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 397 (1974); Note, Union
Power to Discipline Members Who Resign, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1536 (1973); Comment, The Inherent Conflict Between Sections 7 and 8(b)(1)(A) of the NationalLabor Relations Act-Union Attempts
to Discipline Resigning Strikebreakers, 1978 Wis. L. REV. 859.
27 388 U.S. 175 (1967).
28 An economic strike is a protected activity under the NLRA. Although economic
strikers may not be dismissed or disciplined by an employer, they may be permanently
replaced. 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1976); see NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333
(1938); Gould, The Status of Unauthorized and "Wildcat" Strikes Under the National Labor Relations Act, 52 CORNELL L. REV. 672, 675-80 (1967).
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trial committees found the members guilty of "conduct unbecoming a Union member," 2 and assessed fines against them. After
one of the union locals obtained a state court judgment against a
member who had refused to pay a fine, 30 the company filed an
unfair labor practice charge with the Board alleging that the local
unions' disciplinary actions violated section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.
The Board dismissed the charge on the ground that the proviso
to section 8(b)(1)(A) exempted all internal union discipline from
unfair labor practice liability. 3 I The Seventh Circuit reversed the
Board, holding that in spite of the proviso, section 8(b)(1)(A) unambiguously prohibits union discipline that restrains or coerces
employees who exercise their right to refrain from union ac32
tivities.
A closely divided Supreme Court reversed. 3 3 The majority
concluded it was "highly unrealistic" that the statutory language
"precisely" proscribed this union discipline. 34 The majority
examined the proviso's legislative history, finding that the
[n]ational labor policy has been built on the premise that by
pooling their economic strength and acting through a labor organization freely chosen by the majority, the employees of an
appropriate unit have the most effective means of bargaining
for improvements in wages, hours, and working conditions....
Integral to this federal labor policy has been the power in
the chosen union to protect against erosion its status under that

policy through reasonable discipline of members who violate

29 388 U.S. at 177.
30 Id. The Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision affirming the trial court's finding that it
was not unlawful for the union to collect these fines by suits in state courts is reported in
Local 248, UAW v. Natzke, 36 Wis. 2d 237, 153 N.W.2d 602 (1967).
"' Local 248, UAW (Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co.), 149 N.L.R.B. 67, 57 L.R.R.M. 1242
(1964).
32 Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 358 F.2d 656 (1966), rev'd, 388 U.S. 175 (1967).
33 Justice White filed a concurring opinion expressing his "doubt ... about the implications of some of [the] generalized statements" in the majority opinion. 388 U.S. at 199.
He reasoned that logic compelled the Court to uphold the discipline because the Court had
previously upheld more severe discipline (i.e., expulsion from the union) imposed on other
strikebreakers. Moreover, he qualified the majority opinion:
I do not mean to indicate, and I do not read the majority opinion otherwise, that every conceivable internal union rule which impinges upon the § 7
rights of union members is valid and enforceable by expulsion and court action.
There may well be some internal union rules which on their face are wholly
invalid and unenforceable.
388 U.S. at 198.
31 Id. at 179.
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rules and regulations governing membership. That power is
particularly vital when the members engage in strikes. The
economic strike against the employer is the ultimate weapon in
labor's arsenal for achieving agreement upon its terms.... Provisions in union constitutions and bylaws for fines and expulsion of recalcitrants, including strikebreakers, are therefore
commonplace and were commonplace at the time of the TaftHartley amendments.3
The Court advanced two important arguments to support its
conclusion that the unions' sanctions did not violate section
8(b)(1)(A). First, the Court reasoned that the failure to acknowledge a union's right to fine its members under the NLRA would
encourage unions to expel or exclude workers from the union as
alternative forms of discipline. Because the expulsion remedy
could be utilized by only strong unions that can afford to lose
members, this approach would penalize weak unions. 3 1 Second,
the Court observed that the union security clause in the collective
bargaining agreement between the company and the two local
unions did not compel full union membership; an employee was
required to become a member only "to the extent of paying his
monthly dues." 7 Consequently, because the employees had become full union members voluntarily, they knowingly assumed all
membership obligations -including subjection to union discipline.
The Court argued that
the relevant inquiry here is not what motivated a member's full
membership but whether the Taft-Hartley amendments prohibited disciplinary measures against a full member who crossed
his union's picket line.... Whether those prohibitions would
apply if the locals had imposed fines on members whose membership was in fact limited to the obligation of paying monthly
dues is a question not before us.... 38

35

Id. at 180, 181-82 (footnotes omitted).

36
37

Id. at 183.
Id. at 196.

38

Id.

at 196-97. The Court also relied on two other arguments to support its holding

that the union discipline did not violate § 8(b)(1)(A). First, the Court noted that a contrary

interpretation of § 8(b)(1)(A), stripping unions of their ability to fine members for strikebreaking, would imply that the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure (LandrumGriffin) Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1976), which had apparently established the
first explicit set of procedural and substantive protections for union members vis-a-vis their

unions, was actually preceded by an even more comprehensive, albeit implicit, code regulating internal union affairs. 388 U.S. at 181, 183. Second, the Court referred to the
legislative history of § 8(b)(1)(A) and noted that Congress specifically disavowed any intent
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Although the Allis-Chalmers decision appeared to strengthen
the union's right to discipline its members, under section
8(b)(1)(A)'s proviso, it also raised many questions concerning union
discipline imposed upon employees who are not members. The
remaining sections of this Article examine the ramifications of
Allis-Chalmers upon discipline of nonmembers and former union
members.
II
CLARIFYING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
UNION DISCIPLINE AND UNION MEMBERSHIP

The Allis-Chalmers Court indicated that it may regard the degree of union membership significant in determining the extent
of a union's disciplinary authority. Although the Court did not
explicitly address this question, 39 it implied that a worker whose
union "membership" was limited to paying dues and initiation
fees should be less vulnerable to sanctions than a "full" union
member.4" The issues that arise more frequently, however, conto interfere with the internal affairs of trade unions. Id. at 184-85. Section 8(b)(1)(A) was
designed by Congress solely to protect workers from union threats and reprisals during
organizational campaigns. Id. at 185-91. This conclusion was consistent with the "'contract
theory' of the union-member relationship that prevailed at [the] time" Congress enacted
the National Labor Relations Act. Id. at 192. Although fines and sanctions were sanctioned
by § 8(b)(1)(A)'s proviso, the Court noted that judicially enforceable fines existed only
under the contract between the union and the member as embodied in the union's constitution and bylaws. Id. at 192-95.
Justice Black, joined by Justices Douglas, Harlan and Stewart, wrote a lengthy dissent,
arguing that the union discipline in this case was clearly designed to coerce workers in
violation of § 8(b)(1)(A). Id. at 199, 202-08.
39 Id. at 196.

40 Under an agency shop provision, a worker is required only to pay union dues and
initiation fees. A union shop provision, on the other hand, requires the worker to join the
union and become a full member as well as pay dues and initiation fees. See text accompanying notes 142-49 infra.
The relatively few cases concerning union discipline of limited members supports the
proposition that limited members-those paying dues only under an agency shop
provision-can be disciplined only for nonpayment of dues. See Local Union No. 167,
Progressive Mine Workers v. NLRB, 422 F.2d 538 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 905
(1970) (union cannot deny nonmembers access to welfare plan provided they pay equivalent- of union dues); UAW Local 1756 (Am. Hoechst Corp.), 240 N.L.R.B. No. 13, 100
L.R.R.M. 1208 (1979) (union cannot assess readmission fee and threaten employee with
dismissal after employee resigned from union but continued paying equivalent of union
dues); Bricklayers' Union No. 11 (Rochester Floors, Inc.), 221 N.L.R.B. 133, 90 L.R.R.M.
1621 (1975) (nonunion employees who tender dues and initiation fees not required to pay
new initiation fees after union negotiates new security clause); Laborers' Local 573 (Mengel
Constr. Co.), 196 N.L.R.B. 440 (1972), enforced, 83 L.R.R.M. 2988 (7th Cir. 1973) (union
cannot terminate from hiring hall nonmembers who tender dues).
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cern the validity of post-resignation union discipline and union
restrictions on the right to resign.
A. Discipline of Former Union Members
The clearest case for invalidating union sanctions would arise
when a worker resigns his union membership before violating a
union rule. In Scofield v. NLRB, 41 the Supreme Court held that
union fines imposed on members who had exceeded production
quotas in violation of a legitimate union rule were valid under the
proviso to section 8(b)(1)(A). 4 2 Justice White, writing for the
majority, observed:
[Section] 8(b)(1) leaves a union free to enforce a properly
adopted rule which reflects a legitimate union interest, impairs
no policy Congress has imbedded in the labor laws, and is
reasonably enforced against union members who arefree to leave
43
the union and escape the rule.
The Court squarely addressed the question of whether the
ability to resign union membership was a precondition for valid
union discipline in NLRB v. Granite State Joint Board, Textile Workers. 44 An eight member majority held in Granite State that a union
had violated section 8(b)(1)(A) by fining workers for returning
to work during a lawful strike after they had resigned from the
union.4 5 The union membership had voted to strike shortly after
the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement if their demands were not met. After the strike began, the membership
ratified a proposal to levy fines on any member who aided the
employer during the strike. 46 Notwithstanding this warning, a
number of workers resigned from the union and returned to
work during the strike. 47 The union fined the strike-breaking
former members and sued in state court to collect the fines.
The Court distinguished Allis-Chalmers on the ground that
the workers disciplined in Allis-Chalmers "enjoyed full union membership" whereas the workers in Granite State had lawfully re41 394 U.S. 423 (1969).
42

Id. at 428-30.

* Id. at 430 (emphasis added).
44 409 U.S. 213 (1972).
45 Id. at 215-18.
46 NLRB v. Granite State Joint Bd., Textile Workers, Local 1029, 446 F.2d 369, 370
(lst Cir. 1971). Only one member dissented when the strike vote was taken. Id.
4 409 U.S. at 214.
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signed from the union. 48 Noting that section 7 of the NLRA gives
the worker the " 'right to refrain from any or all' concerted activities relatded] to collective bargaining,"4 the Court concluded:
[T]he power of the union over the member is certainly no
greater than the union-member contract. Where a member lawfully resigns from a union and thereafter engages in conduct
which the union rule proscribes, the union commits an unfair
labor practice when it seeks enforcement of fines for that conduct. That is to say, when there is a lawful dissolution of a
union-member relation, the union has no more control over the
former member than it has over the man in the street.5 0
The Court rejected the argument that the workers were properly
disciplined because they had participated in the votes approving
the strike and the strike-breaking penaltiesA t Thus, the Court
confirmed in Scofield and Granite State what it had hinted in AllisChalmers-that union membership is a prerequisite for valid discipline under section 8(b)(1)(A).
B. Protecting the Right to Resign
In Granite State, the Court did not rule on the validity of "a
union's constitution or bylaws [that] defin[ed] or limit[ed] the circumstances under which a member may resign from the union";5 2
it held that the workers had lawfully resigned from the union before violating the union rules. The opportunity to consider this
question soon arose, however. In Booster Lodge No. 405, Machinists
v. NLRB, 53 a group of workers who had crossed picket lines during a lawful strike was fined by the union under a constitutional
provision that prohibited "members" from strikebreaking.5 4 Although the union's constitution did not expressly prohibit or
permit members to resign, some of the fined members sent letters
of resignation to the union before returning to work and the
55
others sent similar letters shortly after they returned to work.

48 Id.
4

at 215.

Id. at 216 (quoting National Labor Relations Act of 1935, § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157

(1976)).
Id. at 217. See Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinion, 409 U.S. at 218, 220-21.
31 Id. at 217-18.

50
52

409 U.S. at 216.

53 412 U.S. 84 (1973) (per curiam).
54 Id. at 87.

5- Id. at 85.
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In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that the union
committed an unfair labor practice by seeking judicial enforcement of fines that stemmed from post-resignation activities.5 " Although the Court left "open the question of the extent to which
contractual restriction[s could be placed] on a member's right to
resign," - -as it had done in Granite State 5 8 -it concluded that
the fine was illegal because the union presented "no evidence that
the employees here either knew of or had consented to any limitation on their right to resign." " Rejecting the union's argument
that the strikebreaking penalty could be enforced against a former
member as part of a contract entered into before termination of
membership, the Court noted:
Nothing in the record indicates that Union members were informed, prior to the bringing of the charges that were the basis
of this action, that the provision was interpreted as imposing
any obligation on a resignee. Thus, in order to sustain the
Union's position, we would first have to find ... that the
Union constitution by implication extended its sanctions to
nonmembers, and then further conclude that such sanctions
were consistent with the Act. But we are no more disposed to
find an implied post-resignation commitment from the strikebreaking proscription in the Union's constitution here than we
were to find it from the employees' participation in the strike
vote and ratification of penalties in Textile Workers [Granite
State]. 60
Thus, the Court appears to have established a new statutory
"right to resign," grounded in section 8(b)(1)(A) and recognized in
Scofield, Granite State, and Booster Lodge. Yet it has left undefined
the scope of that right. The Granite State Court noted in dicta that
members should be free to resign from the union at any timeeven during a strike-in order to avoid discipline. 6 ' The
employees' valid resignations in both cases effectively nullified
otherwise lawful union discipline. The issue raised by these decisions, then, is the extent to which a union may restrict its members' right to resign. The Board has addressed this issue in several

Id. at 88.
Id.
5' "We do not now decide to what extent the contractual relationship between union
56

57

and member may
59 412 U.S. at
60 Id. at 89-90
61 409 U.S. at

curtail the freedom to resign." 409 U.S. 212, 217 (1972).
88.
(footnote omitted).
217. See text accompanying notes 91-93 infra.
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cases, but it has yet to find that any union's constitutional provision restricting member resignations falls within the protective
ambit of the proviso to section 8(b)(1)(A). 62 The Ninth Circuit,
on the other hand, recently upheld a provision of the International Association of Machinists' (Machinists) constitution restricting the right to resign.6 3 After reconsidering its decision on a
motion for rehearing, the court issued a second opinion remanding the case to "give the Board, the expert body in the field of
labor relations, an opportunity to consider and decide" whether
the restriction was valid under section 8(b)(1)(A). 6 4
Three types of union constitutional restrictions on a
member's right to resign have been challenged. The Court in
Booster Lodge invalidated one potential restriction, implied from a
union constitution's silence on member resignation, when it held
that a member was free to resign from the union at any time if
the constitution did not explicitly prohibit or limit resignations.
The following subsections discuss two other types of restrictions:
absolute prohibitions on resignations and partial restrictions allowing resignations during limiteo1 escape periods.
1. Absolute Prohibitions
Constitutional provisions that effectively place an absolute
prohibition on resignation present the clearest case for invalida62 See, e.g., Oil Workers Local 6-578 (Gordy's, Inc.), 238 N.L.R.B. No. 172, 99 L.R.R.M.
1639 (1978), enforced, 103 L.R.R.M. 2895 (8th Cir. Mar. 13, 1980); Machinists Local 1327
(Dalmo Victor), 231 N.L.R.B. 719, 719, 96 L.R.R.M. 1160 (1977), enforcement denied and
remanded, 608 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1979); Local 1384 UAW (Ex-Cell-O Corp.), 227 N.L.R.B.
1045, 1050-51, 94 L.R.R.M. 1145 (1975); UAW Local 647 (General Electric Co.), 197
N.L.R.B. 608, 80 L.R.R.M. 1411 (1972); Aeronautical Indus. Dist. Lodge 751 (Boeing Co.),
173 N.L.R.B. 450, 69 L.R.R.M. 1363 (1968); cf. Meat Cutters Local 81 (Empire Enterprises), 241 N.L.R.B. No. 125, 100 L.R.R.M. 1607 (1979) (union did not violate § 8(b)(1)(A)
by adopting rule banning resignations when strike is imminent because no evidence union
enforced rule). See also Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Teamsters Local 822, 584 F.2d 41 (4th Cir.
1978) (union restriction on revocation of dues checkoff authorization invalid).
63 NLRB v. Machinists Local 1327, 101 L.R.R.M. 3096 (9th Cir. 1979). See text accompanying notes 122-35 infra.
64 NLRB v. Machinists Local 1327, 608 F.2d 1219, 1222 (9th Cir. 1979), dening enforcement and remanding 231 N.L.R.B. 719, 96 L.R.R.M. 1160 (1977).
At this time, the Board has yet to rule on the Dalmo Victor case after remand from the
Ninth Circuit. The Board has consolidated with Dalmo Victor an appeal from the administrative law judge's (ALJ) decision in Pattern Makers' League (Rockford-Beloit Pattern Jobbers Ass'n), No. 33-CB- 1132 (NLRB, Div. Judges, San Francisco, filed Nov. 28, 1978) (on
file at the Cornell Law Review). In that case, the ALJ invalidated the Pattern Makers' League
Law 13 and ruled that it must be "expunged" from the union's league laws because it
'unequivocally prohibits resignations during the course of a strike or when a strike appears
to be imminent." Id., slip op. at 10.
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tion. These provisions, which typically allow a member to resign
only if he leaves the trade or industry, 65 subject a worker to the
Hobson's choice of relinquishing his livelihood or accepting union
discipline. The Board has held that this method of restricting
member resignations offends public policy and constitutes unlawful restraint and coercion under section 8(b)(1)(A).6'
Absolute
prohibitions on member resignations also conflict with the
Board's interpretation of the NLRA that an'employee's lack of
union membership cannot affect his employment status under a
union shop provision unless he fails to tender periodic dues and
67
initiation fees.
2. Resignation Limited to "Escape Periods"
Union constitutions and bylaws that limit a member's ability
to resign to a fixed time period present more complex issues. The
Board has considered numerous challenges to the United Auto
Workers' (UAW) constitution, which permits members to resign
only if they send a signed, written communication by registered or
certified mail to the financial secretary of the local union within
68
ten days of the end of the union's fiscal year.
65 In Paperworkers Local 725 (Boise S. Co.), 220 N.L.R.B. 812, 90 L.R.R.M. 1358
(1975), the Board characterized the UNITED PAPERWORKERS INT'L UNION CONST. art. XI,
§ 7 (1972), as follows: "We note that this provision only deals with withdrawal from the union
when a member is leaving the International's jurisdiction.... [W]e conclude that [under
this provision, the member is] able to resign -at will.
220 N.L.R.B. at 813-14, 90
L.R.R.M. at 1359.
", See, e.g., Sales Workers Local 80 (Capitol-Husting Co.), 235 N.L.R.B. 1264, 98
L.R.R.M. 1123 (1978); Paperworkers Local 725 (Boise S. Co.), 220 N.L.R.B. 812, 90
L.R.R.M. 1358 (1975); Local 205, Lithographers Union (General Gravure Serv. Co.), 186
N.L.R.B. 454, 75 L.R.R.M. 1356 (1970); cf. NLRB v. Machinists Lodge 1871, 575 F.2d 54
(2d Cir. 1978) (union cannot fine members for resigning during strike when constitution
did not explicitly restrict such resignations). See also Local 357, Teamsters v. NLRB, 365
U.S. 667 (1961) (hiring halls valid under NLRA); Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S.
17 (1954) (union unlawfully caused employer not to rehire employee by refusing employee
member in good standing status).
67 See John J. Roche & Co., 231 N.L.R.B. 1082, 1083-84, 96 L.R.R.M. 1281, 1284
(1977); Communications Workers Local 6135 (Southwestern Bell Tel. Co.), 188 N.L.R.B.
971, 971, 76 L.R.R.M. 1635, 1636 (1971); Chemical Workers Local 143 (Lederle
Laboratories), 188 N.L.R.B. 705, 707-08, 76 L.R.R.M. 1385, 1387 (1971).
68 A member may resign or terminate his membership only if he is in good
standing, is not in arrears or delinquent in the payment of any dues or other
financial obligation to the International Union or to his Local Union and there
are no charges filed and pending against him. Such resignation or termination
shall be effective only if by written communication, signed by the member, and
sent by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, to the Financial
Secretary of the Local Union within the ten (10) day period prior to the end of
the fiscal year of the Local Union as fixed by this Constitution, whereupon it
shall become effective sixty (60) days after the end of such fiscal year; pro-
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The resignation will become effective sixty days after the close of
the fiscal year. The constitution also provides that a resignation
from an employee who has executed a dues check-off authorization becomes effective either upon the termination of this authorization or sixty days after the end of the fiscal year, whichever is later. 69
In UAW Local 647 (General Electric Co.),

70

the Board first

ruled on the validity of a union's discipline imposed on members
who failed to resign in accordance with these provisions of the
UAW constitution. After the union fined two employees for crossing a picket line during a valid strike, the employees and the
company filed unfair labor practice charges with the Board, claiming that the fines violated section 8(b)(1)(A). The union argued
that the discipline was valid because the employees had not resigned within ten days of the end of the union's fiscal year, 7 1 as
required by the constitution. The Board rejected the union's arvided, that if the employer of such member has been authorized either by such
member individually or by the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the
employer and the Union to check off the membership dues of such member,
then such resignation shall become effective upon the effective termination of
such authorization, or upon the expiration of such sixty (60) day period,
whichever is later.
UNITED AUTO WORKERS UNION CONST. art. 6, § 17 (1977).
69 Id.
Unions have employed a variety of methods and procedural hurdles for
employees seeking to tender an effective resignation. The Board has often invalidated the
most complicated and unnecessary restrictions on tendering a valid resignation. See, e.g.,
Meat Cutters Local 81 (Empire Enterprises), 241 N.L.R.B. No. 125 (1979) (slip op.) (union
ban of resignations when strike imminent invalid); Sheet Metal Workers Local 170 (Able
Sheet Metal Prods., Inc.), 225 N.L.R.B. 1178, 93 L.R.R.M. 1071 (1976) (union cannot prohibit oral resignations that are clear and unequivocal expression of intent to resign); Bookbinders' Local 60 (Interstate Book Mfg., Inc.), 203 N.L.R.B. 732; 83 L.R.R.M. 1518 (1973)
(resignations submitted orally or by registered mail valid); Communications Workers Local
6135 (Southwestern Bell Tel. Co.), 188 N.L.R.B. 971, 76 L.R.R.M. 1635 (1971) (resignations effective when union received surrendered membership cards if constitution is silent
on resignation question); Electrical Workers Local 1522 (Western Elec. Co.), 180 N.L.R.B.
131, 73 L.R.R.M. 1091 (1969) (resignation effective when worker sent dues check-off deauthorization form to company and union demonstrating intent to resign); Aeronautical
Indus. Dist. Lodge 751, Machinists (Boeing Co.), 173 N.L.R.B. 450, 69 L.R.R.M. 1363
(1968) (member may resign by notifying union in writing during interim period between
expired and new collective bargaining contracts); Local 621, Rubber Workers (Atlantic Research Corp.), 167 N.L.R.B. 610, 66 L.R.R.M. 1109 (1967) (oral resignation effective); Oil
Workers Union (United Nuclear Corp.), 148 N.L.R.B. 629, 57 L.R.R.M. 1061 (1964) (resignation effective in face of silent constitution when made either orally or by telegram
prior to effective date of contract). See generally Wellington, Union Fines and Workers' Rights,
84 YALE L.J. 1022 (1976).
70 197 N.L.R.B. 608, 80 L.R.R.M. 1411 (1972).
71 Cf NLRB v. UAW, 320 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1963) (union did not violate § 8(b)(1) by
requesting employer discharge employees whose resignations did not comply with union
constitution).
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gument, analogizing the provision to an absolute prohibition on
the right to resign:
[T]he provision imposes such narrow restrictions as to amount,
in effect, to a denial to members of a voluntary method of severing their relationship with the Union. In short, the present
provision does not make it possible for a member to avail himself of the "strategy" of leaving the Union....
We cannot view union members as being "free to leave the
union" when their right to leave is as narrowly restricted as it is
here. We need not pass upon the broader question of whether
any provision in the union's constitution or bylaws which purports to regulate the means or timing of resignations would
have to yield to the members' freedom to leave the union ....

It

is sufficient in this case to hold that the very limited escape
route contained in [the UAW's] constitution is inadequate .... 72
The Board reconsidered the UAW constitution three years
later. In Local 1384, United Auto Workers (Ex-Cell-O Corp.), 73 the
union sought not to fine employees, but to secure their discharge
from employment under a maintenance of membership clause
contained in a collective bargaining agreement.7 4 Before May 1,
the effective date of the maintenance of membership clause, a
group of employees who had previously signed membership cards
sent resignation letters to the union. The union argued that because the members had not resigned during the ten day escape
period at the end of the fiscal year, their subsequent failure to
tender dues required the employer to discharge them under the
collective bargaining agreement. 75 The Board affirmed the administrative law judge's finding that the UAW's constitutional
impediment to resignation was impermissibly broad and violated
section 8(b)(1)(A). 7 1 After considering the union's petition for re72

197 N.L.R.B. at 609, 80 L.R.R.M. at 1412.

219 N.L.R.B. 729, 90 L.R.R.M. 1152 (1975).
74 A maintenance of membership clause in a collective bargaining agreement requires
that once a worker voluntarily joins the union, he must remain a union member during the
life of the agreement. See R. GORMAN, supra note 20, at 642-43. An escape period is usually
provided either at the expiration of the old contract or prior to the effective date of the
new contract. See Aeronautical Indus. Dist. Lodge 751, Machinists (Boeing Co.), 173
N.L.R.B. 450, 69 L.R.R.M. 1363 (1968) (employees validly resigned membership before
maintenance of membership clause became effective); cf. NLRB v. Allied Prod. Workers
Local 444, 427 F.2d 883 (1st Cir. 1970) (union may not prohibit resignations during interim period between old and new contract when new contract does not contain security
clause).
,5 219 N.L.R.B. at 732-33, 90 L.R.R.M. at 1154.
76 Id. at 729-30, 90 L.R.R.M. at 1153-54.
73
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view and the Board's cross-application for enforcement, the
Seventh Circuit remanded the case to the Board for reconsideration of whether the union's restriction on the right to resign was a
reasonable union rule falling within the proviso to section
77
8(b)(1)(A).
On remand, the Board considered the union's 'Justifications
for curtail[ing the] employees' statutory rights." 78 The union
conceded that the provision did, in effect, require workers to remain union members for an entire year, but claimed the limited
resignation period was necessary to stabilize relations between the
union and its members. 79 Because they provided the union with
greater control over its members, the restrictions helped the
union prevent wildcat strikes and internal union schisms. 8 0 This
limited resignation period was also necessary, the union argued,
to promote solidarity during strikes and to protect it from raiding
by rival labor organizations."'
The Board rejected these arguments, concluding that the union had failed to demonstrate
adequately the need for a one year waiting period before a resignation became effective. 2 Although it recognized the union's interest in maintaining solidarity during strikes, the Board concluded the union's "limitations upon the member are broader
than those which are necessary to serve the union interest because
resignations are barred during nonstrike periods as well [as during strike periods]." 83 In addition, the Board concluded that the
resignations were valid because the union had not informed the
workers that their resignations were ineffective nor even that the
constitution placed any limit on their right to resign.8 4
The Board found support for its conclusion in dicta from the
Granite State opinion:
Not only does the rule lack precise tailoring to the Union's
needs, but also gives no regard to the important considerations

7 Local 1384, UAW v. NLRB, No. 75-1910 (7th Cir. 1976). Part of the Court's unpublished order is reproduced in Local 1384, UAW (Ex-Cell-O Corp.), 227 N.L.R.B. 1045,
1045, 94 L.R.R.M. 1145, 1145 (1977), supplementing and affirming 219 N.L.R.B. 729, 90
L.R.R.M. 1152 (1975).
78 227 N.L.R.B. 1045, 1050, 94 L.R.R.M. 1145, 1151 (1977).
79 Id.
80 Id. For an example of internal union schisms caused by a lack of solidarity, see
Hershey Chocolate Corp., 121 N.L.R.B. 901, 42 L.R.R.M. 1460 (1958).
81 227 N.L.R.B. at 1050, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1151.
82 Id. at 1051, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1151-52.
83 Id.
84

Id. at 1049, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1149.
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that the Supreme Court has explained may necessitate an
employee's resignation during a strike:
Events occurring after the, calling of a strike may have unsettling effects, leading a member who voted to strike to
change his mind. The likely duration of the strike may
increase the specter of hardship to his family; the ease
with which the employer replaces the strikers may make
85
the strike seem less provident.
Unless a strike arose during the ten day period at the end of the
fiscal year, a dissenting employee would never be able to resign
under the UAW constitution.86 Thus, the Board held that the
provision did not fall within the proviso to section 8(b)(1)(A) because it was not "tailored" to "reasonabl[y] accommodat[e] between the Union's and the employees' conflicting interests." 87
Subsequent decisions have invalidated other constitutional provisions requiring sixty days notice before a resignation became effective. 88
The Granite State dicta is troublesome. The Court implied
that a union can never restrict the right to resign, even during a
strike. It is unclear whether the Board will give the dicta this expansive reading. The Board has, however, declined to state specifically how a inion may validly restrict the time or manner of
resignation. The Supreme Court has thus left two questions unanswered: the extent to which a union may restrict the right to
resign and the extent to which unions may regulate postresignation conduct.
III
DEVELOPING AN APPROPRIATE UNION PROCEDURE
FOR LIMITING THE RIGHT TO RESIGN

Allis-Chalmers and its progeny clearly demonstrate the relationship now required between valid discipline and the union

15 Id. at 1051, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1151-52 (quoting Granite State, 409 U.S. at 217).
86 Id. If the employee was a union member who had authorized the checkoff of union
dues, he could resign only when his checkoff revocation became effective, or 60 days after
notifying the union of his wish to resign, whichever occurred later. See note 68 supra.
87 227 N.L.R.B. at 1051, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1152.
'8 See, e.g., Local 444, Electrical Workers (Sperry Rand Corp.), 235 N.L.R.B. 98, 98
L.R.R.M. 1526 (1978); UAW Local 469 (Master Lock Co.), 221 N.L.R.B. 748, 90 L.R.R.M.
1563 (1975); cf. TKB Int'l Corp., 240 N.L.R.B. No. 114, 100 L.R.R.M. 1426 (1979) (local
union bylaw requiring statement of reasons for resignation held invalid).
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member's right to resign from the union. On the other hand, the
Court also stressed in Allis-Chalmers that federal labor policy must
protect the union's ability to maintain solidarity by permitting
reasonable discipline of members who violate rules and regulations governing membership. 8" Protecting this solidarity interest
is particularly vital when the union exercises its ultimate economic
weapon: the strike. Although the Court has separately acknowledged both interests-the individual's right to resign and the
union's need for solidarity-it has not attempted to accommodate these
interests, thus leaving the Board relatively unguided in its own
balancing efforts. Moreover, a principled balancing is difficult because the dicta in Granite State recognizing a right to resign during
strikes obviously undermines the solidarity interest of AllisChalmers.
Nonetheless, the Board struck an appropriate balance between these two interests in holding that the UAW constitution
inappropriately restricted the individual employee's right to resign. Foremost among the UAW constitution's deficiencies was its
extremely abbreviated time period at the end of the union's fiscal
year for resignations and the substantial delay for the effective
date of the resignations. Because strikes involving UAW members
employed in the auto industry often occur in the autumn and not
at the end of the union's fiscal year,-" the UAW rule completely
failed to accommodate the worker's interest in resigning from the
union prior to the strike. This rationale, however, does not justify
extending the right to resign to periods during the strike. As the
Court recognized in Granite State, the potential unsettling effects
of a strike may induce the worker to change his mind about the
union. 9 This Granite State dicta is extremely misguided and inconsistent with the Court's explicit sanction of union discipline

89 388 U.S. at 181.
90 Gould, supra note 26, at 1105-07.
91 Events occurring after the calling of a strike may have unsettling effects, leading a member who voted to strike to change his mind. The likely duration of
the strike may increase the specter of hardship to his family; the ease with
which the employer replaces the strikers may make the strike seem less provident. We do not now decide to what extent the contractual relationship between union and member may curtail the freedom to resign. But where, as
here, there are no restraints on the resignation of members, we conclude that
the vitality of § 7 requires that the member be free to refrain in November
from the actions he endorsed in May and that his § 7 rights are not lost by a
union's plea for solidarity or by its pressures for conformity and submission to
its regime.

409 U.S. at 217-18 (footnote omitted).
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during a valid strike in Allis-Chalmers.' 2 Interpreting Granite State
to prohibit unions from guarding against "fair weather" members
who leave the fold during a strike would unfairly circumscribe
union authority over members.. 3 The Board now applies the
Granite State standard, as it must, and as a result has invalidated most union restrictions on the right to resign.
The Court should overrule its decision in Granite State."4 The
disciplinary authority approved in Allis-Chalmers is most important
when union members participating in a strike are likely to become
strikebreakers. Although workers know that a strike may cause
hardships, they generally expect to surmount these difficulties.
Indeed, labor is almost always the winner in short strikes. ': Thus,
workers may eagerly support work stoppages that they believe will
be brief. Long strikes, on the other hand, are more likely to cause
"unsettling effects" that induce the worker to leave the fold."1
This fact alone, however, does not justify allowing members to
resign during the strike, even if they later become dissatisfied;
majority rule is the cornerstone of labor solidarity. Notwithstanding Granite State, a member should generally be compelled to follow a union's decision. Justice Blackmun persuasively argued in
his dissenting opinion in Granite State that the majority
seems to ... exalt the formality of resignation over the substance of the various interests and .national labor policies that
are at stake here. Union activity, by its very nature, is group
activity, and is grounded on the notion that strength can be
garnered from unity, solidarity, and mutual commitment. This
concept is of particular force during a strike, where the individual members of the union draw strength from the commitments of fellow members, and where the activities carried on by

92

See text accompanying notes 33-38 supra.

The need to use discipline is greatest when the union instigates a strike. See Gould,
supra note 5, at 1106-07.
" See Boys Market, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U.S. 235, 240-41 (1970) ("'[Sltare
decisis is ... not a mechanical formula of adherence'" (quoting Helvering v. Hallock, 309
U.S. 106, 119 (1940)); id. at 255 (Stewart, J., concurring).
" See Gould, The Supreme Court and Labor Law: The October 1978 Term, 21 ARIz. L. REv.
621, 625-30 (1979); Livernash, The Relation of Power to the Structure and Process of Collective
Bargaining, 6 J.L. EcoN. 10 (1963).
96 The strike in Granite State was in effect for about six weeks before the workers resigned their membership and crossed the picket lines. 409 U.S. 213, 214 (1972). The workers in Dalmo Victor resigned from the union and crossed the picket lines approximately
nine months after the strike began. NLRB v. Machinists Local 1327, 608 F.2d 1219, 1221
(9th Cir. 1979).
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the union rest fundamentally on the mutual reliance that inheres in the "pact." 97
A. Creating Democratic Proceduresfor Mid-Strike
Challenges to Union Decisions
As long as Granite State remains the law, unions desiring to

prohibit resignations both before and during strikes!"' must establish procedures that not only ensure employees free choice when
the strike decision is made but also accommodate Granite State's
concern for post-strike reassessment of the strike decision. One

way to achieve this balance would be by utilizing secret ballot box
procedures both before and during the strike. Giving employees
the opportunity to express their views about the -desirability of a
strike without fear of censure would allow all members to address
those potential unsettling effects of a strike,9 9 and would justify
binding the member to the group decision. The secret ballot box
would also accommodate the union's solidarity interests recognized by the Court in Allis-Chalmers.1 00

409 U.S. at 221.
Although he concurred in Justice Douglas' majority opinion, Chief Justice Burger expressed a similar concern in his concurring opinion:
I join the Court's opinion because for me the institutional needs of the Union
important though they are, do not outweigh the rights and needs of the individual
The balance is close and difficult; unions have need for solidarity, and at no
time is that need more pressing than under the stress of economic conflict.
Id. at 218.
98 See, e.g., AMALGAMATED CLOTHING & TEXTILE WORKERS UNION CONST. art. IX, § 11
(1976) (prohibiting any resignation during strikes); INTERNATIONAL ASS'N OF MACHINISTS
CONST. art. L, § 3 (1977) (prohibiting member who resigns after fourteenth day preceding
strike from working at struck establishment).
'9 Several union constitutions provide for a membership vote on continuing or terminating a strike. See, e.g., UNITED AUTO WORKERS UNION CONST. art. 50, § 5 (1977) (either
International Executive Board or majority vote by local union membership may terminate
strike); INTERNATIONAL ASS'N OF MACHINISTS UNIONS CONST. art. XVIII, § 4 (1977) (either
Executive Council or vote by local lodge membership may terminate strike); CoMMUNICA9

TIONS WORKERS OF AMER. UNION CONST. art. XVIII, § 8(a)-(b) (1979) (either local union

in accordance with local bylaws or Executive Board or Convention may terminate strike):
ALUMINUM WORKERS INT'L UNION CONST. art. IX, § 2 (1975) (Although local union membership may terminate strike by majority vote, local's executive board may override decision to terminate); INTERNATIONAL BHD. OF TEAMSTERS UNION CONST. art. XII, § l(b)
(1976) (majority vote of local members may terminate strike); UNITED Ass'N OF PLUMBERS
AND PIPEFIT'rERS UNION CONST. § 188(b) (1976) (majority vote by either Metal Trades
Branch or Building and Construction Trades Branch of local union may terminate strike).
'0' This approach would also comport with other provisions of the NLRA permitting
employee free choice. For example, 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (1976) provides that the Board
"shall [direct an election by] secret ballot ... and certify the results thereof" when a petition for election of a bargaining unit representative has been filed. But cf. Rocket Freight
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Testing employee sentiment by secret ballot is infinitely preferable to forcing the union member who wishes either to challenge the strike decision on behalf of all workers or to plead for a
hardship exemption allowing him to cross union picket lines during a strike to appear before an internal union tribunal that will
weigh loss of employee income against the union's solidarity interest.' 0 ' Employees who might disagree with a strike or the
penalties for strikebreaking may be unwilling to risk the wrath of
their more militant brethren by advertising their dissidence at a
union-controlled hearing. Even if it is fairly staffed, the tribunal
will not be particularly hospitable towards members wishing to
0 2
resign.1
This solution would not create insurmountable practical
problems for initiating a vote on the appropriateness of the strike
or the strikebreaking penalties. A union rule providing that 10%
to 20% of the workers may petition for a secret ballot would not
be inconsistent with Granite State. Certainly, the percentage should
be considerably below the 30% showing of interest now required
for employees to request a secret ballot election to rescind the
authority of their bargaining representative. 0 3
The primary difficulty with this proposal is that the voting
procedure would, without any specific statutory authorization,
modify, and sometimes contravene, internal union policy. 1 4 NaLines v. NLRB, 427 F.2d 202, 204-05 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 942 (1970) (even
though majority of local union members approved contract offer, international validly
fined them for crossing picket lines when international rejected this offer).
ioi See Comment, supra note 26, at 879-80.
102 Several unions, including the UAW, have experimented with "public review boards"
consisting of nonunion members appointed by the union hierarchy. See Brooks, Impartial
Public Review of Internal Union Disputes: Experiment in Democratic Self-Discipline, 22 OHmIO ST.
L.J. 64 (1961); Klein, UAW PublicReview Board Report, 18 RUTGERS L. REv. 304 (1964); Oberer,
Voluntay ImpartialReview of Labor: Some Reflections, 58 MICH. L. REv. 55 (1959); Stieber, The
UAW Public Review Board: An Examination and Evaluation (1960-61) (monograph no. 35,
Mich. St. Univ. Indus. Rel. Ctr.).
103 See 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (1976).
A procedure that will effectively limit the individual employee's right to refrain must
not create an insurmountable barrier to the exercise of that right. Requiring a majority
vote against the previous union decision as a precondition for a mid-strike reconsideration
would be unduly restrictive.
104 The labor "bill of rights" established by the Landrum-Griffin Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 41 l(a)(l)-(5) (1976), guarantees union members the right of free speech in internal union
affairs. See, e.g., Soto v. Masters, Mates and Pilots Union, 100 L.R.R.M. 3125, 3129
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (right of free speech for opposing contract bargained by union not
abridged by union rules of order); Lacy v. Teamsters Local 667, 99 L.R.R.M. 2403, 2405
(W.D. Tenn. 1978) (union cannot punish member who invokes right of free speech). This
right of free speech, however, does not guarantee a member the right to vote for approving a contract unless the union's restrictions on voting rights are unreasonable. See, e.g.,
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tional and international unions often exercise significant control
over strikes at the local union level. For example, one union constitution provides that "[wihenever the International Executive
Board decides that it is unwise to longer continue an existing
strike, it will order the members of the local unions who have ceased
to work in connection therewith to resume work and thereupon
... all assistance from this International Union shall cease."105
The UAW's Constitution contains a similar provision:
Before a strike shall be called off, a special meeting of the Local
Union shall be called for that purpose, and it shall require a
majority vote by secret ballot of all members present to decide
the question either way. Wherever the International Executive
Board decides that it is unwise to longer continue an existing
strike, it will order all members of Local Unions who have
ceased work in connection therewith to resume work and
thereupon and thereafter all assistance from the International
Union shall cease. I0 6
The Board and courts should validate discipline imposed by
unions with constitutional provisions that either create democratic
internal union procedures for convening special union meetings
to vote on the continuation of a strike or require a majority vote
on strike decisions and strike sanctions. Unfortunately, these
democratic ballot box guarantees are often effectively nullified by
provisions that allow union executive bodies to exercise complete
control over the continuation of a strike. Although a provision
such as the UAW's gives members a right to limit the continuation
of a strike, it empowers the international union to override the
decision at the local union level. Limiting the ability to continue a
strike with effective mid-strike democratic procedures complies
only in part with Granite State's dicta; placing plenary veto power
in international tribunals, on the other hand, is not consistent with
Granite State's fear of the unsettling effects of strikes. 0 7 Similarly,
an administrative mechanism must be established for implementing these democratic ballot box proposals; current union procedures often provide that a certain number of union members in
Williams v. Typographical Union, 423 F.2d 1295, 1298 (10th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 824 (1970) (union may reasonably restrict members' right to vote on wage scales); cf.
Trail v. Teamsters, 542 F.2d 961 (6th Cir. 1976) (member stated cause of action against
union that did not submit local rider governing wages to local membership vote).
105 INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED PLANT GUARD WORKERS CONST. art. XXXVII, § 5
(1975).
106
107

UNITED AUTO WORKERS UNION CONST. art.

See note 91 supra.

50, § 5 (1977).
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the executive board may initiate these special meetings rather
than allowing a relatively small percentage of members to petition
for a meeting. 10° These procedures, however, clash with both the
international union's veto power and with the requirement under
Granite State for effective mid-strike democratic procedures because the spectre of unfavorable union control might intimidate
potential dissidents. Accommodating Granite State by utilizing the
secret ballot box, therefore, will disrupt the normal course of
American industrial relations.
B. An Alternative Proposal: Allowing Unions to Restrict the Right to
Resign Shortly After Negotiations Commence
At the heart of the problem of creating valid union restrictions on the right to resign is the competition between the interest
in labor solidarity, necessary for promoting effective collective
bargaining, and the individual's interest in refraining from union
activity."" A framework for analyzing this conflict can be developed by examining the nature of the union-employee relationship. The Allis-Chalmers opinion characterizes this relationship as
contractual.1 1 0 This is not, however, an entirely accurate characterization; the contract, if any, resembles a contract of adhesion. " ' The union constitution or contract is only the starting
point for this analysis. The union's solidarity interest and the
employee's right to refrain are based not on this union-employee
contract but rather on the federal labor statutes. Recognizing the
fundamental source of these competing interests is crucial to resolve the right to resign issue. Once the interests are recognized,
they can be properly balanced. Justice Blackmun's dissent in Granite State is the proper starting point for this balancing. Any prohibition on the right to resign should become effective only when

108 See text accompanying notes 105-06 supra.
109 See generally Local 444, Electrical Workers (Sperry Rand Corp.), 235 N.L.R.B. 98, 98
L.R.R.M. 1526 (1978); Machinists Lodge 1871 (General Dynamics Corp.), 231 N.L.R.B.
727 (1977), enforced, 98 L.R.R.M. 2170 (2d Cir. 1978); Broadcast Employees Local 531
(Skateboard Prod., Inc.), 245 N.L.R.B. No. 77, 102 L.R.R.M. 1250 (1979).
110 388 U.S. at 196. Thus, the Board will not enforce individual contracts between the
employer and worker that will usurp either the collective bargaining agreement or the
union member's relation to the union. See Sheet Metal Workers Local 29 (Metal-Fab, Inc.),
222 N.L.R.B. 1156, 91 L.R.R.M. 1390 (1976).
"I See 6A A. CORBIN, CONTRAcrs § 1420, at 349 & n.74 (2d ed. 1962). See generally
Gould, supra note 26, at 1101 n.13 4 .
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the worker can make an intelligent and knowledgeable decision
on whether to refrain from concerted activities.
Unions could adequately balance these interests by prohibiting resignations during the strike, but allowing members to resign
before the strike becomes effective. The group decision would
prevail after a cutoff date for resignations, and thereafter the
member would be bound by, and subject to discipline for violating, the strike decision. Admittedly, this approach does not fully
comport with Granite State's dicta, which seemingly requires the
opportunity to modify the group decision during the course of
the strike. Failure to fully accommodate this dicta, however, is not
fatal because this dicta conflicts with the union's solidarity interests protected under federal labor policy. 1 ' The legitimate interest recognized in Granite State would be partially served by this
approach; it protects the individual's right to refrain, which was
promoted in Granite State, because employees would be free to resign up to the point when the union's solidarity interest peaks.
This approach also ensures that the worker will have the opportunity to assess both sides of the controversy before making a decision about refraining from"concerted union action. The question
that remains to be answered, however, is at what point may the
union lawfully restrict the right to resign.
Although many union constitutions fail to address the
strikebreaking and resignation issues, those that do have prohibited dissident conduct, including the right to resign, not only during the strike but also for a short period of time preceding the
strike. 1 13 The Board is currently considering such a provision in
Machinists Local 1327 (Dalmo Victor).' 14 In most respects, these
limitations successfully accommodate the union's solidarity interest with the worker's right to refrain. The union constitution
crosses the border line into "coercion and restraint" only when the
effective date limiting the right to resign substantially precedes a
scheduled strike vote. Workers will not have the information
needed to make a knowledgeable decision about resigning union
membership at such an early stage in the negotiations. On the

1.2See note 91 and accompanying text supra.
113 Union constitutions do not typically allow dissidents to leave the union immediately

before or during a strike. See note 98 supra.
14 See notes 123-37 and accompanying text supra.
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other hand, unions should not be allowed to fix an inflexible
across-the-board date for limiting the right to resign. For example, a union might prohibit resignations fifteen days before a
strike becomes effective or ten or fifteen days after a strike vote is
taken. Depending upon the union involved and its pattern of
negotiation, a variety of dates might insure that members can
make a knowledgeable decision about their continued union affiliation and the need to place economic pressure on the employer.
The difficulty of establishing a fixed date in advance of a strike is
undiminished by the "no contract, no work" approach of many
unions.1 1 5 Unions that ostensibly rely on this philosophy may
postpone the strike indefinitely, thereby confusing employees
about the resignation cut-off date. Unions should not formulate
this date far in advance of a strike, and thereby miscalculate the
point at which the employee can make a reasoned decision that
will bind him. The Board and courts should not allow such arbitrary dates to fall within the proviso to section 8(b)(1)(A).
Adding to the difficulty of pinpointing a date when members
can make knowledgeable decisions about exercising their right to
refrain is that union leaders may be tempted to publicize unreliable rhetoric that will push the bargaining parties into rigid and
unworkable positions that promote industrial strife. A potential
solution to this dilemma would be to allow union constitutions to
prohibit resignations for a short period of time before a strike
unless the worker can show that he could not knowledgeably participate in the strike decision prior to the cut-off date. Providing
this "affirmative defense" to a subsequent union allegation of
either improper resignation or strikebreaking would accommodate
the individual interests recognized in Granite State while creating a
presumption of union legitimacy.
Guaranteeing employees the ability to freely resign until
shortly before the strike, on the other hand, may overcompromise
the union's interest in solidarity. In addition to his attitude toward
the union, the employee bases his decision to resign on such factors as the union's bargaining stance, the union's willingness to
strike (or the likelihood of an employer lockout), and the potential
benefits or hardships that may accompany a strike, particularly a
long one. Escape routes will be most utilized when there is a
strong prospect of a strike, thus jeopardizing the union's solidarity
"5 Some unions automatically strike when their contracts expire if negotiations have not
produced an acceptable tentative agreement at that time. Collective bargaining agreements
often suspend the no-strike obligation when negotiations have not produced any acceptable
settlement. See [1979-80] Coll. Barg. Negotiations & Contracts (BNA) 36:61-65, 36:301-304,
77:101-103.
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interest recognized in Allis-Chalmers. The group interest is more
easily protected, irresponsible bargaining avoided, and the rank
and file encouraged to challenge stale union leadership if the resignation prohibition is imposed at an early or intermediate
juncture in the negotiations.
Although most contract negotiations do not produce strikes,
bargaining in the private sector is induced by the union's credible
threat to use its economic weaponry.'1 6 Management and labor
tend to negotiate seriously only after labor manifests its solidarity
by demonstrating its ability to utilize economic pressure. Allowing
members to resign on the eve of the contract expiration date will
deprive the union of its credibility. Thus, the last date for effective resignations must be set early enough for the union to ascertain the potential effectiveness of its strike weapon but late
enough to ensure that the worker can make a knowledgeable resignation decision. The Board and courts should uphold union
constitutions that prohibit resignations ten to fifteen days after
negotiations have commenced if those negotiations are initiated
approximately sixty days before the contract expires. 117 This approach not only satisfies the worker's need to know the last possible date for exercising the resignation option 118 but also avoids
problems that arise if the resignation date is tied to a strike date
that the union leadership may postpone indefinitely. Moreover, a
solution focusing on the start of the negotiation process recognizes the noncontractual nature of the union-employee relationship by setting the last date for resignations when the union's solidarity interest exceeds the individual's interest in refraining from
union activity. This solidarity interest is at the heart of the federal
labor statutes and federal labor policy " :-it cannot be ignored.
IV
UNION PROHIBITIONS

ON POST-RESIGNATION CONDUCT

Even if reasonable escape periods that restrict the right to
resign fifteen days after contract negotiations commence are es116 NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 489 (1960); cf American Ship
Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 308-13 (1965) (employer lockout after bargaining impasse held valid application of economic pressure).
I17 There is some experience under the NLRA with contract expiration dates. Section
8(d)(1) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1) (1976), provides that a party may not modify
or terminate an agreement unless that party "serves a written notice upon the other party
to the contract of the proposed termination or modification sixty days prior to the expiration date thereof."
118 See Booster Lodge 405, Machinists v. NLRB, 412 U.S. 84, 89 (1973).

119 See note 10 supra.
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tablished, some unions may attempt to restrict resignations indirectly by threatening to discipline former members for their
post-resignation conduct. A worker's post-resignation activities,
however, should not be subject to union control unless it provides
a method for members to challenge the union's collective decisions about the strike and strikebrdaking penalties during the
strike. The Granite State Court did not settle whether union control
over an employee's post-resignation conduct constitutes an implicit
restriction on the right to resign, even though the Court held that
the post-resignation discipline at issue was unlawful.1 20 The
Court subsequently held in Booster Lodge that the union violated
section 8(b)(1)(A) by fining employees for strikebreaking after
they had resigned from the union. 121 The Machinists' constitution in that case, however, had no provision governing resignation
rights. After the Court's decision, the Machinists union amended
its constitution by adding a provision that explicitly prohibited
members from strikebreaking or crossing picket lines after they
resigned from the union:
Accepting employment in any capacity in an establishment
where a strike or lockout exists as recognized under this Constitution, without permission [shall constitute improper conduct
by a member]. Resignation shall not relieve a member of his
obligation to refrain from accepting employment at the establishment for the duration of the strike or lockout or within 14
days preceding its commencement. Where observance of a
primary picket line is required, resignation shall not relieve a
member of his obligation to observe the primary picket line for
its duration if the resignation occurs during the period that the
picket line is maintained or within 14 days preceding its estab22
lishment.'
In Machinists Local 1327 (Dalmo Victor), 12 3 the Board held that
1 24
fines imposed under this provision violated section 8(b)(1)(A).
The union fined three workers who had apparently validly resigned from the union and returned to work during a lawful
economic strike; the fines equalled the total amount of strike ben120 409 U.S. at 217.

121 See text accompanying note 56 supra.
122 INTERNATIONAL ASS'N OF MACHINISTS CONST. art. L, § 3 (1977). See Machinists Local

1327 (Dalmo Victor), 231 N.L.R.B. 719, 719, 96 L.R.R.M. 1160, 1160 (1977), enforcement
denied and remanded, 608 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1979); Local 1994, Machinists (O.K. Tool Co.),
215 N.L.R.B. 651, 88 L.R.R.M. 1120 (1974).
123 231 N.L.R.B. 719, 96 L.R.R.M. 1160 (1977).
12i Id. at 720-21, 96 L.R.R.M. at 1161-62.
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efits received by the former members. 12 5 The Board noted that
the question left unanswered in Granite State-the extent to which
a union could restrict the right to resign-was not before it. In
the majority's view, the Machinists' constitution "place[d] no clear
restriction, no subtle restriction, no restriction by implication, and,
in sum, no restriction whatsoever upon the employee's right to
resign." 126 The Board's majority also rejected the dissenters' argument that the proscription against post-resignation strikebreaking was actually a valid restriction on the right to resign under the
proviso to section 8(b)(1)(A). 1 2 7 The majority only considered
whether the union could control the post-resignation conduct of
former members in the absence of a contractual relation. 1 28 The
Board concluded that this question had been clearly settled by the
Court in Granite State and Scofield-union discipline of former
129
members violated section 8(b)(1)(A).
A three-judge panel from the Ninth Circuit reversed the
Board's order.1 30 The majority rejected as a "hypertechnical
reading of the Union's constitution" 131 the Board's argument that
the provision did not restrict the right to resign:
[The constitutional provision] plainly tells its members that resignation "shall not relieve a member from his obligation to refrain from accepting employment" at the struck establishment,
or from his "obligation to observe the primary picket line" dur125 Id.
128

at 720.

Id.

127 Id.

128 Id. at 721.

121 In a previous case involving the same provision in the Machinists' constitution, the
Board noted that the employees fined in Allis-Chalmers
enjoyed full union membership .... Not only do full members reap the benefits
of their continuing union membership, but they also have a continuing voice in
the union's course of action, a factor the Court relied on in Allis-Chalmers ....
Balancing an individual's right under Section 7 to refrain from concerted
activity following resignation from a union against that of a union to maintain
solidarity during a strike, we conclude that the latter must give way. Conformity
may be none too high a price for the benefits of union membership. But the
choice, at least in the absence of reasonable restrictions on resignation, is the
individual's to make, not the union's. Should he choose to resign and forgo [sic]
the benefits of union membership, the union may not nonetheless seek to exact
conformity without regard to the individual's Section 7 rights.
Local 1994, Machinists (O.K. Tool Co.), 215 N.L.R.B. 651, 653, 88 L.R.R.M. 1120, 1122
(1974). In Dalmo Victor, the Board expressed a similar theme, noting that a worker surrenders his right to participate in union affairs when he resigns. 231 N.L.R.B. at 721, 96
L.R.R.M. at 1162.
130 NLRB v. Machinists Local 1327, 101 L.R.R.M. 3096 (9th Cir. 1979).
13, Id. at 3098.
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ing the strike or the picketing, if the resignation occurs during
that time or 14 days before. Surely that is "a restriction on a
member's right to resign," Booster Lodge, supra, a "defining or
limiting [of] the circumstances under which a member may resign," Granite State, supra. Apparently the Board majority
would confine these phrases to provisions that expressly prohibit resignation at certain times or under certain circumstances. Such a provision would be a more drastic limitation
on the member's right to resign, and thus less likely to be upheld, than the provision that is before us. In short, we conclude
that this case presents the question reserved by the Court in
32
Granite State and Booster Lodge.1

The majority agreed with the Board's dissenters that this provision was a "reasonable regulation" falling within the proviso to
section 8(b)(1)(A) protecting union rules regarding "the acquisition or retention of membership." 133
In a second opinion issued after a rehearing, 3 4 the majority
abandoned its holding that this constitutional provision was valid
under the proviso.1 3 The court remanded the case to the Board
so that it could first consider whether the provision was a pro13
tected union rule under section 8(b)(1)(A) 1

132

Id.

133 Id. The court quoted the Fifth Circuit's decision in Local 1255, Machinists v. NLRB,

456 F.2d 1214 (1972) to support its conclusion:
"The proviso [to section 8(b)(1)(A)] makes no distinction between acts done
while [someone is] a member and those done while [someone is] not a
member." It is true that in [Local 1255, Machinists] the only penalty for not
paying a fine for strikebreaking was expulsion, a fact upon which the court
relied. But that is not a particularly effective sanction against one who has resigned. That is why we think that the sanction of a fine ...is also permissible ... in this case.

101 L.R.R.M. at 3098 (quoting Local 1255, Machinists v. NLRB, 456 F.2d 1214, 1217 (5th
Cir. 1972)). See also NLRB v. District Lodge 99, Machinists, 489 F.2d 769 (lst Cir. 1974)
(discipline for post-resignation strikebreaking, not unfair labor practice).
Judge Kennedy dissented from the panel's decision. He argued that union authority is
limited by the "concept of membership." 101 L.R.R.M. at 3099. Since the members had
validly resigned, the degree of membership required by Allis-Chalmers as a prerequisite for
union discipline was lacking; thus, he concluded that the discipline in this case was improper; "[tihe Union's right to enforce the fines it imposes on its members is a corollary of
the member's rights not only to reap the benefits of continuing union membership, but
also to maintain a continuing voice in the union's courts of action." Id. at 3099-3100.
134 NLRB v. Machinists Local 1327, No. 77-3723 (9th Cir., petition for rehearing
granted Oct. 9, 1979).
,35 NLRB v. Machinists Local 1327, 608 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1979).
131Id. at 1222.
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The majority's original view of the Board's "hypertechnical"
refusal to characterize the Machinists' provision as an implicit resignation restriction was appropriate. If a member contemplating
both strikebreaking and resignation is threatened with union sanctions after he resigns, it is unlikely he will utilize the resignation
escape route contemplated by Granite State. This is, at the bare
minimum, a "subtle restriction" on the right to resign.
Although this provision, which ostensibly controls the postresignation conduct of workers, is a restriction on the right to resign, the question remains: is the restriction protected by the proviso to section 8(b)(1)(A)? The Ninth Circuit originally held, and
the two dissenting Board members argued, that it was so protected. This conclusion, which creates a labor law minefield by
approving post-resignation discipline that is tantamount to an absolute restriction on the right to resign, is the product of the
Ninth Circuit's overly generalized interpretations of the proviso to
section 8(b)(1)(A). The Granite State dicta, which adopts an opposite view, i.e. that a union can never control the "man on
the street," also hinders a cogent analysis of this issue. The apparent superficial illogic of precluding unions from controlling nonmembers, implicit in these conclusions, is inconsistent with reality.
Unions commonly exercise control over both members and nonmembers. Union membership is prerequisite for access to joint
union-employer apprenticeship programs and to union administered hiring halls that operate as de facto closed shops.1 37 Congress enacted the proviso to allow unions to deny membership to
those individuals the union deemed undesirable, e.g., Negro
workers,1 38 thus enabling the union to control access to many
employment opportunities not available to nonmembers. Without
union membership, a worker may be unable to participate in
07 See NLRB v. Local 2, Plumbers & Pipefitters, 360 F.2d 428 (2d Cir. 1966), enforcing
152 N.L.R.B. 1093, 59 L.R.R.M. 1234 (1965); W. GOULD, BLACK WORKERS IN WHITE
UNIONS 281-315 (1977).
138 See 93 CONG. REC. 2955 (1947) (remarks of Rep. Smith); id. at 4272 (remarks of Rep.
Cole). See also Oliphant v. Brotherhood of Locom. Firemen & Enginemen, 262 F.2d 359
(6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 935 (1959) (Railway Labor Act does not prohibit
union from denying membership to employee).
The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VI, §§ 703(c)-(d), 78 Stat. 253, as
amended by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat.
103 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(c)-(d) (1976)), now prohibits unions from discriminating against members on the basis of sex, race, religion and national origin. When it enacted
the proviso to § 8(b)(1)(A), Congress emphasized that unions could continue to exclude
blacks from membership pursuant to the authority retained under the proviso. See 93
CONG. REc. 4193 (1947) (remarks of Rep. Taft). See generally Sovern, The National Labor
Relations Acts and Racial Discrimination, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 563, 583-84 (1962).
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strike and contract ratification voting.' 3 :' Moreover, the union
may initiate an action to recover delinquent dues against a worker
even after he resigns from the union. 140 In sum, the relationship
between the union and the worker is neither as simple as it was
characterized in Granite State nor as contractual as viewed in
Allis-Chalmers. The superficial illogic of precluding unions from
controlling nonmembers is indeed erroneous.
The Board and courts should require a reasonable accommodation of the various competing interests that make up the
union-employee relationship before they uphold post-resignation
union discipline. The Machinists' constitution partially accommodates the union's interest in solidarity during strikes recognized in
Allis-Chalmers, but fails to account for the individual worker's interests in refraining from concerted activity. The worker who resigns from the union and is fined for post-resignation strikebreaking bears the burdens of union membership without any of its
benefits. There is no ballot procedure available for such a worker
after the strike decision is made. Granite State seems to require
some form of a post-strike decision ballot procedure allowing the
worker to change his mind about either the strike or the strikebreaking penalties as a prerequisite to valid post-resignation discipline. Thus, the effect of the Machinists' constitution is to extend
union control and influence over former members in a manner
not contemplated by Congress when it enacted the proviso.
Because the provision of the Machinists' constitution authorizing post-resignation discipline is overinclusive, it seriously
impinges on a worker's right to refrain in another way. A worker
who starts working fourteen days before a strike cannot partiipate in the strike decision. The presumed rationale for this fourteen day requirement is that workers should be bound by the
strike decision only after they have participated in the delibera39 See General Motors Corp., 133 N.L.R.B. 451, 456-57 n.12, 48 L.R.R.M. 1659, 1661

(1961), enforcement denied, 303 F.2d 428 (6th Cir. 1962), rev'd and remanded, 373 U.S. 734
(1963); Gould, supra note 5, at 1094 n.118.
A corresponding duty is imposed on unions to refrain from utilizing the dues paid by
nonmembers for purposes other than collective bargaining. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of
Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977); Reid v. UAW, 479 F.2d 517 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1076 (1973); Detroit Mailers Union No. 40 (Detroit Newspaper Publishers Ass'n), 192
N.L.R.B. 951, 78 L.R.R.M. 1053 (1971). Limited members whose "membership" has been
impaired by union discipline may refuse to pay dues. Local 1101, Communications Workers (New York Tel. Co.), 211 N.L.R.B. 114, 87 L.R.R.M. 1253 (1974), enforced, 520 F.2d
411 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1051 (1976).
140 See Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 HARV. L. REv. 1049 (1951);
note 30 supra.
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tions and decision. Job applicants hired shortly before the strike
who are also union members do not have the freedom to refrain
from any strike decision because they are bound by a decision
made before they were hired.
The Machinists' constitutional provision should not be validated under the proviso to section 8(b)(1)(A). Notwithstanding the
union's strong interest in unfettered control over the strike
weapon, the post-resignation activities of a worker should not be
subject to union control unless the union provides a method for
members to challenge the strike decision during the strike. Of
course, such ballot procedures may not be popular with unions
because they may encroach upon the union's solidarity interest.'4
The best approach for unions is to explicitly restrict
the right to resign fifteen days after negotiations begin, rather
than indirectly restrict resignations by the threat of postresignation discipline.
V
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN UNION
DISCIPLINE AND UNION SECURITY

No area of labor law has created more confusion for unions,
management and individual workers than the relationship between valid union discipline and union security.' 4 2 In AllisChalmers, the court emphasized the nonmandatory nature of
union membership under the agency shop provision of the collective bargaining agreement involved in that case.' 43 The Court
did not, however, consider the workers' motiication for becoming
full-fledged union members. Most collective bargaining agreements contain union security clauses that require union membership as a condition of employment, i.e., union shop clauses. Few
of these clauses explicitly refer to the Supreme Court's interpretation of the term "membership"-that membership obligations are
fully satisfied if periodic dues and initiation fees are paid to the
union; actual membership is not required. 4 4 Many of the prob-

141 See text accompanying notes 116-19 supra.

142 Union security clauses in collective bargaining contracts, such as an agency or union
shop clause, establish the status of the union in the plant. See text accompanying notes
145-49 infra.
143 388 U.S. at 196.
144See Haggard, A Clarificationof the Types of Union Security Agreements Affirmatively Permitted by Federal Statutes, 5 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 418, 425-32 (1974).
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lems caused by union discipline and restrictions on the right to
resign would be avoided if workers were accurately informed that
they can never be forced to join a union even though the collectively bargained union security clause ostensibly requires a worker
to "join" the union within thirty days of his hiring. Although the
union has a fiduciary obligation to inform workers of their real
membership obligations, they will probably shirk this responsibility. The Board should step in to fill this educational gap to reduce
the potential for future discipline and resignations.
Many union security clauses establish union shops that require each worker to join the union within thirty days after accepting the job.1 4 5 In NLRB v. General Motors Corp., the Court
clarified the meaning of the term "membership" by holding that a
worker satisfies all membership obligations by paying dues and
initiation fees to the union that is the bargaining representative of
all workers within the unit.' 46 Although the union security
clauses in some collective bargaining agreements explicitly state
that union membership status is satisfied by meeting these union
financial obligations, the individual worker, along with union and
management representatives, is often unaware that he is not required to become a union member if he fulfills his financial obligations. This problem was compounded by the Court's statement
in Booster Lodge that "[s]ince the collective-bargaining agreement
expired prior to the times of the resignations, the maintenance-ofmembership clause therein was no impediment to resigning."l14
Although dicta, this statement suggests that actual union
membership could be required under a union security clause in a
collective bargaining agreement. The Court indicated that members could resign in that case without forfeiting their jobs because
of nonmembership only when either the contract did not require
it or when the agreement. had expired. If this interpretation is
correct, then Allis-Chalmers can no longer be interpreted to require
union membership as a prerequisite for imposing union discipline because union membership would no longer be voluntary.
The Allis-Chalmers Court based its decision upholding discipline of
union members on the assumption that union membership was
voluntary under the agency shop clause.1 4 8 The Court in General
Motors went even further when it held that membership was not
145 See
146 373
147 412
148 388

note
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

13 supra.
734, 741-44 (1963).
at 88.
at 196.
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required even under a union shop clause. The significance of
these cases is that workers who become union members must do
so with the understanding that they are bound by the union's
rules. Booster Lodge's dicta, however, would overrule this important
assumption. Subsequent court and Board decisions fortunately
have not followed this path, 14" and the Court's interpretation of
the meaning of membership obligations in General Motors is still
the accepted law.
Notwithstanding General Motors' apparent disposition of this
question, workers, union officers and personnel directors often
equate the union shop with the agency shop.1 50 It is highly unlikely that the workers in Allis-Chalmers or Dalmo Victor knew that
the membership obligations they assumed were not required
either by statute or by contract.' 1 The Board and courts should
require, as a prerequisite for validating union discipline under the
NLRA, that the union inform the worker when' he begins work
about the potential discipline that accompanies full-fledged union
membership and the opportunity-or lack of it-to resign union
membership. Unions should also be required to advise workers
through the contract and the union constitution, as well as by personal communication, that their responsibility to the union encompasses nothing more than meeting the financial obligations of
regular union membership. Typically, the worker knows very little
about either his right to refrain or the obligations of union membership when he accepts employment in a plant covered by a
union security clause. The union has a fiduciary obligation to

149See, e.g., Electrical Workers v. NLRB, 487 F.2d 1143, 1167-68 n.26 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 418 U.S. 904 (1973); Local 749, Boilermakers v. NLRB, 466 F.2d 343, 344-45 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 926 (1972); Leeds & Northrup Co. v. NLRB, 357 F.2d 527, 536
(3d Cir. 1966); American Fed. Tel. Radio Artists (William F. Buckley, Jr.), 222 N.L.R.B.
197, 199, 91 L.R.R.M. 1094, 1096 (1976).
150 See generally Haggard, supra note 144.
151 Shortly after CTI and Dalmo Victor merged, the work force expanded to well

over 400 employees all of whom had to join the union. We were never told by
either the Machinists union or the company that we did not have to become
full members of the union. Quite the contrary, we were told to join the union
or lose our jobs.
Throughout my employment at Dalmo Victor, I was never informed that I did
not have to be a full union member in order to retain my job but instead could
simply pay the equivalent of dues and fees required of members. I would
never have formally joined the union had I been informed of all my rights.
Affidavit of Hilda Hall in Support of Motion to Reopen Record at 2-3, Machinists Local
1327 (Dalmo Victor), No. 20-CB-3491 (NLRB, Dec. 18, 1979) (on file at the Cornell Law
Review).
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provide this information to the workers that it represents. 15 2 The
Court implicitly recognized this obligation in Booster Lodge, finding
that without such information, employees lacked the knowledge,
consent and notice necessary for valid union discipline. 153
Unions should recognize that workers will often receive information about resigning their membership in either garbled or
anti-union form.1 5 4 Unions would promote their interest in preserving solidarity by* informing dissidents who are unwilling to
support the union when the strike weapon is utilized of the adverse consequences of union discipline before they join the union.
If the union fails to provide this information, the workers may
turn to the employer. Some employers are only too pleased to
volunteer this information-not only during union organizing
campaigns but also during a strike or other labor dispute. Although it is unlikely that employers with established, sophisticated
trade union relationships in industries such as steel, auto and
rubber will utilize these tactics, other employers may rely on this
type of propaganda when confronted with a long economic strike.
The employer's ability in certain circumstances to pay the fines
levied on dissident union members exacerbates this danger." 5

1*2 Cf Local 315, Teamsters (Rhodes & Jamieson, Ltd.), 217 N.L.R.B. 616, 617-18, 89
L.R.R.M. 1049, 1051 (1974), enforced, 545 F.2d 1173 (9th Cir. 1976) (emphasizing duty of
fair representation's fiduciary nature).
113 412 U.S. at 89.
134 The Board set aside union representation elections in Hollywood Ceramics Co., 140
N.L.R.B. 221, 51 L.R.R.M. 1600 (1962), overruled, Shopping Kart Food Market, Inc., 228
N.L.R.B. 1311, 94 L.R.R.M. 1705 (1977), reinstated, General Knit of Calif., Inc., 239
N.L.R.B. 619, 99 L.R.R.M. 1687 (1978), because the employer had misrepresented the
consequences of unionization or union membership to employees. See, e.g., TRW-United
Greenfield Div., 245 N.L.R.B. No. 147, 102 L.R.R.M. 1520 (1979) (election set aside because employer falsely asserted that union was responsible for two plant closings); Robbins
& Myers, Inc., 241 N.L.R.B. No. 11, 100 L.R.R.M. 1523 (1979) (election set aside because
of cumulative effect of employer's misleading statements).
An issue raised in many cases concerns the employer's confidential communications
with his employees. Professor Wellington notes that if William F. Buckley, Jr., was misled
about his rights as a union member, see Evans v. American Fed. Tel. Radio Artists, 354 F.
Supp. 823 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), rev'd and remanded sub nom. Buckley v. American Fed. Tel.
Radio Artists, 496 F.2d 305 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1093 (1974), it is likely that the
average union member will be confused. Wellington, supra note 69, at 1051-52. If the
average worker, or even a sophisticated one such as Buckley, is bewildered about his rights
as a union member, he also may be very susceptible to employer misstatements. See Gould,
supra note 5, at 1108. Professor Wellington believes, however, that the employer is unlikely
to "[risk] the wrath of a firmly entrenched union by advising prospective members" that
full membership is not required. Wellington, supra note 69, at 1052 n.156.
155 See Electrical Workers v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 496 F.2d 1, 2 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 879 (1974); Cox v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 319 F. Supp. 92, 101 (D. Minn.
1970); Standard Plumbing & Heating Co., 185 N.L.R.B. 444, 75 L.R.R.M. 1065 (1970);
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Knowing that he can pay the fine, the employer may advise or
subtly encourage the worker to resign.'-5
Employers will exploit
the dissent created by the union's nondisclosure. This result is
undesirable under a statute designed to encourage collective bargaining.
How should unions advise prospective members about the relationship between membership status and disciplinary sanctions?
Even after the Court's decision in Granite State, most workers
probably assume that they are bound by the group decision in a
strike vote. Justice Blackmun argued in his dissenting opinion in
Granite State that "it seems likely that the three factors of a
member's strike vote, his ratification of strikebreaking penalties,
and his actual participation in the strike, would be far more reliable indicia of his obligation to the union and its members than
the presence of boilerplate provisions in a union's constitution." 157 The majority held, however, that workers are immune
to disciplinary sanctions for strikebreaking if they resign from the
union before crossing picket lines.1 5 8
Even if Justice Blackmun's characterization of typical
employee behavior is only partially correct, it is unlikely that a
boilerplate union constitutional provision can adequately inform a
union member about membership obligations and strikebreaking.
By emphasizing that the contract failed to place any limits on the
right to resign, 159 the Court in Granite State may have boosted the
importance of such provisions. 6 ' The Board, on the other hand,
has concluded that a boilerplate constitutional provision is inadequate to put union members on notice of strikebreaking penalties. 161 Similarly, the Board has also regarded a worker's failure

Barney Wilkerson Constr. Co., 145 N.L.R.B. 704, 55 L.R.R.M. 1030 (1963); cf. Leeds &
Northrup Co., 155 N.L.R.B. 1292, 60 L.R.R.M. 1482 (1965) (employer providing legal
counsel). See also UAW v. Right to Work Found., 590 F.2d 1139 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
156 See Gould, supra note 5, at 1126-27. But see Wellington, supra note 69, at 1052 n. 156.
157 409 U.S. at 220.
158Id. at 215-16.
159 Id. at 214.
160 Such provisions would comport with the contract approach to the union-member
relationship. See NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 174, 192 (1967); Machinists v.
Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617, 618 (1958).
161See, e.g., Broadcast Employees and Technicians Local 531 (Skateboard Prod., Inc.),
245 N.L.R.B. No. 77, 102 L.R.R.M. 1250 (1979); Machinists, Lodge 1871 (General
Dynamic Corp.), 231 N.L.R.B. 727, 96 L.R.R.M. 1158 (1977), enforced, 575 F.2d 54 (2d Cir.
1978); Local 1384, UAW (Ex-Cell-O Corp.), 227 N.L.R.B. 1045, 94 L.R.R.M. 1145 (1977);
accord Booster Lodge 405, Machinists v. NLRB, 412 U.S. 84, 90-91 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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to receive a copy of the union constitution and the failure of
union pledge cards to spell out constitutional provisions governing
membership ties and the right to resign as significant in determin62
ing whether the worker was aware of his resignation rights.i
Putting the union member on notice of a constitutional provision that clearly defines membership obligations is only half of
the battle-the other half is drafting the provision so that the
typical worker understands it. The likely result, however, is confusion. If the Ninth Circuit and the Board cannot agree on an interpretation of the provision in the Machinists' constitution in
Dalmo Victor, how can workers understand a similar union provision defining union membership obligations? The Second Circuit
recently emphasized the importance of clear notice and understanding of the union constitution in its analysis of the same
Machinists' provision litigated in Dalmo Victor:
The Union argues that any reasonable union member would
know that the act of resigning during a strike would injure the
Union and would call for sanctions. However ... nothing in the
Union's constitution unmistakably gave employees notice that
mid-strike resignation could result in' fines. If anything, the
Union constitution implicitly recognized the right to resign
without sanction by specifically referring to a member's obligation after resigning not to return to work during a strike. Other
provisions of the constitution, e.g., sanctions for "other conduct
unbecoming a member" of the Union, were too vague to limit
63
the right to resign.'
To avoid these practical difficulties unions, as part of their
fiduciary obligation, should explain orally the legal interpretation
of union security clauses requiring union membership, the relationship between union membership and union discipline, and the
clear meaning of constitutional provisions governing discipline
and circumstances where a member may resign. If unions are not
capable of explaining the rules embodied in its own constitution
and bylaws, either the leadership or the rules, or both, ought to
be discarded.
This approach, however, does have its drawbacks. Even
high-priced labor counsel may have difficulty articulating the
shifting currents of law. Every union local should certainly not be

162Local 1384, UAW (Ex-Cell-O Corp.), 227 N.L.R.B. 1045, 1048, 94 L.R.R.M. 1145,
1149 (1977).
163 NLRB v. Machinists Lodge 1871, 575 F.2d 54, 55 (2d Cir. 1978) (per curiam).
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required to retain counsel for this purpose. A substantial policing
effort may be required to ensure that the union fulfills its
fiduciary duty. Policing may be difficult, moreover, because
unions are often uninterested in providing information about any
of these subjects, 1 6 4 even though many employees will prefer the
benefits of full union membership, e.g., participation in strike and
contract ratification voting, notwithstanding the union's desire
to counter employer propaganda and misrepresentations on
union membership in discipline. The Board is already overburdened with other administrative responsibilities to fully ensure
compliance.' 6 5 In addition, employers working with established
unions under a traditional union security clause may not be willing to risk the disruption that could result when employees are
fully informed of their membership obligations. 16 6 The crucial
point is that unions should undertake this responsibility even
though it may be contrary to their short run interests in expanding membership because union solidarity in the long run will be
improved if dissidents are able to refuse union membership when
they are hired. The Board and courts may be able to judicially
enforce this obligation by making notice and knowledge of membership rights a prerequisite for valid union discipline. Workers in
union discipline cases are often represented by their employers
rather than by their own counsel. This not only signifies that the
dispute between the union and the worker is actually part of the
164

Professor Wellington's solution to the union discipline problem rests on the assump-

tion that unions can be forced to comply with their fiduciary duty to inform workers of
their right to abstain from full union membership. Wellington, supra note 69, at 1055-59.
Although he recognizes that it is unlikely that "fellow workers or union officials" will fully
inform workers of the true meaning of a union security clause, id. at 1058, he concludes
that the Board can enforce this duty by sanctioning union discipline as a violation of
§ 8(b)(1)(A) when the union fails to inform the disciplined members of their right to limited
membership. Id. at 1057-58. Historical evidence fails to demonstrate, however, that unfair
labor practice sanctions will force unions to alter their primary conduct. Cf. Smith,
Landrum-Griffin After Twenty-One Years: Mature Legislation or Childish Fantasy?, 31 LaB. L.J.
273, 277-79 (1980) (worker "bill of rights" has not prevented undemocratic union conduct).
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For the nineteenth consecutive year, the National Labor Relations Board
in fiscal 1979 was called upon to process a record number of unfair labor
practice and representation election cases arising under the National Labor Relations Act.
The total was 54,907 cases of all types filed by employees, labor organizations, and business firms with the independent agency which administers the
basic U.S. labor relations law ....
The case intake was up 3.1 percent from the preceding fiscal year.
NLRB, FORTY-FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1
(1979).
166 Wellington, supra note 69, at 1052 n.156.
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power struggle between labor and management but also explains
why the voluntarism issue, i.e., the worker's knowledge of the relationship between full union membership and union discipline, is
seldom raised. The voluntarism issue was raised in Dalmo Victor
only after the Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the Board and
16 7
the workers then obtained their own counsel.
Unions may more likely comply with this fiduciary obligation
if the Court, through a limited reversal of Allis-Chalmers, ignored
the distinction between limited and full members for the purpose
of imposing union discipline. As an alternative, Congress could
authorize union discipline imposed upon all workers who pay
union dues or their equivalent under a union security clause that
compels union membership when the union is involved in negotiations which may culminate in the use of economic pressure. Such
congressional authorization is consistent with Allis-Chalmers' approval of union discipline of union members during strikes. The
quid pro quo for this union authority should be legislation allowing
employees with both religious and nonreligious conscientious objections to pay the equivalent of union dues to another nonunion
organization.1 68 Thus, if unions impose disciplinary sanctions
upon limited members who have been compelled to join the
union under a union security clause, nonreligious conscientious
objectors should be able to opt out in the same manner as religious objectors. If unions do not desire this authority, the workers'
ability to opt out can be more circumscribed. This approach not
only strikes an appropriate balance between union solidarity and
individual rights but also simplifies the rules regarding union discipline by eliminating both the differences between full and limited members and the need for relying on full disclosure by the
unions of membership obligations.
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See note 151 supra.

168 Even before the Court's decision in General Motors, religious objectors could decline

full union membership. Union Starch & Refining Co. v. NLRB, 186 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir,),
cert. denied, 342 U.S. 815 (1951). The House recently approved legislation to provide a
religious exemption under the NLRA. The religious accommodation provision of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, § 701(j), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1976), may have prompted this
legislation. See McDaniel v. Essex Int'l, Inc., 571 F.2d 338 (6th Cir. 1978); Cooper v. General Dynamics, 533 F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1976); Ross, Caesar and God: A Statutory BalanceUnion Security and Religious Discrimination under the Title VII Requirement of Reasonable Accommodation, 3 IND. REL. L.J. 321 (1979). A bill is currently pending in Congress that would
amend the National Labor Relations Act and the Railway Labor Act to require employers
and unions to accommodate an employee's religious beliefs. S. 101, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
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Notwithstanding the union's fiduciary obligation to supply
this information, the Board should also begin its own educational
campaign because unions may be unable or unwilling to satisfy
this need. The Board could begin by posting election notices and
distributing books or pamphlets prepared for the layman that describe these rights. This approach would be consistent with the
method currently utilized by the Board for providing information
on other subjects. 169 Many workers do not understand the subtle
intricacies governing union discipline and union membership; the
assistance provided by unions and management is fraught with
conflicts and is subject to abuse by propagandization. This problem is exacerbated by the legal counsel available to workers in
union discipline cases; workers are often represented by
employers and their lawyers rather than by the workers' own
counsel. The Board has contributed to the confusion 170 it
should not shy away from attempting to rectify that result.
CONCLUSION

In Allis-Chalmers, a narrowly divided Court attempted to
strike an appropriate balance betiveen the union's interest in labor
solidarity and the worker's right to refrain from concerted activity. That balance was subsequently upset when unions began restricting the right to resign union membership and disciplining
former members for post-resignation strikebreaking. The Supreme Court failed to realign these interests in its post-AllisChalmers decisions; in fact, its Granite State opinion heavily tips the
scale in favor of the individual worker's rights, especially during a
strike. Federal labor policy, however, requires that unions be able
to invoke disciplinary sanctions during strikes. Thus, unions
should be allowed to prohibit resignations ten to fifteen days after
full-fledged contract negotiations begin. Post-resignation discipline
should not be validated unless the union establishes procedures
for its members to challenge the strike decision during the course
of a strike. As a prerequisite for any valid union discipline, unions

See NLRB, A GUIDE TO BASIC LAW AND PROCEDURES UNDER THE NATIONAL LABOR
ACT 2-7 (1976) [hereinafter cited as GUIDE].
GUIDE fails to address the relationship between union membership and discipline. It simply states that a valid union security clause may require workers to "join" a
union. Id. at 2-3. Although it notes that a union commits an unfair labor practice by fining
a worker for post-resignation conduct, id.at 31, the GUIDE does not advise the worker of
his right to resign in spite of a union security agreement that ostensibly compels membership.
169
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must fully inform their members about membership obligations,
particularly that union membership is not required-even under
a union shop clause-if the worker pays regular union dues and
initiation fees. Congress enacted the federal labor statutes to protect the rights of individual workers. The vitality of those rights
rests on both knowledge and solidarity. It is ironic that laws designed to protect them are now being used to exploit them. If
unions are not allowed to prohibit resignations during a strike,
and choose to promote solidarity by punishing members for postresignation activities, they must establish democratic, albeit disruptive, procedures that permit workers to change their minds and
return to work during a strike.

